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ABSTRACT
Rich in Needs: the forgotten radical politics of the welfare rights movement
by
Wilson Sherwin
Advisor: Frances Fox Piven

Situated temporally between the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Liberation
Movement, the Welfare Rights Movement of the 1960s and 70s distinguished itself by its
militant critique of waged labor. Returning to the movement’s archives I examine how the
mostly poor, Black, female participants developed their antiwork politics, how they asserted their
right to live not only meager but occasionally luxurious lives—demanding not only bread but
also roses. In the courts, streets, welfare offices, department stores, policy proposals, and
numerous internal debates, these women waged national battles to assert full autonomy over their
families, consumption, sexuality, and their own time.

As working class people continue to struggle to obtain the basic necessities despite working full
time jobs, we may view welfare activists— the frustrations and challenges they faced, as well as
the alternatives they proposed— as modern day Cassandras, signaling not only the problems of a
society that emphasized work as the solution to all its ills, but also prescient in the alternatives
they imagined.
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Therefore, many females would… prefer… having most of their time for themselves, to
spending many hours of their days doing boring, stultifying, non-creative work for someone else,
functioning as less than animals, as machines, or, at best -- if able to get a ‘good’ job -- comanaging the shitpile.
—Valerie Solanas SCUM Manifesto
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2016 the French Minister of Labor proposed major reforms to labor laws in order to
lower stubbornly high unemployment rates, hoping to achieve full employment. These proposals
were met with a massive outcry. Millions of people—union workers, black blocs, high school
students and retirees—flooded the streets protesting the proposed laws and challenging the
purported value of waged work implied in the reforms. If these undesirable retrenchments were
necessary to guarantee full employment, many asked, was employment worth it? That spring and
summer graffiti appeared on surfaces across the country declaring: “End of work, magical life!”
A sign on a factory gate echoed Rimbaud claiming, “If life is work, I’m on strike.” “Retirement
at age 13!” appeared at a bus stop, and on a university hallway someone dared ask “what’s the
difference between a worker and a slave?” Their answer: “A slave wants to be free.”
On June 14 , 2016 over a million people came from across the country to march through
th

the wide Haussmanian boulevards of Paris in protest of these reforms. At one point in the day,
thousands of people chanted “full employment stops with us!” a slogan which referenced a
famous popular advertising campaign from the 1990s: “AIDS stops with us.” In following
weeks, articles examining the protests from nearly every angle appeared in every newspaper, but
there was—with the exception of one obscure ultra-left blog—absolutely no mention of this
antiwork sentiment coursing through the movement. If I hadn’t been there myself I would have
had no idea any of this took place.
Antiwork politics – defined perhaps best by French communist Roland Simon (2001) as
the aspiration that work no longer be the condition nor the center of people’s lives—aren’t
unique to the 21 century, nor to the (in)famously work-shy French. Nevertheless, the near total
st
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blackout they faced in the French media has, for the most part, carried over to scholarship, where
they make only occasional appearances.
In recent years antiwork politics has become an increasingly popular subject in social
theory and philosophy (Granter 2009; Weeks 2011; Frayne 2015; Hemmens 2019). Many of the
recent texts on the subject assert the normative claim that contemporary labor conditions
necessitate reevaluating and refusing the hegemony of work, but they provide little basis for
understanding how or even if this ever occurs in practice. Many of these studies remain confined
to a highly abstract theoretical level, providing a hermeneutics of Leftist thinkers—Marx,
Fourier, Paul Lafargue, William Morris, Andre Gorz—and their stances vis-à-vis work. Despite
what we should expect from scholars concerned with questions of labor, the working class and
any form of mobilization that might bring about a post-work society is glaringly absent from
their analysis.
Sociology does not fare much better on this topic: labor sociology has long been
concerned with the strike, which functions most commonly as a temporary work refusal
deployed as leverage in order to improve work by making it safer or better remunerated, but
sociologists have almost completely ignored the broader notion of labor refusal. British social
historians and a handful of American scholars have acknowledged that laborers’ inculcation into
the Protestant work ethic has not been a seamless, universal occurrence, but rather, as Herbert
Gutman (1973) argues, the “ghost” of pre-modern work habits— stubborn contempt for the
clock, a penchant for holidays and heavy drinking, “shore gazing,” “prolonged merriment”, and
resistance to the deskilling routinization involved in highly specialized subdivision of labor—
has “haunted” generations of employers. Wherever they looked, Gutman argues, scholars
frequently found among their studies, “men who never adjusted to factory labor” (1973: 547).
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Gutman clarifies this generalization, writing “[t]o describe similarities …is not to blur important
differences but to suggest that otherwise quite distinctive men and women interpreted such work
in similar ways” (550) that is, with aversion.
Although it appears rarely, when it does emerge in scholarship on the working class,
resistance to work appears to be mostly individualized, what anthropologist James Scott has
called “Brechtian” weapons of the weak: shirking, absenteeism, theft, sabotage, etc. In existing
literature one has very little sense of resistance to work as an intentional, collective, or cohesive
project. Even Michael Seidman’s Workers Against Work, which identifies what he calls “guerilla
warfare against work”, waged by disaffected Spanish radicals following the liberation of
Barcelona during the Popular Front, doesn’t examine what we would typically identify as a
social movement per se. In Seidman’s account rebellious, insubordinate workers did not write
manifestos or treatises on their hatred of work, but instead voiced their distaste for work by
recusing themselves all together. Seidman’s close rereading of the period’s archives reveal
startling rates of sabotage, theft of materials, and self-harm, among other tactics of work
avoidance (many of which parallel James Scott’s descriptions) but they never coalesce into
collective, formal confrontations or articulations.
Examining the scholarly record of antiwork politics one could easily believe that when
resistance to work appears, it is primarily the purview of either radical highbrow intellectuals
theorizing amongst themselves with no real connection to praxis, or it is atomized, clandestine,
and made of individualized acts, which become visible only as interpreted through the
imagination of the scholar. Indeed, scholarship on social movements demanding economic
justice (which in the US includes the feminist movement, the Civil Rights movement, the labor
movement, and Occupy Wall Street) all overwhelmingly emphasize access to and improvement
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in employment opportunities (see for example, Weiss, 1997; Freidan, 1963; or Eisenstein’s 2009
critique of this rationale). As Mathew Forstater argues, “after civil rights legislation, perhaps no
other public policy goal was so widely supported among African-American organizations and
leaders in the post–World War II era as full employment” (2007:64). One of the primary
objectives of this dissertation is to challenge the acknowledged range of social movement
responses to waged labor, expanding it to include not just the improvement of work, but also its
overcoming.
This project steps into the lacuna left by existing literature and examines the welfare
rights movement as a case study of a social movement that attempted to theorize and articulate
critiques of and alternatives to waged labor. As such this study operates on two main levels. The
first level is ontological: I assert that resistance to work is indeed an actually existing repertoire
of contention (Tilly 1975) that is developed and articulated collectively by militants in action and
is not just the purview of theorists. Second, I examine the epistemic or methodological questions
raised by the subject’s near total occlusion from the scholarly record and problematize the
evidence they offer for many of the claims in that literature.
I examine how activists attempted to forge an analysis and an alternative to an institution
which is assumed to have no alternative. How is it possible to conceive of something as
inconceivable as “a world without workers”? Examining the case of the welfare rights
movement, alongside existing scholarship on class consciousness, I suggest it is attempted in
sometimes contradictory ways, largely by drawing on lived experience and developments unique
to the political economic context in which participants were operating.
The central chapter of this dissertation (chapter 3) provides an intellectual history of
NWRO’s radicalization and the crystallization of their antiwork politics through a study of their
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written archive. Set against current historiography and contemporaneous anti-poverty programs
like the Freedom Budget, this chapter shows how the NWRO came to articulate an antiwork
position. Methodologically, I argue that this is the formation of an “oppositional consciousness”
around poverty and welfare; and insist that we also learn to see NWRO’s strategic use of
language, contradictions, and changing ideas as part of (not counterposed to) the creation of that
oppositional consciousness.
In tracing the development of NWRO’s antiwork imaginary I uncover numerous
challenges to existing scholarship, which has most commonly argued that welfare recipients
primarily sought benefits in order to retreat to the domestic sphere that had been denied Black
women. In chapter four I argue that in promoting this analysis, existing scholarship on the
welfare rights movement has silenced many of its more radical feminist tendencies and accorded
undue emphasis on recipient activists accordance to hegemonic, patriarchal standards. By
exploring recipient activists’ rejection of waged work, anti-war politics, and their fight for
reproductive justice, I demonstrate how welfare recipients forged sophisticated arguments for the
importance of guaranteed income as a means of facilitating women’s autonomy and civic
engagement, rather than reifying gendered social roles.
Situating the movement in a unique historic conjuncture, I argue that existing scholarship
has overlooked a particularly relevant feature of the long 1960s, which helps explain the
trenchant critique of waged work that emerged in the NWRO: a broader working-class crisis of
the hegemony of waged labor brought about by numerous political-economic developments
including falling profit rates, speed ups, dissatisfaction with unions and more. In chapter two I
examine myriad expressions of this crisis alongside the developing militancy of welfare
recipients to argue that pessimism about waged labor was perhaps more characteristic of the time
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than scholars often acknowledge, and that expanded welfare benefits— as well as the bold
articulations of welfare recipients— fueled and inspired many of the more militant expressions
of this pessimism.
Throughout the text I argue that due to a number of particular historical developments,
especially an unusual expansion of welfare state provisions, members of the NWRO were
unconstrained by the two most severe structural limitations that typically curtail working class
resistance to work: the possibility of exiting the labor market, and an alternative activity in which
to find meaning and legitimacy. Welfare recipients in the late 1960s and early 1970s possessed
both in abundance. Additionally, they drew from the energy of a broad working class, militant
upsurge at their back, helping to foster and encourage their increasingly radical beliefs.
In addition to tracing the emergence of the antiwork politics of the welfare rights
movement, I place these analyses in conversation with a long-established radical approach to
waged work, Marxism, in order to reveal commonalities between the two. I argue that the
welfare rights movement, far from just being the product of post war consumer society, can also
be understood as part of a broader and often overlooked Leftist legacy that prioritizes pleasure
over austerity. By drawing lessons from this example, we may enliven our collective radical
imaginaries and deepen our understanding of the types of mobilization that contribute to forging
working class consciousness.
Marx was profoundly critical of capitalism, and catalogued its many deficiencies in great
detail, but he also managed to identify a number of important consequences of capitalism which
he believed would be beneficial or helpful to humanity in the long run. One of the benefits Marx
identified was that capitalism created human beings who were “rich in needs” (Heller 1976, 437). Far from simply having animal-like needs for shelter and food, capitalism expanded human-
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being’s needs to be “many sided.” Members of the welfare rights movement were particularly
rich in needs, and their bold articulations resulted in many of these needs being satisfied. At least
for a time.

Emergence of the Welfare Rights Movement
The National Welfare Rights Organization began in 1966 as the recognition and
amalgamation of an upsurge in grassroots organizing on the part of welfare recipients, rather
than as a top-down movement. George Wiley, a former Chemistry professor and Civil Rights
Movement activist, initially sought to create an organization (the Poverty Rights Action
Committee or P/RAC) addressing poor people’s concerns and considered focusing on issues of
housing. After Wiley attended a welfare rights conference in 1965 he recognized that there was
already considerable momentum of welfare activists organizing autonomously across the
country, leading him to alter the focus of the organization to welfare (West 1981). Formally
active until 1975, the NWRO was comprised mainly of poor, Black, women, welfare recipients
themselves, a small portion of “friends of welfare rights” (sympathetic middle-class allies),
professional organizers and affiliated lawyers who assisted with various efforts of the
organization. At the height of its influence, the NWRO counted approximately 25,000 members,
who represented over 100,000 recipients (including children and other family members who
received benefits) with approximately 540 affiliated groups in all 50 states (West 1981).
The movement had a major impact on the distribution of benefits across the nation: it
helped increased the number of recipients receiving benefits, obtained “special grants”,
contributing to what Piven and Cloward (1993) described as a “welfare explosion” in which both
the generosity of grants and the number of recipients increased dramatically. Additionally, the
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movement sought to challenge arbitrary and punitive policies regarding welfare provisions.
Through the course of the movement, welfare recipients established the right to a hearing before
benefits could be terminated, challenged coercive policies that could force women to be
sterilized in order to obtain or continue their benefits, won the repeal of “man in the house laws”
and did away with a number of other frustrating barriers to accessing benefits to which they were
entitled.
The movement temporally overlapped the civil rights movement and the rise of the
women’s liberation movement, drawing strength from both movements, and also revealing
trenchant insights into the limitations and constraints of the radical imagination proffered by the
other two movements, especially with regards to wage labor and the futures the other movements
aspired to forge.
The welfare rights movement was certainly not one homogenous entity. To the contrary,
one of its compelling features is the fact that despite its dispersion over the entire US, with vastly
different constituents (lawyers, professional organizers, recipient activists, poor Black women,
elite white men, etc.) there are notable, striking continuities that have all too often been occluded
in the record. It is to those we now turn.
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Chapter 2: The Political Economy of Work’s Crisis of Hegemony
“So wrapped in cant and the worst sort of revisionism, so clouded by the
admitted excesses and confusion of the times, so discredited by the defeats and
reversals that followed the turmoil of 1968, and so silenced by the perils of
nostalgia (in which the new generation of activists are rightly loathe to
participate), that it has become impossibly difficult to reclaim what was, and
indeed what remains, so radical and relevant about the sixties.”
--- Michael Watts “1968 and All That...”
Introduction
Massive mobilizations of the1960s and 70s impacted so many institutions that Rudi
Dutschke, echoing Gramsci, called the period “the long march through the institutions” (Watts
2001). Activists demanded the opening of previously closed sectors of society to women and
people of color, contesting many existing barriers to equality. I argued in the following chapter
that one aspect of the welfare rights movement which distinguishes it from other
contemporaneous movements is that it developed particularly scathing critiques of the
fundamental institution upon which capitalism relies: waged labor. This is not to say that their
challenge was totalizing, nor that it was successful. Rather, the movement was significant and
unique enough in its scope and depth to warrant more than simply a demonstration that it existed
tout court, but also an analysis of why indeed it came about. In this chapter the NWRO will take
a backseat to the context in which it existed.
Piven and Cloward have argued that in order to function normally, society requires a
complex series of systems of cooperation with institutions that are typically perceived as
legitimate (1997:284). Major social mobilizations often come about due to the eroding
legitimacy of these institutions, which encourages participants to risk severe sanctions by
withholding their cooperation. Why at certain moments, and not others, people become so
disaffected that they are willing to flout social and legal norms, withdraw their cooperation and
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face the resulting penalties, is a question social scientists have long sought to answer (Tilly 1975;
Durkheim 1977). This chapter examines a number of transformations to the perception and
experience of waged work in the late 1960s and early 70s in an attempt at understanding why
“the long march through the institutions” included robust challenges to waged work as both the
means of subsistence and respectability.
Rather than simply dismiss the wave of dissatisfaction with work as an idea that was in
the air, I attempt to examine the influences that transformations in political economy had on both
the rise and decline of resistance to waged work. I argue these ideas emerge in response to
palpable transformations in institutions – including, but not limited to transformations to waged
work related to automation, deindustrialization, speed-ups and the concomitant responses of
unions. While those developments impacted how people perceived work and the potential for
improving it, changes outside waged work also impacted the range of solutions envisioned.
These included global uprisings throughout the third world and a declining confidence in and
relevance of Leftist parties (especially the Communist Party), which mediated working class
responses to life in the post-war era.
This chapter makes two main arguments: First, that the welfare rights movement was not
entirely unique in its critique of waged labor, but rather perhaps the most visible, vociferous, and
cohesively embodied expression of a notion that was echoed throughout many upsurges in the
era. Although its position on waged work distinguished NWRO from more mainstream, visible
movements of the time, including the civil rights movement and the mainstream women’s
movement, the welfare rights movement was far from alone in their critiques of waged work. In
the 1960s and 70s, a number of other movements and collectives launched stark critiques of
work, and other related institutions— sometimes even more explicitly challenging the commonly
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held belief that more and better work was the best way to improve working class lives. As such,
this chapter joins the chorus of those attempting to challenge the “tradition of trivialization” to
which the 1960s has been subjected (Watts 2001:163). I argue that despite revisionist insistence
that the concerns of 1960s were primarily cultural, challenging waged work was indeed an
integral component of the alternative world envisioned and sought during the long 1960s.
Secondly, by highlighting currents of antiwork politics present in radical Black politics at
the time, this chapter expands who is typically understood as the purveyors of antiwork politics.
Far from being exclusive to a small number of white radicals in industrialized nations like Italy
and the US—as existing scholarly emphasis on Autonomia and Wages for Housework as the
main examples of antiwork politics in praxis suggests (Weeks 2010; Cuninghame 2005)— this
chapter reveals that challenges to the institution of waged labor also draw from Black, Asian and
Brown liberation movements across the globe, and locally. As Stephen Tuck argues, “Far from
belonging to the post-civil rights era, the decade of the 1970s was the high-water mark of the
Black liberation movement. The overall story of African American protest that emerges during
the decade is not so much one of fragmentation as one of proliferation” (Tuck 2008). This
chapter underscores the critique of waged work present in many of the important political
developments of Black liberation politics of that era.
The late 1960s have been described by many as an opening of possibilities, transgressing
of norms, increasing inclusion into many of society’s institutions. But the period was also,
importantly, the beginning of major foreclosures of possibilities as well. A number of
contemporaneous developments provide insight into why working class frustrations were not
channeled into more typical or expected avenues: demanding more and better work, and turning
to the institutions that have historically helped to ensure this. Institutions that typically (across
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much of the western world) addressed working class frustrations were failing to do so, and
different alternatives were gaining traction. I argue that because of particular political, economic
and social transformations in this era, answers to questions like “who is the working class and
where is its revolution” (Caffentzis 1975) or even ‘who lives at the expense of whom’? were
destabilized, creating openings and opportunities to alternative conceptions of what demands
might be raised and even perhaps achieved.
Those affiliated with the welfare rights movement were aware of these divergent and
intersecting trends to varying degrees—they, and their family members, had long histories of
employment in which they felt the impact of issues like automation or dissatisfaction with their
unions, they were imbedded in communities suffering from the effects of these transformations
and grappling with making sense of them in varying ways (Orleck 2006; Kornbluh 2007). In
some instances, the connections between these political economic and ideological
transformations are more speculative, in others, the direction of influence is inverted: I hope to
render visible the ways that welfare recipients, rather than simply reacting to external
transformations, also helped to inspire a significant reconfiguration of responses to political
economic transformations of the era (Zerowork 1975; Federici 2017).
In either case, responding to or inspiring responses, I argue, like others have before, that
“NWRO’s strategy was a product of its time” (Reese 2005:114). Reese situates NWRO firmly
within an era of deeply gendered family wage: “In 1970, only about 30 percent of married
women with children under six were in the labor force. Like others, the NWRO embraced the
family wage system, demanding poor mothers’ right to stay at home with their children and
“federal funds for immediate creation of at least 3 million jobs for men’ in order’ to permit them
to assume normal roles as breadwinners and heads of families’” (ibid). Of course, the NWRO
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was indeed a product of its time, however, I suggest we identify alternative core elements of that
time from which NWRO drew, and contributed.
While I do not claim that all the aspects of working class resistance I examine below are
instances of antiwork politics, I argue they contribute to or help reveal a “crisis of hegemony”
waged labor underwent in this era. Stuart Hall (and his numerous co-authors) in Policing the
Crisis, describe a crisis of hegemony as marking
a moment of profound rupture in the political and economic life of a society, an accumulation of
contradictions. If in moments of ‘hegemony’ everything works spontaneously so as to sustain and
enforce a particular form of class domination while rendering the basis of that social authority
invisible through the mechanisms of the production of consent, then moments when the
equilibrium of consent is disturbed…are moments when the whole basis of political leadership and
cultural authority becomes exposed and contested (Hall et al 1978:217).

By examining key features influencing waged labor’s crisis of hegemony I demonstrate how
worker’s refusal to accept austerity under the pretext of declining profitability, coupled with
growing fears about automation making workers redundant, and changing attitudes toward wage
labor among the employed, resulted in a new horizon for demands, in which income was
demanded not based on labor but upon inherent rights to a guaranteed income. This, and not the
‘cultural’ contestation of ‘American values,’ nor the desired return to a family wage, was the
context in which the welfare rights movement emerged.

Work: less of it and deteriorating conditions?
The idea that income and financial security should be decoupled from the dictates of the
market was not completely unique to welfare recipients of the 1960s. Even within the employed
portion of the working class, currents of this logic appeared as evidence of workers strength. In
1955 for example, in one of the largest wildcat strikes in a decade known for rampant wildcat
strikes, nearly half a million steel workers walked off their jobs in an unauthorized strike
protesting losing negotiations over a proposal which would have guaranteed them minimum
13

annual income regardless of hours or demand (Brenner 2010: 50). This measure would have had
limited reach, but it is nevertheless an example of a very different relationship to employment
and security brewing in the American working class. In other words, even within the employed
portion of the working class, notions about the possibility of decoupling income and work were
becoming visible.
Simultaneously, technological changes—beginning in the 1940s and 50s— pushed
hundreds of thousands off the fields and into the cities looking for work (Piven and Cloward
1993) just as massive shifts in industrial labor were taking place, making previously good jobs
scarcer, less secure and less well remunerated, while a simultaneous hope in a future of
abundance encouraged optimistic solutions (Sugrue 2005; Stein 2011).
This threat of automation loomed especially large in the 1960s, informing not just the
welfare rights movement’s analysis, but many others thinking through the problems of work, and
delineating potential solutions.1 Scholars, journalists, civil rights activists and politicians alike
feared that “cybernation” (automation) was developing at an increasing rate and would
eventually result in an economy in which “potentially unlimited output can be achieved by
systems of machines which will require little cooperation from human beings” (The Triple
Revolution Report 1964 cited in Ford, 2016). Many feared this would quickly lead to
unemployment, inequality and declining consumer demand.
Amid these fears Robert Theobald’s 1966 Guaranteed Income: Next Step in Economic
Evolution became a cornerstone text of the era. It brought notions of the “immanent reality of

1

Acknowledging the significance of automation in this era is by no means to take a position on debates over the
empirical validity of claims: whether fears of automation were accurate and justifiable or not, is for our purposes,
beside the point. Rather, understanding the importance this fear had in shaping responses to critiques of work
situates the welfare rights movement within broader working class concerns of the time.
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abundance”, technological unemployment and guaranteed income to a large audience. The
edited volume included a number of authors from varying fields and political persuasions, most
of whom argued for the either moral or economic necessity of a guaranteed income, precipitated
largely by an impending specter of technological change and automation. They argued that
despite the cyclical nature of concerns about automation, this era was qualitatively different than
previous: “Today’s changes,” emphasized Robert H. Davis, “are so different in scope and kind as
to constitute a new order of phenomena that dwarfs in social significance all past change” (Davis
in Theobald 1965:29). Although most generations perceive their concerns and preoccupations to
be of a unique importance, the sense of urgency and crisis with which the threat of technological
change was met in this era is particularly notable.
Researchers concerned with this topic argued early on that a key consequence of
automation was not just disappearing jobs, but that there appeared a bifurcation in the quality of
the remaining jobs. Scholars feared automation would result in hollowing out middle level jobs
leaving, on one end of the spectrum some jobs that were too onerous, inexpensive or unimportant
to automate and a few high skilled, well paid ones on the other end of the spectrum. Theobald
argued, “the notion that automation would necessarily upgrade the work force was thoroughly
smashed by James Bright. In his investigations he found no upgrading; since the object of
automating was to replace human, lower skills appeared sufficient for the jobs that remained.”
(Theobald 1965:77).
Many contributors to Guaranteed Income raised fears about the potential material
consequences of automation for the workforce but were optimistic about the transformative
impact it might have on ideology. One major outcome they predicted was that automation might
result in a declining faith in the “invisible hand” of the market to determine needs of production
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and distribution. Theobald averred, “[t]he ever-growing threat of unemployment resulting from
advanced technology, the growing abundance made possible by this technology, and the manifest
inapplicability of the only existing accepted theory of income distribution have made it
inevitable that a wide range of new ideas on the subject of income distribution and organization
of human activity would be advanced” (Theobald 1965:19). The technical transformations of the
1960s showed, Theobald argued, not only the possibility of alternative socioeconomic
arrangements but their necessity. One such alternative which gained significant headway in this
moment was a guaranteed income.
Welfare rights organizers were certainly aware of discussions about automation and
guaranteed income. In addition to the issue being popular in the news, Wiley attended a
conference on the subject with Theobald.2 Additionally, Piven and Cloward’s work on the
subject, especially their infamous 1966 Nation article “Weight of the Poor” underpinned the
NWRO’s strategy of arguing for a guaranteed income in lieu of other approaches to remedying
poverty. Piven and Cloward asserted a pessimistic justification for guaranteed income,
many of the contemporary poor will not rise from poverty by organizing to bargain collectively.
They either are not in the labor force or are in such marginal and dispersed occupations (e.g.
domestic servants) that it is extremely difficult to organize them. Compared with other groups,
then, many of today's poor cannot secure a distribution of income by organizing within the
institution of private enterprise. A federal program of income redistribution has become necessary
to elevate the poor en masse from poverty.

In the summer of 1966 a special issue of American Child Magazine focused on debates
around Guaranteed Income and featured among others Piven, Cloward, Theobald and Wiley. The
magazine’s opening editorial noted, whether Piven and Cloward’s strategy would indeed “lead to
a guaranteed income we may soon see. At the least, the strategy should force attention to the
antidote for poverty most neglected in the campaign to cure it: money.” This notion resonated

2

Letter dated December 15 1966. NWRO Papers, Box 2076, Folder “GAI Clippings.”
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powerfully as a much-needed intervention into a stagnant pool of solutions. More common
solutions to reducing poverty had long focused on
participation (poverty as the lack of power and dignity); services (poverty as the incapacity to
consume); social welfare (poverty as the lack of access to amenities and training opportunities);
employment (poverty as the incapacity to maintain an income stream for lack of available jobs).
Most conspicuously absent from this impressive list of intervention strategies is the assumption
that poverty is a lack of income and what the poor need is more money which can be made
available through present or new income-transfer systems. (Editor’s Introduction American Child
1966:2)

Money, as the primary and perhaps sole solution to poverty, was a notion a number of
scholars and activists were beginning to consider, but the NWRO brought this assertion
to life like no other.
However, even within proponents of guaranteed income there existed intense internal
debate over questions such as the speed with which technological unemployment would begin to
pose problems for the American working class, or the form that new economic arrangements
should take: they debated between guaranteed income decoupled from work or guaranteed
income as full employment programs. Theobald, for example, believed firmly that guaranteed
income necessitated and implied moving away from employment as the central and desired
means through which working class survival was ensured.
At the present time we are committed…to the idea that we can and should provide jobs for all.
This is no longer valid, and we should therefore provide everybody with an absolute right to a
guaranteed income. This will, of course, mean that there will be far more unemployment in the
future than there is today. We will, however, come to perceive unemployment as favorable.3

Theobald found it problematic that “the dominant opinion is that the fruits of future
abundance, flowing from technological advance, must come primarily from extension
rather than a cutback of paid employment” (ibid), and sought to abandon this logic. Leon
H. Keyserling, an economist and one of the co-authors of the Freedom Budget, objected
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to this. He argued instead, “When I join in the view that all of our people should be
guaranteed a ‘modest but adequate’ income and standard of living,” he wrote in a critical
review of The Guaranteed Income, “I envisage this as stemming primarily from a full
employment policy coupled with adequate compensation, and secondarily from
guaranteed incomes for those not qualified for gainful employment.”4
Religious groups, some of the longstanding supporters of NWRO (West 1981)
were influenced by this intellectual current of the time and devised their own analyses of
poverty and guaranteed income. A 1967 “Presentation to Committee on the Church and
Economic Life” compiled findings from a number of reports on the question, arguing that
“A society, in which abundance replaces scarcity and social structures are increasingly
complex, demands re-appraisal of traditional forms and relationships.” Importantly, the
report underscored the need to decouple income from typical notions of deservingness
tied to work which have often predominated religious notions of relief. The report
summarized, “our burgeoning productivity makes possible, and our Judeo Christian ethic
of justice makes mandatory, the development of economic policies and structures under
which all people, regardless of employment status, are assured an adequate livelihood.”5
In a similar discourse used by the NWRO, (examined in Chapter Three), the
statement to the Committee on the Church and Economic Life argued that typical efforts
to relieve poverty by economic growth and job creation were insufficient, thus
necessitating a new approach. “Historically,” the authors argued, “the major attempts to
solve the problem of poverty have been channeled through 1) policies to promote
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economic growth and increase employment opportunity, 2) measures to increase
individual employability and productive capacity” (ibid 5-6). While the report concluded
these programs should be continued, they also concede “[t]hus far, these efforts have not
eliminated poverty nor solved the problem of distributive justice.” While they leave the
exact form open, they strongly advocate the pursuit of guaranteed income programs
“available to all as a matter of right”, and that are “developed in a manner which will
increase the freedom of persons to choose their own careers and to make their own
maximum contribution to the meeting of personal and community needs” (ibid 7).
Numerous studies that examine the groundswell of guaranteed income proposals
in this era describe proponents as agnostic or favorable towards the question of
employment, or as discouraging work force participation for women out of an atavistic
adherence to the family wage (Reese 2005; Nadasen 2008; Chappell 2010; Cooper 2017
and others). But here, as elsewhere, it is clear that this is not the primary objective for
many of the most militant advocates of a guaranteed income. Rather, as I examine in
Chapters Three and Four, the underlying propulsion for these programs was 1.The failure
of employment to address the problem of poverty; and 2. An emphasis on pursuing the
“increased freedom… to meeting personal and community needs”, not retreating to the
domestic sphere. The Committee on the Church and Economic Life text demonstrates the
profundity and forward thinking of groups (not solely the NWRO) concerned with this
topic, which scholars have often overlooked or mischaracterized. It is especially
important to note here that despite the typically conservative perspective religious
organizations take towards gendered norms, the entire proposed policy statement makes
no mention of family wage, or gendered divisions of care and waged labor. Rather, the
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report relies on a similar logic deployed by the NWRO, broadening the conversation to
gender neutral aspirations for “personal and community needs” that income decoupled
from employment might make feasible.

Speed ups and safety issues
Many feared that work wasn’t just undergoing a quantitative change but a qualitative one
as well. Jobs seemed to be disappearing, but that those left were transforming, becoming more
and more undesirable, and workers responded accordingly. Declining profitability in
manufacturing was a major factor influencing the working class’s relationship to work in the era.
According to Robert Brenner, the rate of profit in manufacturing fell by 40.9 percent between
1965 and 1973 (2006:101). Many employers responded to declining profitability by instituting
speed ups—pushing workers to produce more in less time. One of the many concrete ways these
speed ups impacted workers was by rendering their jobs not only significantly more unpleasant,
but dangerous. Workplace accidents increased precipitously in this era, in some industries as
much as 20 percent (Fairris 1998). A 1973 report found that in the auto industry alone that year
there were over 16,000 on the job deaths (half from heart attacks), “making it clear that more
auto workers were killed and injured each year on the job than soldiers were killed and injured
during any year of the war in Vietnam” (Georgakas and Surkin [1975] 2012:88).
The processes through which these speed ups occurred (or, at the very least, were
perceived) were so deeply racialized, distributing the worst impacts to Black workers, that some
Black workers (particularly those affiliated with League of Revolutionary Black Workers)
regularly referred to them as “niggermation.” A glaring example of the effects of frustrating
transformations to work encapsulated in this neologism is visible in the 1971 case of James
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Johnson. Johnson worked for a number of years as an autoworker at Chrysler’s Eldon plant
when he was laid off. After his firing Johnson returned to the plant where he shot and killed two
foreman and a job setter. What is particularly notable about this case however, is the public
sympathy Johnson generated. This was largely due to Johnson’s lawyers’ strategy which they
described as putting “Chrysler on trial for damages to this man caused by his working
conditions"(Harris, 1997). And indeed, the Detroit jury found the company’s safety violations so
egregious that they declared Johnson not responsible for his action, and furthermore, in a later
trial Johnson was awarded workers compensation beginning the day of his “breakdown”
(Georgakas and Surkin, 2012:86). Leaflets were passed around the Eldon plant declaring "Hail
James Johnson" (Harris, 1997). Johnson was not such a uniquely sympathetic individual as to
encourage a jury to forgive such a violent act, but rather, his lawyers were able to tap into the
widespread perception at the time that work was so onerous, and workers so put upon by it, that
acts of explosive resistance were not only occasionally perceived as understandable, but justified.
Johnson’s case is just one example of the intense frustrations workers felt as they
encountered the effects of business’s struggle to retain profit high rates. Perceptions (and realities
of) speed ups, declining safety, increased alienation and frustrations with unions responses to
these transformations, all contributed to a mounting crisis of hegemony of waged work I will
continue to unpack below.

Rank and File Rebellion / Blue Collar Blues
In 1968 the Kerner Report concluded that unemployment and joblessness was a major
factor contributing to dramatic urban uprisings that swept through much of the country in the late
1960s (The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disturbances, 1968). However, by the early
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‘70s it was evident that the mere possession of a job was no guarantee of social quiescence. Loss
of control of the industrialized workforce came later than the rebellions of the unemployed, but
when it arrived, it did so with an impressive force. No longer were critiques of waged labor
levied exclusively from those shut out of formal employment, but they became visible even
among those within the putatively best employment sectors the so-called golden age had to offer
to the working class. The Lordstown uprising of 1972 provided an important expression of this
changing perception of work. According to a New York Times journalist, “Lordstown was the
most explosive story in American industry, the symbol of a new kind of worker - young,
militant, balking at authority, unwilling to put up with repetitive, tedious work” (Serrin, 1982).
Speed-ups played an enormous roll in kicking off the Lordstown strike. “Rather than
assembling 55 vehicles per hour as was typical of most plants at the time, Lordstown workers
were expected to turn out 100 per hour as promised by the plant's modern technologies. After the
GMAD workforce reductions, this equated to each worker having only 36 seconds to complete
work, rather than the standard 60” (Orchard 2013). Widespread rank and file resistance to this
increased productivity, and frustration with union acquiescence, provided key motivation for the
strike.
During the Lordstown strike, local residents argued there was something qualitatively
different about this generation of workers. “I can’t get over some of these guys,” one local noted
derisively. “When they went out on strike, I don’t think most of them cared if they ever went
back to work.” The treasurer of UAW Local 1112 attempted to articulate the distinction between
these insubordinate workers and previous generations of workers, as well as speculate on some
of the causes for this difference:
it’s a different generation of working men. None of these guys came over from the old country
poor and starving, grateful for any job they could get. None of them have been through a
depression. They’ve been exposed—at least through television—to all the youth movements of
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the last ten years and they don’t see the disgrace of being unemployed. They’re just not going to
swallow the same kind of treatment their fathers did… They want more than just a job for 30
years” (Quoted in Norman 1972: 96).

One major factor contributing of a growing disillusionment with work, its norms and regulations,
was rank and file frustration with unions. Major indications of worker dissatisfaction with not
only their jobs but their unions as well, was an upsurge in wildcat strikes and an “epidemic”
number of rejected contracts, which frustrated union leaders to no end and prompted desperate
attempts at solutions,
The epidemic proportion of rank and file contract rejections, dramatized best by the April
Teamsters’ revolt against their union leadership, had prompted a panel consisting of the
construction industry, the top building trades unionists, and Secretary of Labor George Shultz
(before his promotion to the white house staff) to propose that the right to vote on contracts be
taken away from the rank and file in the construction industry (Katsiaficas 101:1987).

The late 1960s early 1970s witnessed a massive increase in wildcat strikes, accounting
for more than a third of all strikes in the U.S. during that period. In nearly a decade, over 5,700
strikes (half of which were wildcat) took place, involving more than 3 million workers (Winslow
in Brenner 2010:3). 1970 alone featured major illegal strikes by postal workers, Teamsters, and
mine workers.
Scholars have argued that an upsurge in rank and file worker militancy was largely
spurred by both the deteriorating quality of jobs and the lackadaisical response mounted by many
unions, so that workers felt forced to take matters into their own hands (Georgakas and Surkin,
2012; Brenner 2010). Instead of protecting workers from some of the more egregious onslaughts
of the employer offensive, through which owners attempted to recoup profit rates, unions often
either turned a blind eye or facilitated transformations that worsened working conditions for
many. As one observer of this pattern within the United Mine Workers union noted: “The union
that once protected the men from the bosses has become the union that protects the bosses from
the men” (Quoted in Brecher 1977:276). Additionally, some viewed these wildcat strikes as not
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simply frustrations with the way unions functioned, but a much broader critique of the
employment relation writ large. Cal Winslow, for example, argued, “Wildcat strikers were the
shock troops of the ‘rebellions from below’…These strikes were often repudiations of the union
leadership, and implicitly, of the entire post war system of industrial relations” (Winslow in
Brenner et al 2010).
Many radicals asserted that rank and file militancy was a symbol of broader rejection of
waged work: Paolo Carpignano viewed shifting working class relationship to work as “a
continuous refusal of the capitalist organization of work” (Carpignano 1975:19). Lordstown
loomed particularly large in this analysis, confirming for many that something qualitative had
shifted in the way the working class approached work and its regulating institutions: “Lordstown
is the latest example, perhaps the most striking, of a trend that has characterized the entire cycle.
Refusal to work is the present connotation of working class self activity” (Carpignano 1975:21).
In Carpignano understanding, what was visible at the core of extensive working class
mobilization in this era was not attempts to improve or reform negative aspects of waged work, it
was its refusal.
For scholars like Brecher and Carpignano this attitude to and frustration with work was
representative of a tangible shift from a New Deal logic to something altogether different.
Despite acknowledging that changes in workers attitudes were “subtle, hard to pin down, and
harder to measure” Brecher argued there was a general trend which,
undermine[d] some of the fundamental constraints that in the past contained mass strikes within
the limits of the existing social structure. Workers in the 1930s, for example, even when they
engaged in such direct action as the sitdown strikes, saw the solution to their problems in building
up the power of the union and government officials, welfare bureaucracies, and the like, who
would win for them more favorable conditions. Increasingly, people today experience the
institutions that have been set up to “help” them—the unions, the schools, the welfare agencies,
and the like—as alien and even hostile forces. They no longer look to such agencies to solve their
problems, for the past failures of these agencies have become a dominant fact of everyday
experience (1977:284-5).
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Here Brecher avoids Carpignano’s conclusion that massive work refusal defined the time,
but nevertheless, Brecher notes a fundamental shift towards intense pessimism around
social democratic means for improving the working class, which were once viewed with
such hope.
Intellectuals and politicians alike attempted to make sense of these shifting perceptions,
particularly vis a vis waged work. An enormous body of literature on the subject of “blue collar
blues” emerged in the 1970s. In 1972 the popular radio journalist Studs Terkel published
Working, a nearly 600 page tome on labor in America, which opened with a provocative
reflection on the institution:
This book, being about work, is, by its very nature, about violence — to the spirit as well as to the
body. It is about ulcers as well as accidents, about shouting matches as well as fistfights, about
nervous breakdowns as well as kicking the dog around. It is, above all (or beneath all), about daily
humiliations. To survive the day is triumph enough for the walking wounded among the great
many of us.

Unlike accounts that tended more often to exalt heroic efforts than point out frustrations of the
working class, Terkel listened to hundreds of hours of Americans talking about how they
perceived work in the late 1960s and 70s and could only conclude it was violent and humiliating.
The same year Turkel published Working, Congress called a hearing on “worker
alienation” concluding:
alienation of American workers because of the nature of their jobs is a problem of growing
seriousness to the national economy and to individual workers; (2) alienation often results in high
rates of absenteeism, high turnover, poor quality work, a decline in craftsmanship, and lessened
productivity; (3) alienation often results in high, levels of frustration among workers with the
following consequences: poor mental health, poor motivation, alcoholism, drug abuse, and social
dissatisfaction among workers (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1973).

Worker rebellion was so intense that GM included the following clause in their contract in 1971:
"We insisted that an organized effort be made to improve employee job attitudes and reduce
absenteeism, which in our industry has doubled in the past nine years"(Quoted in Zerowork
1975:69).
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Many at the time concluded that worker discontent was so broad and substantive that it
necessitated examining the entire system of production and distribution which placed waged
work at the center of society, and asking,
whether true remedies lie anywhere within the present work structure—a nettlesome but persistent
question that occurred in a political framework in earlier decades and returns now in a broader
social context. We are only now admitting the sense of such a notion, worker militancy having
lent it sudden relevance, and just beginning to puzzle through the information that may yet lead to
new proposals for radically altering the force and purpose of work in our lives (Zimpel 1974:14).

Simply identifying the transformations undergoing the institution of waged work at this time,
encapsulated by automation, speed ups, and declining confidence in union efficacy, is
insufficient to explaining both why these transformations were so palpable to so many and why
much of the working class’s response to the “daily humiliations” (identified by Turkel as
constitutive of work), was not to double down on demands and tactics that, as Brecher argues,
had defined working class resistance in previous generations, but to seek out new proposals.
Why was their strategy not to insist on the continued or more robust fulfillment of the promises
of the New Deal—more inclusive this time around of women and people of color— but rather, in
some cases, the abandonment of its logic altogether?
Alternative explanations exist for why working class militancy developed as it did. Cal
Winslow describes it as originating in the sense of optimism, “confidence and combativeness”
(Brenner et al 2010:3) fueled by post-war prosperity, while other interpretations place more
importance on the sense of exclusion from this prosperity in fueling rebellions from below. The
authors of Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, for example, argued that it was those who had been shut
out of the greatest benefits of the post war compromise who made up the vanguard of the new
offense from below (Georgakas and Surkin 2012). But changes within the workplace were not
the only place this profound shift was being felt.
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Inspirations from beyond the workplace
Transformations occurring outside the workplace, and outside the boundaries of the U.S.
also helped contribute to how the working class, especially the beleaguered Black working class,
made sense of its position, and possible avenues for resistance. Göran Therborn observed in 1968
that “the dialectic of the war has transferred the ideology of the guerillas into the culture of the
metropolis” (1968: 4, Quoted in Watts 2001:170). In particular, the strength of peasant uprisings
and critiques of the colonial “working class” created openings for emphasizing alternative
strategies and priorities that decentered the traditional working class as the vehicle to liberation.
“Cuba, China, Vietnam and the postcolonial African states,” argues Watts,
…was formative for not only the sixties New Left but also for those of the October tradition and,
as Eric Hobsbawm (1994: 437) again reminds us, to the entire radical community who needed
something more than social security and rising real wages as the pillars of the New Jerusalem. So
often it was to the peripheral other – Ho, Mao, Fidel – that the 1968ers turned for their reference
points, their heroes and their hopes. Third worldism corroborated not only a sense of revolutionary
internationalism, but also confirmed that there were models of revolution and liberation outside,
and beyond, both the Communist and Social Democratic traditions (Watts, 2001:170).

I will argue later that radicals recognized and appreciated the welfare movement for similar
reasons that Watts identifies in the inspiration of the third world: it provided a model outside and
beyond social democratic traditions.
In the United States, the Black Panther Party (BPP) presented one of the strongest
articulations of this shifting perspective in “heroes” and “hopes”, providing alternative
ideological frameworks for thinking through resistance. BPP drew inspiration from Franz
Fanon’s analysis—popularized in The Wretched of the Earth—and expanded upon his attempt to
decenter the traditional working class and reexamine the lumpen or sub-proletariat as a class with
enormous potential for social change. Eldridge Cleaver’s On Lumpen Ideology (1972)
demonstrates the Panthers’ application of Fanon’s position to the American context. In it,
Cleaver refutes traditional elements of Marxist analysis by placing the lumpenproletariat at the
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center of his understanding of class struggle. Cleaver’s argument stresses two points: the failure
of the classical Marxian analysis to account for the political potential of those excluded from
wage labor and, similar to Fanon, the often politically regressive tendencies of the traditional
working class.
Cleaver was contending with a particular conjuncture in which the forms of actually
existing socialism or communism offered few attractive options and capitalism continued to
demonstrate an impressive capacity for mitigating and reforming labor’s more radical demands.
Responding to the failure of Marxism to address the situation of those racially excluded from
production and wage labor, Cleaver writes, “And who are we? Who is this ‘us’, still oppressed
and longing to be free? Who are we that neither capitalism, socialism nor third worldism
provides for? … we thought that Socialism was our future and represented what we were
fighting for, and if we are not proletarians, what are we, what’s left?” (3-4). To Cleaver and the
Panthers, the division between the Black working class and the unemployed was fluid and not
sufficiently fixed to merit a division of the sort that much of the orthodox Left clung to, deriding
those outside wage labor as Marx and Engels did in the Communist Manifesto: “The ‘dangerous
class’, the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old
society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its
conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary
intrigue.” (Marx and Engels 2012). Instead, the Panthers reclaimed the category of
lumpenproletariat. In so doing, Cleaver argues for understanding the lumpenproletariat as the
revolutionary vanguard of the Black community. In “On the Ideology of the Black Panther
Party” Cleaver writes,
The Lumpenproletariat are all those who have no secure relationship or vested interest in the
means of production and the institutions of a capitalist society. That part of the "Industrial Reserve
army" held perpetually in reserve, who have never worked and never will, who can't find a job;
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who are unskilled and unfit; who have been displaced by machines, automation, and cybernation,
and were never retrained or invested with new skills; all those on Welfare or receiving State
Aid…Those who don't even want to work and can't relate to punching some pig's time clock, who
would rather punch a pig in the mouth and rob him than punch that pig's time clock and work for
him, those whom Huey P. Newton calls "the illegitimate capitalists." In short, all those who
simply have been locked out of the economy and robbed of their rightful social heritage (Cleaver
2015:177).

Cleaver’s analysis challenges the traditional Marxist identification of the working class as the
primary agent of social struggle, condemning in particular unions and communist parties.
Cleaver develops his understanding of the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat as part
of a critique of the cooperation and compromise that defined relations between labor and capital
during the “golden age” of post war capitalism. Cleaver identifies the class consciousness of the
lumpenproletariat as “more advanced than the job-seeking, fringe-benefit consciousness of the
AFL /CIO/ Communist Party /Working Class accommodationist movement” (1972:10). and
argues that the classical Marxian emphasis on organizing the proletariat has had “disastrous
effects on the revolutionary movement”6 because instead of fulfilling Marxist predictions, the
traditional proletariat class “has become as much a part of the system that has to be destroyed as
the capitalists themselves. They are the second line of resistance, after the cops” (ibid).
Although sometimes offered in a particularly incendiary manner (in an especially
memorable passage Cleaver calls working class proletarians, “the house niggers of capitalism”)
Cleaver reveals important, and popular criticisms of major institutions which were supposed to
improve the lives of working class people: unions, traditional radical parties like the Communist
Party, and even working class people writ large. In dispensing with these categories or
institutions as holding the key to working class improvement, he argues that instead of seeking
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Worsley also makes this point particularly convincingly, emphasizing that treating the lumpenproletariat as if it is
apolitical, or worse, the “worst of all possible allies” is a clear way of abandoning them to more reactionary causes.
Worsley writes, “Ruling classes should be very grateful that modern revolutionary leaders have more often taken
their ideas on the lumpenproletariat from Marx rather than Mao, for treating people like apolitical pariahs will help
to ensure that they remain so.”
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access to the point of production, demands should emphasize decoupling waged work from
income: “The basic demand of the Lumpen, to be cut in on Consumption in spite of being
blocked out of Production is the ultimate revolutionary demand.” (ibid) In this statement,
Cleaver expresses a too often overlooked sentiment of his time, and one which the welfare rights
movement echoed.
In the Manifesto for the Black Revolutionary Party, originally published in 1969, former
Detroit autoworker James Boggs joined the chorus of voices, including Theobald et al, predicting
(or perhaps hoping) “the antihuman work relations that have governed this country since the rise
of capitalism and racism have now been made obsolete by the revolution in technology” (Boggs
2011:218). Like others, Boggs argued a shift had taken place from previous generations who
“were primarily concerned about the opportunity to work at any kind of job. Today the most
rebellious layer of blacks is not concerned chiefly with jobs” (2011: 219). Boggs was optimistic
that a massive struggle towards achieving a society based on the fulfilment of people’s needs
was already well under way and could not be contained without “naked counter revolution”
(ibid). In Boggs’ analysis a major locus and propeller of this struggle was the welfare rights
movement. Boggs was particularly inspired by the “the mounting struggles for community
control of schools, of health and welfare institutions, of housing and police” (Boggs 2011:206)
all projects in which welfare activists were deeply engaged.
At the heart of these contemporaneous struggles—enabling, fueling, inspiring this new
and qualitatively different working class struggle— many writing at the time, situated the issue
of welfare. “The Welfare movement was not just an aspect of capitalist initiative”, Carpignano
asserted, “but primarily a mode of expression of a new cycle of working class struggle. It was
the basis for the amplification and circulation of social struggle, for the homogenization of
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demands, and ultimately, for the process of recomposition of the working class” (Carpignano
1975:13). In other words, working class recomposition implies that who counts as the working
class, what groups might form fruitful alliances, and what their objectives are, changes over
space and time (Weeks 2010:95) and at the center of this transformation was the issue of welfare
and work refusal.
One of the major pitfalls of existing scholarship on the welfare rights movement is that it
has thus far failed to account for the enormous influence the movement had on many of the most
significant radical projects of its time (and beyond). Partially, I argue, this is due to the way the
movement is framed by existing scholarship as offering a limited critique of waged work, in
favor of domestic retreat, rather than being situated at the center of a number of massive
challenges to waged work and related institutions at the time.
Although it was not published until after the crest of both welfare activism and the “rank
and file rebellion” which characterized much of the late 1960s and early 1970s, in 1975 a
publication appeared that—like Boggs and Cleaver—situated work refusal at the core of the
heady politics of the era. Zerowork, argued in its introduction,
the political strategy of the working class in the last cycle of strugglers upset the Keynesian plan
for development. It is in this cycle that the struggle for income through work changes to a struggle
for income independent of work. The working class strategy for full employment that had
provoked the Keynesian solution of the Thirties became in the last cycle of struggle a general
strategy of the refusal of work. The strategy that pits income against work is the main
characteristic of struggle in all the articulations of the social factory. The transformation marks a
new level of working class power and must be the starting point of any revolutionary organization.
The strategy and refusal of work overturns previous conceptions of where the power of the
working class lies and junks all the organizational formulae appropriate to the previous phases of
the class relation (Zerowork vol 1:2).

The authors of Zerowork identified a qualitative shift in working class demands, from full
employment to income decoupled from labor. In addition, they argued this necessitated locating
the site of struggle elsewhere than just the factory. One movement, which devoted itself
especially to the demand to be “cut in on Consumption in spite of being blocked out of
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Production”, and initiated new strategies of waging these battles, was of course the welfare rights
movement.7 Many revolutionaries at the time recognized the influence welfare militancy was
having in shifting working class aspiration away from New Deal emphasis on full employment,
instead towards envisioning a life where waged work was decentered. Likewise, there is
substantive evidence that participants in the welfare rights movement understood themselves as
part of a reserve army of labor. In particular, many understood their position within the economy
and their relationship to the broader working class in a similar vein as Marx understood the
“reserve army of labor”: as a population redundant to capitals’ productive needs, which is
nevertheless generative as it serves to weigh down both wages and the aspirations of the
employed segments of the working class. Recall for example the Ms. Magazine article in which
Tillmon asked ‘why would someone work an unpleasant job with terrible pay?’ The answer she
provided was “because they know there is somewhere worse they could be: they could be on
welfare” (Tillmon 1972). But a shift took place, which radicals and business leaders alike
noticed, by the mid 1960s welfare had transformed from a response intended to stifle civic
disorder (Piven and Cloward 1993) to one that encouraged and inspired it.
It wasn’t only radicals who took note of the influence welfare provisions were having on
working class sentiments and behavior. Charles Murray noted the late 1960s were a “watershed”
moment “showing strange and unanticipated shifts” (Murray in Pierson and Castles eds
2000:102). Murray was aghast at the significant reduction in labor force participation he found,
especially among poor Black men who he claimed in 1968 were 3.4 percent less likely to work
than white men. By 1972, he argued, the gap was 5.9 percent. “Whether unemployment was high
or low, until 1967 black males behaved the same as whites; after 1967 they did not.” Murray
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clarified that the explanation for this racial gap was the disproportionate poverty of Black men:
this was a class phenomenon being fueled, he argued, by generous welfare state provisions.
“Without a doubt” Murray stated, “something happened in the mid 1960s that changed the
incentives for low-income workers to stay in the job market. The Great Society reforms
constitute the biggest, most visible, most plausible candidate” (Murray in Pierson and Castles eds
2000:102-103).
Business leaders were similarly flummoxed by this “strange and unanticipated” working
class obduracy. Attempting to make sense of why rising unemployment levels weren’t having the
anticipated (and desired) deflationary effect on wages, business leaders concluded that social
provisions were buffering workers from the threat of unemployment. They argued, “’the
unemployed of today are subject to less economic pain’ owing to ‘more generous income
maintenance programs.’ As a result, Bosworth concluded that the unemployed ‘posed no threat
to the employed’ And Fabricant recommended letting unemployment rise to “intolerable levels”
in order to bring wages down” (quoted in Piven and Cloward 1993:358). Much to their
frustration, business leaders felt they were being “engulfed by a rising tide of entitlement” (Silk
and Vogel quoted in Piven and Cloward 1993:359). These business interests argued, “the
recession should be used to drive home the point that ‘people need to recognize that a job is the
most important thing they can have’” (Domhoff quoted in Piven and Cloward 1993:359). “In
effect,” Piven and Cloward concluded, “the social programs had altered the terms of struggle
between capital and labor” (1993:359). If there was one thing that capitalists and radicals alike
seemed to agree on in this era, it was this.
Many scholars have noted that the rapid and expansive imposition of work requirements
for welfare recipients which commenced in the late 1960s was a clear response to business class
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frustrations over the power shifts generous provisions fostered, and not just for those who were
direct beneficiaries, but the broader working class.
Support for federal work requirements was also growing among businesses, increasingly
reliant on female labor and concerned about rising welfare expenditures. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) urged Congress to enact
work requirements for AFDC. The Council for State Chambers of Commerce also supported
them, claiming, ‘We believe this proposal is a refreshing change. We see it as a negation of the
attempt to establish an absolute or constitutional right to welfare payments or to a guaranteed
income’ (Reese 2005:118).

Piven and Cloward concluded decades later that, “There was no evidence, in short, that
business required the labor of AFDC mothers. What business did require was the more tractable
labor force that results from intensified competition for jobs” (1993:389).
If Domhoff hoped people would “recognize that a job is the most important thing they
can have,” the recession of 1974-‘75 had precisely this desired effect. Cowie, for example,
argues the recession had an immediate impact, quelling unrest:
the insurgencies of the first half of the 1970s dissipated with remarkable speed with the midseventies recession. The unrest of the early decade was based on the most successful economy in
American history—simply put, in terms of class power, most workers never had it so good. Once
the rug of economic success was pulled out from underneath workers during the bitter recession
that began with the first oil shock in 1973, they lost their footing in their fights for solutions to
their discontents (Cowie 2012:72).

The crisis of 1974-75 was the most severe recession the nation had experienced since the 1930s
and its impact had severe repercussions not only for people’s material lives, but also deeply
trammeled what they perceived to be possible and desirable outcomes of mobilization. In 1973
autoworker (and former student activist) Jack Weinberg recounted, “A month ago, under the
impact of inflation, it was hard to get by on a forty hour paycheck. Already today, lay-offs make
the forty hour paycheck look real sweet… With survival on the mind, it’s sometimes hard to
respond to questions of speed-up, health and safety, working conditions” (Winslow in Brenner et
al 2010:21). With the onset of the recession much of the sense of militant possibility for
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reimagining an abundant life without work seemed to evaporate into thin air. This was also the
exact moment the NWRO’s expansive, visionary project came crashing to a standstill.

Conclusion
This chapter has sought to make sense of some of the political economic and ideological
trends during the late 1960s and 70s which helped to fuel the NWROs articulated pessimism
about the possibility of improving waged work to meet the needs of poor people, and their desire
to seek solutions outside a social democratic repertoire.
Existing scholarship on work refusal has either highlighted groups like Autonomia and
Wages for Housework, or emphasized its more clandestine, inchoate, evasive forms that appear
often as foot dragging, absenteeism, insubordination and the like (Seidman 1991; Kelley 1994;
Weeks 2011). Here I suggest that the largest organized and formal collective to challenge the
hegemony of waged work, the welfare rights movement, was intertwined within a historic crisis
of the hegemony of work that was deeply racialized. Challenges from a number of institutional
locations, frustrations with the limitations of unions, nascent deindustrialization, speed ups, and a
global era of militant mobilization undermined many of the typical responses to working class
struggles, and fostered an upsurge not only questioning but challenging the primacy of waged
work as the means for securing livelihood and legitimacy.
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Chapter 3: A World With No Workers
Where I’m Bound
Come and go with me to that land
Come and go with me to that land
Where I’m bound
Come and go with me to that land
Come and go with me to that land
Where I’m bound
Ain’t no welfare in that land—
Aint no begging in that land
Aint no hunger in that land
Ain’t no workers in that land
Nothing but joy in that land
From the National Welfare Rights Organization songbook8

Introduction
Many scholars have acknowledged the NWRO’s unique analysis of poverty and waged
labor in a cursory way that blunts the significance and uniqueness of their political vision.
Premilla Nadasen for example writes “NWRO wanted to solve the problem of poverty through
an adequate income, not employment. It argued that ‘having a job is no guarantee against
poverty’ and that the proposed federal program would create hardship for women on AFDC.”
(2005:136) Ellen Reese outlines a similar narrative of the movement in Backlash Against
Welfare Mothers Past and Present (2005), writing, “jobs were a secondary concern to NWRO
leaders, who focused instead on ‘bread and justice.’ As Wiley (Executive Director of NWRO)
told one reporter, NWRO's ‘chief concern… has been money’” (2005:114). Felicia Kornbluh
expounded on this priority, explaining,
NWRO members argued that the way to deal with women’s poverty was to let them decide
whether they preferred to receive their income directly from the government, from a private
employer or from a combination of the two. The way to address men’s poverty was to let them,
too, make choices between government grants and wages (Kornbluh 2007:152).
8
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Although these scholars recognize and acknowledge NWRO’s attempts at decentering
waged labor as the primary means through which poor families ensured their survival, none to
date have deemed this unique, and fundamentally radical political analysis worthy of further
examination. Existing scholarship has largely ignored the extensive textual archive which can
help us trace the contours of the NWRO’s sophisticated attempts at striving towards a world with
not only “no hunger,” but also “no workers.” In this chapter I examine the emergence of the
NWRO’s antiwork imaginary, and ask: how does a social movement devise a challenge to such a
hegemonic institution as wage labor: How do activists articulate this position tactically and
philosophically? What types of conflicts arise? How does the movement respond to external
political and economic transformations to clarify its position? Additionally, I ask a number of
methodological questions of social movement scholarship: how do scholars make sense of
perspectives that are at variance with putatively hegemonic values? How can we see counter
hegemonic beliefs when historical subjects sometimes strategically downplay or hide them?
With the support of pamphlets, newspaper articles, songs, speeches given at congressional
hearings, internal documents and more I provide a number of correctives to the lacuna in existing
scholarship.
First, throughout the dissertation I argue that there is a pattern to existing scholarship
which, when adjudicating between competing or contradictory perspectives, highlights the most
conservative reading of NWRO’s analysis and objectives, emphasizing their congruence with
hegemonic values. This is particularly evident in claims about the NWRO’s approach to waged
work. I argue this is partially due to the fact that scholars have overlooked the importance of the
temporal evolution of the movement and often placed outsized importance on statements made at
the beginning of the movement as emblematic of its perspective as a whole. The NWRO’s
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analysis developed over time, as the movement gained strength, so too did the profundity of its
critiques and alternative aspirations regarding waged work. In addition to the temporal context
of statements, the intended audience of certain statements is rarely accounted for by scholars
when assessing their significance, which I argue is a methodological error.
Finally, I draw insights from existing literature on working class consciousness to make
sense of the elements that influence the development of NWRO’s critiques of waged work and
argue that many scholars have previously identified contradiction and subterfuge as important
features of many non-hegemonic ideologies.

What are antiwork politics anyway?
Antiwork politics have become fashionable recently, epitomized by the success of Kathi
Weeks’ widely read book, The Problem With Work: Feminism, Marxism, antiwork politics and
postwork imaginaries. Weeks explains antiwork politics as follows:
The refusal of work is not a rejection of productive activity per se, but rather a refusal of central
elements of the wage relation and those discourses that encourage our consent to the modes of
work that it imposes. It comprises a refusal of work’ s domination over the times and spaces of life
and of its moralization, a resistance to the elevation of work as necessary duty and supreme
calling. It is at once a model of resistance and a struggle for a different relation between life and
work that a postwork ethics and more nonwork time could help secure (Weeks 2011:124).

Although participants in the welfare rights movement would not have used such a
formulation, archival materials reveal a persistent leitmotif challenging “work’s domination of
the times and spaces of life and of its moralization.” Welfare recipients in no way refused to do
anything (as some fear when they hear the phrase “antiwork”)—they organized, they provided
immense amounts of care labor, they theorized, mounted massive campaigns. But at the same
time, they challenged many “central elements of the wage relation.” The welfare rights
movement criticized the institution of waged work, and offered a trenchant analysis of how that
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institution distributes well-being by race, class and gender in ways that were particularly
sophisticated.
Relying primarily on archival evidence, much of which is overlooked in existing
scholarship on the movement, this chapter offers a case study of a social movement which
mobilized not for more or better work, but instead sought to decouple income from employment,
establishing what they called “the right to live,” freed from the compulsions of waged labor. As
such, I argue the welfare rights movement provides us with a rousing example of an “antiwork”
political imaginary, and the struggles of its praxis.
While I demonstrate that the welfare rights movement developed an organic antiwork
politics, there are also multiple moments when the movement, or participants within the
movement, do make demands for jobs. Piven recounts an incident when organizers promoted a
“training” session to which dozens of recipients showed up, and quickly left, disappointed, upon
realizing it was not a job training program, but rather a training for political organizing.9
Sometimes within the very same speech, a movement participant emphasized the importance of
jobs, while only moments later, excoriated waged labor as an institution. At other times,
organizers or recipients made statements that were open to a wide range of interpretation.
Rather than seeking to smooth out all the contradictions in the movement’s analyses of
work, I hope to examine these seeming ambiguities in the archival record as evidence of the
difficulties entailed in challenging such a hegemonic institution for which there exist few easy
alternatives. To paraphrase Claire Hemmings, to attempt to smooth over these gaps would only
serve to conceal the power relations that create them in the first place (Hemmings 2018:33). Or
as Ann Stoler argues in a different context in Along the Archival Grain,

9
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[t]hese archives are not simply accounts of actions or records of what people thought happened.
They are records of uncertainty and doubt in how people imagined they could and might make the
rubrics of rule correspond to a changing imperial world. Not least they record anxious efforts to
“catch up” with what was emergent and “becoming” in new colonial situations. Ontologies are
both productive and responsive, expectant and late (2009: 4).

We should not demand political purity from welfare recipients; rather, we should see
what was “emergent and becoming” in their work. As mostly single parents, welfare recipients
had the responsibility of ensuring not only their own survival but that of their children. The
archive exposes the challenge of thinking and acting beyond existing institutional frameworks
when one’s survival is on the line. Or perhaps, as Joan Robinson shrewdly noted, “The misery of
being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all”
(2006 [1962]: 45). Activists in the welfare rights movement tried mightily to fight their way out
of that seemingly insurmountable bind.

Can Work Solve Poverty?
The 1960s were by all accounts a heady political moment in the U.S. Situated directly at
the heart of then contemporary problems, and the desired solutions, was an emphasis on
expanding and improving waged labor. The Kerner Report for example, sought to make sense of
the hundreds of riots that swept across the country through the late 1960s, and concluded that
high unemployment rates among African Americans was one of the prime causes. Bayard Rustin
emphasized the limitations of the civil rights movement in securing well being for African
Americans, arguing the country had to move “beyond race relations to economic relations,”
(Rustin Quoted in Reed 2017). One of the major culminations of this vision was the 1967
Freedom Budget, a plan developed by economist Leon Keyserling and endorsed by notable civil
rights activists such as A Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin and Martin Luther King in order to
address the economic plight of African Americans. Central to the proposal was ensuring the
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availability of well-paying jobs. The authors of the Freedom Budget were unequivocal about this
and repeatedly emphasized that “The key is jobs.” They argued:
We can all recognize that the major cause of poverty could be eliminated, if enough decently
paying jobs were available for everyone willing and able to work… What we must also recognize
is that we now have the means of achieving complete employment— at no increased cost, with no
radical change in our economic system, and at no cost to our present national goals— if we are
willing to commit ourselves totally to this achievement (10).

Published only a few months after the initial founding of the NWRO, the Freedom Budget
partially represented both the mainstream and outer limits of social movement stances towards
waged labor: It is continuous with most mainstream liberal analyses in arguing that the solution
to economic problems is the quantity and quality of available jobs, but by insisting that the
federal government, rather than private industry, provide them, the Freedom Budget occupied the
outer spectrum of mainstream demands. Proponents of the Freedom Budget believed there to be
a clear continuity between New Deal programs, the Employment Act of 1946 and the Freedom
Budget, which they envisioned as the ultimate fulfilment of the unfinished, and racially
discriminatory promises contained in the earlier two programs Early materials published by the
NWRO shared a similar perspective to the Freedom Budget, and demanded, “JOBS OR
INCOME NOW! Decent Jobs with adequate pay for those who can work and adequate income
for those who cannot.”10 But as NWRO gained membership and power, they shifted away from
this framing, developing an analysis of poverty that offered a substantive break with this
formulation. Whitaker in his 1970 dissertation on the NWRO argued “Whereas the civil rights
movement had attempted to open up the right to participate in the economic system of American
society, in a sense welfare rights has sought to legitimatize the prerogative of persons to refrain
from such participation and yet still receive sustenance from social sources” (1970:243).
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Those involved with NWRO were well versed in the Freedom Budget; the archives of the
national office, located at Howard University, contain a copy of the 86-page report as well as
numerous newspaper articles analyzing the plan, all closely underlined and annotated.11
However, the NWRO would eventually challenge the analysis proffered by the Freedom Budget
and many other contemporaneous social movements, that it would be possible to reduce
economic insecurity with “no radical changes in our economic system.” Instead, for much of the
organization’s tenure, NWRO came to insist that jobs were not the solution to poverty and that it
was impossible to remedy the plight of the poor with minor reforms. As I detail below, the
NWRO came to argue that impoverishment was constitutive of the working-class experience,
and that only income decoupled from the compulsion to work could remedy this enduring crisis.
It developed this analysis as the movement gained power and its growing, increasingly militant
membership clashed with newly imposed punitive welfare provisions.

The Development of an Antiwork Analysis
NWRO’s initial goal was to increase the number of people receiving their eligible
benefits. (West 1981; Pope 1990). Largely inspired by an early study conducted by Piven and
Cloward as part of Mobilization for Youth that found that only one in two people were receiving
the benefits they were due, this strategy had two main objectives: First to immediately improve
the material lives of poor people, and second, to precipitate a crisis by overwhelming existing
local and state aid that would necessitate the transferring of welfare responsibilities from often
racist, atomized, local and state programs to the federal government, creating a uniform federal
system based on declared need alone (Piven and Cloward 1966; Whitaker 1970). The movement
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was arguably successful at this first goal. In the movement’s initial year, the number of welfare
recipients and general expenditures increased exponentially. Between 1960 and 1969 nearly
800,000 families were added to the AFCD rolls, a 107 percent increase, most of which took
place in the second half of the 1960s (Piven and Cloward 1971:183). In Brooklyn, New York in
the summer of 1968, militant welfare recipients managed to secure $42 million additional dollars
in special grants, compared to $1.3 million in 1963 (Pope 1990:2). Inspired by its successes, the
movement formulated increasingly bold demands and trenchant analyses, particularly regarding
waged work.

In Favor of a Gendered Division of Labor?
In the early years of the organization, the NWRO often articulated its goals as “jobs for
people who can work and income for those who cannot,” with the definition of “those who
cannot” occasionally relying upon gendered notions of the division of labor. For example, in a
press release from August 1967, the first full year of the organization, NWRO critiqued the
House Ways and Means Committee for
declaring all-out war on poor families by attempting to force welfare mothers to work and forsake
their homemaking responsibilities. Wiley asserted that the attempt by the Committee to force
mothers to work [was] against the best interests of their children... Wiley announced August 28 as
the date for a national demonstration to… demand jobs for those people who can work and income
for those who cannot. 12

This gendered framing, which the NWRO occasionally relied upon to argue for welfare
payments, has had an outsized presence in in scholarly analysis of the movement, with many
scholars presenting the movement’s primary objective as maintaining a strict gendered division
of labor (West 1981:257; Nadasen 2005; Chappell 2010; Cooper 2017). This is in part due to the
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fact that most scholars ignore instances when the NWRO articulated clear, gender neutral
critiques of waged labor, or the strategic nature of social movement articulations, both of which I
emphasize here.
Take for example Wiley’s statement at the 1968 Congressional Hearing on Income
Maintenance which is often cited as an example of his (and paid organizers within the NWRO)
retrograde stance on gendered divisions of labor and a pro-work stance, two features I argue do
not define the main analysis of the NWRO. Wiley stated,
Now people want jobs. Welfare recipients want there to be jobs available, but we want these jobs
to be available for men. We want these jobs to be available for those mothers who feel they can
leave their children and go out into the conventional labor force. But we want every person, every
mother who feels that her place is at home raising her children, we want those mothers to have the
opportunity to regard that as their job and their vocation, and that for them to bring up children,
healthy children, children who go to school, children who are going to be a constructive, creative,
and a productive part of this society—this is what welfare mothers want for their children. This is
why they want adequate income, so they can raise their families with a measure of dignity, a
measure of respect, and a measure of opportunity for the next generation of their children (60).

Although Wiley’s statement momentarily appears to take the position that waged labor should be
the purview of men, Wiley’s subsequent comment shifts toward a deeply critical analysis of the
potential for wage labor to improve the lives of the poor. When the conversation between
members of the hearing began emphasizing the importance of jobs and good employment, Wiley
interjected:
I would like to go back and stress the fact that you are interested in jobs and job training and that
part of the problem, and that is an important part, but it is a small part. It is like talking about 5 or
10 percent of the problem when you are talking about poor people. The main problem for poor
people is money, income. If you want to deal with the gut of it, talking about income, let me say,
for example, fully a third of the people—everybody knows this—below the poverty line work full
time at jobs (81).

Wiley and other members of the NWRO discussed jobs and job training at moments when they
were on the defensive and attempting to appeal to powerful, mainstream forces. But the
appearance that they agree with mainstream, family wage values in which men work and women
stay home, endures only very briefly. Wiley clarifies that in the NWRO’s analysis jobs and job
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training are only “about 5 or 10 percent of the problem when you are talking about poor people.”
In other words, in the very formal and conservative environment of government hearings, Wiley
temporarily relies on appealing to mainstream logic, “welfare recipients want there to be jobs
available” but he rapidly reverts to the NWRO’s main analysis that work is not the solution to
poor people’s problems.
Rather than revealing the true priorities of the NWRO I believe Wiley’s initial statement
reflects the difficulty in absolving one’s self entirely from the hegemony of the work ethic, even
while attempting to challenge it. As NWRO organizer Tim Sampson reflected in an interview in
the 1980s: “Whenever we tried to figure out how to… [relate]… to the public obviously jobs, the
work issue, was always a key issue around communication” (Nadasen 2005:138). Sampson’s
behind the scenes reflection emphasized this was a challenging task the organization had to
consistently and consciously navigate.13 In other words, it was strategic. Scholars have taken
these statements as evidence of enduring, principled positions, and thus missed many of the
profound insights proffered by the movement.
By 1969 NWRO’s previous perfunctory calls for jobs for those who could work and
income for those who couldn’t, had been largely replaced with calls for guaranteed income for
all, regardless of age or gender. One example of this stated: “NWRO believes that every man,
woman and child had the right to live. The NWRO calls upon our country to begin subsidizing
life… a family of four needs at least $5500 for the basic necessities of life, not counting medical
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care. NWRO calls upon the Federal government to guarantee every American this minimum
income.”14 Whitaker (1970) also acknowledges a rhetorical shift took place around this time,
arguing “although the first national meeting of welfare rights promotors took place at the GAIN
sponsored conference on the guaranteed income, it was nearly 2 ½ years before the guaranteed
income was proclaimed an official goal of NWRO” (1970:188). Few scholars acknowledge that
the NWRO’s analysis progressed over time in this manner and it is key to understanding the
movement. Whitaker believed this delay was because “P/RAC staff felt that most recipients
were not yet ready to cope with so sophisticated an idea” (1970:188) but he offers no evidence
for this paternalistic explanation. Whitaker also emphasizes that “1968-69 was marked by a
sharp escalation in the militancy of movement rhetoric” (192) although he believes this was not
necessarily substantive. In the following section I provide additional evidence arguing otherwise.

Shifting policies sharpen analyses
Transformations to welfare policy greatly impacted the progression of NWRO’s critiques
of wage work. As relief rolls expanded dramatically in the late 1960s, local, state and federal
government responded by implementing steps to curtail and restrict relief. In 1967 the federal
government proposed the Work Improvement Program which contained the first federal work
requirement for AFDC recipients. Euphemistically abbreviated to “WIN,” the “WIP” was
certainly anticipated by recipients in its implementation. This development resulted in a sharp,
critical and analytical focusing of the movement, particularly its position regarding waged work.
In the following years most subsequent proposed or implemented reforms included stronger
work requirements, but even welfare-related policy proposals, like food stamp policy, which did
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not involve work requirements, provided opportunities for the NWRO to develop and emphasize
their major ideological intervention: that work was not the solution to poor people’s problems.
As with other campaigns and issues the NWRO mobilized around, “WIN” provided an
opportunity for the organization to articulate its criticisms of waged work. In this instance it did
so in some ways typical of other anti-poverty organizations—arguing that there were an
insufficient number of good jobs, and training was of poor quality—but NWRO also went
further and criticized the rationale that elevated waged labor to the determining factor of poverty.
Importantly, despite their criticisms of insufficient, undesirable jobs, they did not seek to remedy
these problems with the creation of more, or better jobs, but rather, they sought to challenge the
reverence of employment as the solution to poverty in general. In attempting to challenge the
implementation of workfare programs NWRO articulated a shift in perspective, from identifying
their primary adversary as stingy program administrators to the broader ideology of the work
ethic.
At the 1968 Congressional Hearing on Income Maintenance Programs, representatives
for the NWRO were asked what they understood to be the major impediments to advancement
for welfare recipients. Richard Cloward provided a statement emphasizing NWRO’s shifting
analysis:
It seems to me the answer is not so difficult to define. Americans, by and large believe that work is
the source of all good—character and morality. So we as a people tend to denigrate anyone who
either cannot or should not work… So my complaint is not so much with welfare departments as
with American attitudes.

Cloward articulated an interpretation that would reoccur throughout numerous NWRO
publications for the next few years: one of the major impediments to poor people’s well-being
was the incorrect insistence that “work is the source of all good.”
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A widely reproduced NWRO pamphlet from May 1969 entitled “WIN: Training for
What?” critiqued the overvaluation of waged labor implicit in the program:
The philosophy of WIN is to get welfare recipients into the labor force. This means to use
available welfare manpower by guiding it into the economy. This is because they believe that
making people “wage earning members of society” will give them a sense of dignity, self worth,
and confidence. Their goal is to restore “the families of such individuals to independence and
useful roles in their communities.”15

Lest it not be explicit enough that NWRO perceived WIN’s philosophy (and the means
through which it would be achieved) with scorn, irony and disapproval, below this text appeared
a cartoon figure of a towering fascistic man giving a ‘heil Hitler’ salute and screaming at a tiny,
cowering woman seated in front of him. The word bubble above his military-style hair cut reads,
“Mrs. Smith everyone must have a job, you must conform, you must fit the system, there is no
room for individuality and character!!”
(See Appendix Image 1)
Representing waged labor with an unhinged, fascist, militaristic man would have been
particularly poignant in 1969 when the military was particularly derided. Additionally, the notion
that forcing them to work would restore dignity and a “useful role” to women who believed
themselves to be engaged in extremely useful roles in their communities would have been absurd
to the pamphlet’s intended audience.
In the same flyer, NWRO expanded on their critique of workfare. “What’s Wrong With
WIN?” they asked,
WIN is the same old story, all over again, but with a different name… WIN is a terrible, punitive
program that doesn’t train people for anything decent. 1. WIN is a repressive program. It forces
people to work and doesn’t give them any choice in the matter. It is based on the prejudiced
attitude that welfare people are no good. They assume that only people with jobs are useful, good
citizens, so the only way welfare people can become useful is to make them have jobs. (emphasis
added)
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Although NWRO was certainly critical of the implementation and efficacy of “terrible
and very inadequate” training programs, their main adversarial target was broader and
more ideological: the “philosophy” and “attitude” which ascribed a moral value to waged
labor and wrongfully assumed that those without employment also lack “dignity” “self
worth” and “confidence.” In these articulations we begin to see a move away from
emphasizing the usefulness of welfare recipients as care-givers and mothers; rather these,
statements are made in open-ended, gender-neutral terms.16
Unlike other organizations and groups who also critiqued job training programs,
NWRO’s criticism of job training programs was not that they were inefficient in their objective
but that the objective itself was problematic. Moreover, they argued, the focus on jobs produced
further inequality: NWRO critiqued training programs as a labor regulation device that mediated
a strict divide between professional and vocational work, relegating one class of people to the
worst jobs while hoarding opportunities for another.
All of the training they have is vocational, which means training for low paying, semi-skilled jobs
usually open to poor people. That means you can get training to be a teacher’s aide, or a nurse’s
aid but not a teacher or a nurse. They don’t let you have training for jobs they think are above you
or too good for you. They want to keep the high paying, skilled jobs for themselves.”17

Despite their criticisms of job training programs, and the chorus of “better job” demands from
other organizations at the time (particularly in the broader civil rights movement), NWRO
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Scholars who were critical of this aspect of NWRO also recognized their unique stance towards the work ethic,
Whitaker for example believed NWRO went too far in their approach to the work ethic: “While correctly
recognizing some of the serious limitations of the overly individualistic American work ethic, the movement fails to
recognize the positive aspects of that value. The movement disparages, for example, whatever pride in themselves
as craftman may remain to workers in this country and rather than attempting to replace the extravagant
individualism of the work ethic with a social sense of mutual interdependence, reinforces the self centered quality of
that standard in programs tending to create a corps of professional welfare mothers” (1970:246-7).
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activists advocated an entirely different logic: abandoning these programs in favor of no-stringsattached income decoupled from employment.
NWRO’s analysis of wage labor, and the pessimistic view they held as to the possibility
of reforming work to meet poor people’s needs, was evident in the pronounced absence of
statements demanding work, good work, well remunerated work, or any similar demands that
were commonly articulated by other social justice organizations at the time. During the peak
years of the movement the NWRO rarely mentions demands for work in the vast majority of
their public facing material—press releases, alternative policy proposals, interviews with the
press, etc. For example, following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in early April of
1968, Coretta Scott King stepped in to lead the Poor People’s Campaign that King Jr had
launched following meetings with NWRO participants (Whitaker 1970; Kornbluh 2007) On
Mother’s Day Sunday NWRO and the Poor People’s Campaign coordinated presentations about
poverty in churches across the country. This was the NWRO’s opportunity to introduce itself to a
vast and potentially very sympathetic public at a moment in which the nation was focused on the
issue of poverty, and it was important to be “on message.” NWRO prepared informational
packets to guide members’ comments. In these guides, the organization chose to eschew the most
typical demand poor people could possibly make: for work. Instead, the speakers were instructed
to say:
What do welfare recipients want?
We want adequate income to raise our children.
We want dignity- the same full freedoms, rights and respect as all American citizens.
We want justice- a fair system which guarantees recipients the full protections of the constitution.
We want democracy- direct participation in the decisions under which we must live.18
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In December of 1966 there were 130 local welfare rights organizations affiliated with the
NWRO, by 1971 NWRO identified 800 groups in all 50 states, the organization could boast an
actively engaged membership with thousands of members who attended annual conferences at
the organization’s peak in the late 1960s, early 70s (West 1981, 51). Coinciding with this
groundswell of support, NWRO gained more confidence asserting their criticisms of waged work
as the solution to poverty. It was an opportune time to raise the issue. Attention to and sympathy
for poverty in America throughout the 1960s reached its crescendo following the 1968 broadcast
of the CBS television program “Hunger in America”, which depicted the extent of serious
malnutrition and poverty in the US. The following year Nixon asserted that it was time “at hand
to put an end to hunger in America itself for all time” (Macdonald 1977:649). One major
recommendation Nixon insisted upon was transitioning from food distribution programs to food
stamps for the poor. NWRO vocally opposed this change and their engagement around the issue
provided opportunity to further articulate the NWRO’s developing analysis of the relationship
between poverty and work. NWRO also “challenge[d] the Nixon administration to press for a
guaranteed adequate income rather than patched up food programs as the basic solution to
hunger in America.”19 There is no mention of jobs or work.
In December of 1969, NWRO showed up in force to disrupt a White House conference
on Food, Nutrition and Health. Although their demands were manifold, the major resounding
intervention these conference-crashers sought to make—and were exceedingly proud of having
made— was to clarify that hunger was a problem to which the solution was money, not work.
The next month’s NWRO newspaper celebrated this disruption as a victory, boasting that with
only 30 people the collective “managed to take control of the conference and hammer home the
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fact that people were hungry due to lack of money.”20 This retort, that the solution to hunger was
income, not food stamps, not work, is further evidence of the NWRO’s analysis which sought to
decenter work as the solution to poor people’s problems.

Challenging Nixon’s Proposed Reforms: the fight against FAP
In 1970 Nixon proposed a major overhaul of the welfare system via a welfare reform bill
called the Family Assistance Program (FAP), which would have allocated benefits of $1,600 a
year for a family of four, with numerous work incentives (Quadagno 1990; Steensland 2011).
Following its announcement, NWRO devoted much of the next few years to critiquing,
campaigning against FAP, and proposing their alternative vision. NWRO was particularly
invested in this issue, in part because they saw FAP as a response, albeit insufficient, to the
pressures their activism was exerting on the welfare system.5 This was a crucial moment to
expose the undesirable ideology and alternatives promoted by Nixon’s plan, and to press for their
own visions of welfare reform.
Two of the major criticisms NWRO mounted against FAP were that the proposed income
was insufficient, and that it placed too much emphasis on the ability of waged labor to resolve
the problems of poor people. An NWRO pamphlet argued,
Nixon’s Welfare Proposals will guarantee a minimum of only $1600 for a family of four. This is
not an adequate income. While the administration proposals contain some positive features
including a little more money for working people they do not recognize the answer to poor
people’s problems is MONEY, not training programs or work incentives for jobs that don’t exist.
The least Nixon could have done was to make Adequate Income a national goal.

In addition to the inadequate income level it proposed, much of the opposition mounted
against FAP was due to severe antipathy by welfare recipients for the provisions they understood
as requiring waged labor for welfare recipients. This critique of work was visible to many
20
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examining the movement at the time. For example, reporting from a welfare rights rally in 1970
a New York Times journalist emphasized the significant departure NWRO made from most other
movement perspectives on waged work. The author summarized the rally stating,
There is also an almost theological chasm concerning the deep-seated American ethic that there is
redemption in labor. Many of the women here have been domestics at wages considerably lower
than a welfare stipend. Many have done farm work in the South, and still have muscles to show it.
And all of dozens of women interviewed at workshops and in the corridors of Wayne State
University’s campus here, where the convention is meeting, said this week they would never, in
this time of technological, economic and human rights advances, perform such “demeaning” and
low-wage work again.

Accounts like this underscore that the current of antiwork politics present in the movement were
not deeply concealed or unique to a small subset of radicals. Rather, a substantial tide of the
movement recognized the myriad problems facing its constituency of primarily poor Black
women and asserted that the solutions were not— as so many social movements throughout
history desired— increased access to waged work or better regulated jobs but rather the right to
live, free from waged labor.
In the Autumn of 1971 NWRO distributed literature for the “People’s Hearings on
Welfare and Welfare Reform” designed to encourage and assist activists holding local events to
discuss the proposed reform. One flyer listing major objections to the bill, seven out of twelve,
including the first five under the heading “What’s wrong with [FAP]” were related to work
requirements.
Moynihan also noted the ferocity of the opposition to the proposal’s work “incentives”
complaining in his 1973 analysis of the failure of FAP that “anyone trying to replace the welfare
system with a guaranteed income would be attacked by welfare militants with a violent and
abusive rhetoric…In particular, any suggestion that income maintenance be associated with work
incentives would be excoriated as repression” (1973:9).
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Another NWRO pamphlet critiquing FAP asserted once again NWRO’s argument that
poverty would not be solved through employment. They insisted this was not merely a temporal
blip due to a stagnant economy or another temporary variable, this was instead the condition
working people endured, always: “NWRO recognizes that people are poor because they don’t
have enough money. Poor people have never been able to secure enough income from the wages
they earn to enable their families to live decently. Yet every man, woman and child has the right
to live.”21 This paragraph was clearly important to the organization’s perspective and resonated
for many as it was reproduced throughout local welfare rights organizations’ materials for years
to come. The assertion that waged labor never provided sufficient income for working class
people implies a structural critique, that understands poverty as systemic to waged labor for the
working class (“poor people”). I will examine the commonalities this shares with a Marxian
analysis of waged labor in Chapter Five.

NWRO’s Alternative Vision
The NWRO’s critique of waged labor as the solution to poverty reached its apex in 1970,
this also happens to be the year Guida West argues the NWRO “peaked” as an organization
(West 1990). That year NWRO submitted an alternative bill, riding on the momentum of FAP
but challenging many of its shortcomings. NWRO’s alternative bill demanded $5500 per year for
a family of four with no work requirements. Pamphlets comparing FAP and the NWRO plan
stated the alternative bill’s goals simply: “$5500 for a family of four; No forced work; Covers
everyone; Cost of living increases; Guarantees justice and dignity.”22
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Endorsed by twenty-one members of the House of Representatives, including the entire
Black Caucus which had just been formed that year, the bill was not only the culmination of
NWRO’s efforts to block the passage of Nixon’s FAP, but also of years of developing
consciousness and articulations of antiwork politics. Nevertheless, activists understood it to be
“only a symbol of the work that lies ahead. The myths about welfare and welfare recipients must
be destroyed and the priorities of our country must be reversed.”23
The Adequate Income Bill contains the most formal articulation of NWRO’s mature
understanding of the relationship between welfare and waged work. In its introduction they
contend,
Millions of Americans are not on welfare but are unable to secure an adequate income from the
wages they earn. The real employment problem is not that people need jobs and jobs need people.
It is that employment does not distribute wealth the way its advocates claim it does. As a wealth
distribution system employment has never worked well for the poor, especially the black poor.
Even if all eligible Americans were employed today, the poverty rate would not be seriously
affected.24

There are a number of remarkable, radical, and too often overlooked insights in this brief
paragraph that opens the Adequate Income Bill: waged labor is fundamentally incapable of
distributing well-being for even if full employment were achieved, poverty would not be
significantly ameliorated. Additionally, despite historians’ claims that NWRO held strongly
gendered notions about who should work and who should stay at home, the bill is framed in
universal, gender-neutral language, insisting only that families have enough income to sustain
themselves. Despite the fairly voluminous scholarship on the welfare rights movement, not a
single text I have encountered mentions this passage or the explicit critique of waged work it
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contains. Scholars describing NWRO’s alternative to FAP overlook this profound intervention
entirely, focusing instead on policy details.25
In and of itself, the Adequate Income Bill was a provocative reprobation of waged work
and its potential for ameliorating poverty. Moreover, examining the influences on the text reveals
that the authors were drawing upon profoundly critical, anti-capitalist analyses challenging the
employment system writ large. Much of the text of the bill (including the above passage which
was replicated in multiple forms in other NWRO publications—both local and national—
throughout the period) drew from a document entitled “Employment Institutionalizes Poverty”
written in 1969 by a Philadelphia-based organization called North City Congress (NCC).26 NCC
distinguished themselves from other organizations’ approaches to poverty by challenging the
very premise of what they understood to be “the employment problem.” Rather than view these
as temporary or resolvable issues, NCC argued the problems of poverty were intrinsic to waged
labor.
According to the NCC, “the ‘employment problem’ is commonly perceived as the need to
remove factors of interference from the economy—or at least to circumvent or counteract
them—so that nature can take its course and poverty can go away. Manpower programs typically
are designed to respond to this definition of the problem” (1). The presumption that employment
problems or poverty were caused by economic or political problems that that could be altered or
ameliorated mirrored the Freedom Budget’s insistence that “we now have the means of
achieving complete employment— at no increased cost, with no radical change in our economic
25

See for example Kornbluh who, in summarizing this incendiary document, recounts tepidly, “in April 1970
version of the NWRO Guaranteed Adequate Income plan the activists offered a list of principles that they saw as
essential to national welfare reform, beginning with adequate income as a “national goal” and a timetable for
reaching a basic income level of $5,500 per year. They sought the addition of emergency grants and regular cost of
living increases to the “flat” guaranteed income in FAP” (2007:153). All the broader critiques of waged work are
silenced.
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system, and at no cost to our present national goals.” (10) Although the socialist sympathies of
many who authored the Freedom Budget have been well established (Blanc and Yeats 2013),
NCC argued that this type of rationale—that minor changes to the system could address poverty
and resolve the employment problem— was based on an implicit general approval of the system.
NCC argued, “the designs and rationale of all [manpower programs] are based in a pattern of
presumptive approval of the economic system. It is this presumption which unavoidably dictates
that removal of interference will be the operational motif of programs attacking the ‘employment
problem’” (NCC 1969:2). Some forms of “interference” they believed manpower programs
attempted to address included most of the major areas on which poverty reformers typically
focus: lack of skills, education and “industrial discipline”; addressing the problem of criminal
records; factors such as “racial, sexual, and age related discrimination”; “racially biased
promotion policies”; automation and more. The authors of the NCC report emphasize that they
too once shared these common perceptions about the causes and solutions to poverty, but that
they had now progressed to a view of employment not as a problem to be resolved, but rather as
a source of poverty itself:
The presumption that the labor market (with its employment process regulated by business, labor
unions, and government) can provide an adequate standard of living for all but three-to-four
percent of the nation’s work force is a basic element in public policy. It is a presumption that NCC
once shared, but shares no longer. The policies which spring from this presumption are inadequate
as regards the economic health of the nation, and ruinous as regards the socio-economic
aspirations of the poor and black.
The condition of employment is not necessarily an answer to poverty. In fact, a clearer view of
employment reveals that it is one important face of the economic system which forms ghettos,
creates and sustains poverty. (3)

NCC importantly emphasized that beliefs are not fixed and static but rather shifting, and mutable
“It is a presumption that NCC once shared, but shares no longer” echoes many of the statements
other NWRO participants made about their evolving perception of jobs, including perhaps the
often quoted comment by Johnnie Tillmon: “We wanted jobs—in the state, in the county, in the
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city… But if they couldn’t come up with the jobs then they should leave us alone and put some
more money in the checks” (Reese 2005:114). Tillmon’s statement has often been read as
confirmation that welfare participants first and foremost desired jobs, but when examined next to
NCC’s analysis, we can also understand it as describing the progression of a political analysis.
“We wanted”: past tense.
NCC’s analysis reveals a profound reversal in the typical logic around poverty and
employment. Unlike the Freedom Budget, NCC does not believe people are poor because they’re
lacking jobs or access to good jobs; instead they aver that poverty exists because of employment,
which, according to NCC, “creates and sustains poverty.” The major insight put forward by NCC
in this document, that employment in fact “institutionalizes” poverty, demonstrates a major
departure from the Keynesian, social democratic analysis predominant in other popular solutions
at the time. In Chapter Five I examine the commonalities this aspect of NWRO’s analysis shares
with a Marxian understanding of wage work.
Take for example the next passage from NCC’s text, in which I have highlighted phrases
NWRO replicated frequently:
The real “employment problem” is not that people need jobs and jobs need people—it is that
employment does not distribute wealth the way its advocates claim it does. Employment is a
wealth distributions system which has never worked well for the poor—especially the black poor—
and shows no signs of starting to do so now. The “interference” programs address by man power
programs are symptomatic of this deeper inadequacy in the American economic structure. Even if
all eligible Americans were employed today, the poverty rate would not be seriously affected.
In light of this fact, the public policy which insists that the poor and the black enter the economic
mainstream through employment is a policy which condemns those outcasts to poverty, and
condemns the nation to socioeconomic strife, class rigidity, and authoritarianism. (3 emphasis
added)

NCC understood employment as a fundamentally exploitative and coercive relationship, to
which only certain portions of the population were subjected (they insist, correctly, that other
groups manage to secure their subsistence from forms of income which are not employment
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based, especially rent, interest and investments). In their repudiation of the employment system
we encounter the stark disavowal of wage work and an assertion that the institution of wage
labor, and the inequalities implicit in it, undermined the very principles of democracy. “Thus,
incredibly” NCC concluded, “a society which rejected political tyranny contradicts itself and
places a high positive value on the economic equivalent of that tyranny” (6).
Although scholars have long acknowledged NWRO’s pursuit for “dignity and justice,”
inattention to the insights the organization espoused and drew from in their critiques of work has
tended to hollow out the profundity of their vision for actual dignity and justice, and the world to
which they aspired.
As an antipoverty organization, one of the major concerns of NWRO was obviously
addressing poverty. Their major ideological intervention was defying long standing explanations
for poverty, as a step towards suggesting alternative (i.e. non employment-based) solutions to the
ones typically proffered. In numerous publications NWRO attempted to demystify prevailing
notions of why people were poor.
For example, in a booklet titled “The NWRO Adequate Income Program $7500 NOW!”
the NWRO sought to answer the question “Why are there so many poor?”
Because of our economic system. Our economic system is structured so there is always a large
number of poor people. The poor are needed to fill millions of low paying jobs that sustain many
industries in our country. When industry needs them, the poor are called to work. When industry
doesn’t need them, many people must go on welfare or survive as best they can. By always having
more people than available jobs, industry is guaranteed all the cheap labor it needs. The “job
market” is like a giant game of musical chairs. Everyone wants a chair but there are not enough
chairs to go around and someone always ends up the loser… The government, by keeping the
minimum wage low and providing enough welfare to keep the poor alive when they are not
needed by industry, subsidizes business and forces millions to live in poverty.27
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A far cry from the Freedom Budget’s assertion that poverty could be addressed by creating more
jobs and minimal transformation of the economic system, the NWRO’s analysis situated poverty
and unemployment as essential to the functioning of the economic system. In this sense, the
NWRO’s analysis of the centrality of unemployment shared more in common with Marx’s
notion of a “reserve army of labor” as essential to the ability of capitalists to generate profits,
than a Keynesian, or New Deal perspective.
Once again, despite their critique of the lack of decent jobs, or their assertion that a
fluctuation in the needs of capital generates a redundant, surplus population, the NWRO did not
call for the creation of more jobs, or regulation of wages. Instead, this text centered around
income for all decoupled from employment.
The pamphlet continued:
Is there a solution to the problem? YES! The first step is to get rid of welfare programs. Present
welfare programs are inefficient and wasteful… they are wasteful because they never do the job
they are supposed to do: get people out of poverty…The second step to eliminate poverty is a
guaranteed income plan… A guaranteed adequate income plan would attack the root cause of
poverty: a lack of money in a large segment of the population due to an economic system that
thrives on cheap labor, high unemployment and the concentration of the country’s wealth in the
hands of a privileged few.”
“National Welfare Rights has a Guaranteed Adequate Income Plan that would eliminate poverty.
The plan would get rid of welfare programs and provide a government subsidy for ALL people
whose yearly income falls below an acceptable standard amount.28

Despite the copious evidence that the NWRO understood guaranteed annual income for all those
who were eligible as the only real solution to poverty, scholars have continued to ignore,
misrepresent or downplay this analysis. In the following section I examine the highly racialized
class consciousness NWRO appealed to in order to articulate their demand for income decoupled
from work (Kelley 1994).
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“We’ve worked enough”
Members of NWRO drew from their own lived experiences to develop arguments against
waged labor as the remedy to poverty. As approximately 90% of the NWRO membership was
Black, activists situated their criticisms of waged labor in the deeply racialized history of U.S.
labor. An extension of their primary argument that labor did not resolve the issue of poverty, was
the assertion that welfare recipients, and poor Black people in particular, had already worked
enough29. This argument has a dual temporality—both as individuals, many of whom had been
working since they were children in deeply racialized jobs as sharecroppers or domestic servants,
(West 1981; Orleck 2006; Puglisi 2017) they felt they had worked enough for a lifetime, but also
as a race, across generations who had produced untold wealth, none of which had accrued to
them. The Welfare Fighter reported testimonies from the large crowd at the Mother’s Day march,
including that of Mrs. Perlie Mae Bynclum of Lamast, Mississippi who “told it like it is. ‘I
picked cotton, I hauled wood, I done everything— and I got nothing to show for it.’”30
Journalists noted this theme was frequently present in participants’ rhetoric, and reexamining the
archival material confirms its reoccurrence.
The Jan-Feb 1972 issue of NWRO’s newspaper the Welfare Fighter, for example, printed
the testimony of Curtis L. Butler who argued for situating the welfare debates within the
racialized history of American labor. Butler argued that mainstream welfare debates occluded an
essential component of the issue, that individuals like himself were impoverished and must rely
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This framing was also deployed by the Wages for Housework movement, which drew explicitly from the welfare
rights movement (see Chapter Three). Mariarosa Dalla Costa for example wrote, “women refuse the myth of
liberation through work. For we have worked enough. We have chopped billions of tons of cotton, washed billions
of dishes, scrubbed billions of floors, typed billions of words, wired billions of radio sets, and washed billions of
diapers by hand and in machines” (Dalla Costa 2019:42).
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on welfare because of America’s unjust racialized history in which Black families were
subjected to generations of forced labor and stolen wages:
And you say you want to take them off welfare. How can you take them off the welfare? I
shouldn’t be on welfare. You know why? Because my great great grandfather worked for nothing.
My great grandfather worked for nothing, my grandfather worked for nothing. My daddy worked
for nothing and they worked hell out of me for nothing. I aint got nothing for me to live for but
this boy now. But you see if I would have gotten paid for the minimum wages and got bread and
justice any white man or anybody else would, I would not be on the welfare.31

An explicit reference to the unpaid and underpaid labor performed by African Americans, as
articulated above, helped underpin both a rejection of work as the solution to poverty, as well as
a sense of rightful entitlement to government benefits. For many members of the welfare rights
movement, the failure of labor to procure many of the promised benefits to the laborer was
especially obvious given the extent of Black dispossession in American history.
This history was also used to argue for the direct redistribution of wealth. A number of
the songs in the welfare songbook, many of which were altered church songs and Civil Rights
staples, reflected this unbroken line of argument. For example, the lyrics to “Right to Live” By
Frederick D. Kirkpatrick are a repeated, insistent protest:
Ev’rybody’s got a right to live,
Ev’rybody’s got a right to live –
And before this campaign fails,
We’ll all go down in jail
Ev’rybody’s got a right to live.
On my way to Washington feelin’ awful sad
Thinkin’ ‘bout an income
That I never had.
Black man dug the pipeline
Hewed down the pines
Gave his troubles to jesus
Kept on toeing the line. (Chorus)
Black man dug the ditches
Both night and day
Black man did the work
While the white man got the pay.
31
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I want my share of silver
I want my share of gold
I want my share of justice
To save my dying soul. (Chorus)32

“A Right to Live” was a persistent rallying cry of the movement, and later, a campaign
mounted by the legal contingent of the NWRO, which took on expansive meanings for the
movement, but it is worth emphasizing that in Kirkpatrick’s song this “right to the income they
“never had” was articulated as particularly rooted in the historic injustices of American slavery
and racialized labor that denied Black Americans income. They were now therefore owed an
income (“Silver, gold, justice”) decoupled from labor. By the mid 1960s many radical Black
organizations held a similar position on the questions of reparations, and indeed, the NWRO’s
argument shares much with for example, the 1969 Black Manifesto advanced by James
Foreman’s Black National Economic Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee and other currents of the radicalizing Civil Rights Movement (Kelley 1994). The
NWRO and Foreman were allies, and Foreman pledged large portions of the reparations he
demanded from churches for the NWRO (West 1981).
Reinforcing their claim of an historical continuity between the brutal exploitation of
African Americans and their own work experience, NWRO often called workforce requirements
“slave jobs.” This argument reappears throughout much of the welfare rights literature and is a
particularly present visual presence in protest materials. Posters and pamphlets opposing FAP
frequently featured the image of an African American woman scrubbing a floor or performing
some other type of menial labor, with what appears to be a whip hovering above her representing
their forced labor. (See Appendix image 2)
32
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On one of NWRO’s posters, bold red text exclaimed: “NIXON-MILLS WELFARE
PLAN: SLAVE JOBS.” The mugshot of Wilbur D. Mills, a congressman central to the FAP bill
was featured on another NWRO poster, with the tagline “WANTED FOR CONSPIRACY TO
STARVE CHILDREN, DESTROY FAMILIES, FORCE WOMEN IN TO SLAVERY AND
EXPLOIT POOR PEOPLE.”33 Again and again, NWRO made work requirements— especially
given the context of inadequate wages and a lack of decent childcare options34—central to their
rejection of welfare reform programs and likened their requirements to slavery, including
Nixon’s FAP. In a pamphlet renouncing FAP, NWRO activists argued against the inadequate
income it proposed and the work requirement, stating that these provisions created “’WORK or
STARVE’ forced work requirements. Even though there are not enough decent jobs in this
country. Even though there is totally inadequate daycare. The Nixon Plan still forces women
with children to register for work. And it would leave enforcement of this unnecessary
requirement to state and local officials.”35
In the pamphlet “Steps Toward True Welfare Reform” NWRO envisioned a future
welfare policy that prohibited any “forced work.”36 NWRO’s renunciation of “forced,”
“compulsory” and “slave” labor raises a number of significant questions about the nature of
waged work under capitalism, and the extent to which these were intractable components of the
working class experience, or if it is possible to be freed from the compulsion to work. We will
further pursue this question in Chapter Five.
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The Right to Live
The appearance of antiwork politics took many forms throughout NWRO’s numerous
campaigns. Over the course of the movement, activists argued passionately that poverty wasn’t
solved by employment, that racial capitalism had dispossessed African Americans long enough,
indirectly implying that time off from work could be a form of recompense; or that technological
employment was too rampant to provide the opportunities for desirable employment. But these
pragmatic and historical arguments may have, for some, lacked something more romantic,
expansive, and universal. Filling that role was the argument for the right to live.
The notion of “the right to live” ran like a live electric current through all aspects of the
welfare rights movement. Appearing in songs, legal cases, newspapers and numerous other
forms, activists, organizers and lawyers alike deployed the notion as one of the primary shields
to protect themselves from the cudgel of compulsory work. In a particularly hopeful and
ambitious aspect of the NWRO, activist lawyers sought to benefit from an expansive political
and judicial climate to establish a constitutional “right to live” As such this attempt represents
37

one of the most rigorous, formal, mainstream expressions of antiwork politics visible in the
movement.
Drawing from the model of the Civil Rights Movement, the NWRO forged a similar
strategy of capitalizing on social unrest to push for legal advancements for poor people. This
activist-legal strategy produced numerous advancements in welfare case law, with enormous
palpable improvements in recipients’ lives: Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) established the right to due
process, transforming the inherent instability and insecurity of welfare into a more regulated
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(Polanyi 1957:85).
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system in which recipients could no longer be denied relief or kicked off the rolls without a
hearing. King v. Smith (1968) overthrew “man–in-the-house” regulations, a particularly arcane
and invasive policy which asserted that if a welfare recipient had any sort of intimate relationship
with a man he could be assumed to be her children’s replacement father and financial support,
and therefore she could immediately be removed from the rolls. In addition to challenging this
regressive logic, it also put a stop to the intrusive practice of midnight raids searching for mens’
items which might reveal a romantic relationship. Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) established the
right for welfare recipients to be able to move freely from state to state without having to
undergo a provisionary period without their benefits, or the need to prove they were not
motivated to move for more generous benefits. These cases in and of themselves helped
contribute to the massive expansion of relief, increasing the pool of eligible people and making it
easier for those already eligible to access their benefits, but they were also intended to serve as
part of a broader strategy, mirroring and bolstering Piven and Cloward’s Crisis Theory (Krislov,
1973).
Ed Sparer, Executive Director of Columbia University’s Center on Social Welfare, Policy
and Law, was the architect of the NWRO’s legal strategy and a close confidant of George Wiley.
Sparer was not content with simply providing “band-aid” solutions to the problems facing
welfare recipients, and he sought to implement a strategy to chip away at the categorical nature
of the welfare system, developing in its place a universal one (Bussiere 2001). Sparer’s plan
proposed an “Initial legal strategy” that could call “for an equal protection attack against
exclusions within federal categories, which—with time and success—would lead to an attack
against the categories themselves” (1971:70). Sparer predicted, “If the assaults as planned were
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to succeed, the nature of the American welfare system would be changed, something akin to a
“right to live” would gradually emerge, and a better society would result” (1971: 67).
Sparer was not alone among welfare rights movement participants in articulating his
desire for establishing a “right to live,” but he was particularly explicit about why he believed it
to be achievable, and how the “right to live” came into stark conflict with waged labor. For
Sparer, one of the most important questions to resolve was addressing the way welfare policies
have functioned as a labor regulation device since the English Poor Laws. Recounting a history
of welfare programs outlined by Polanyi (1944) and Piven and Cloward (1993), Sparer asserted:
Anglo-American welfare programs throughout their history have been pegged to the “work test”
as a means of guaranteeing that able bodied men or women will not turn to welfare as a substitute
for work… When included in the welfare system, the able bodied person’s willingness to accept
an available job—no matter how menial in nature or inadequate in salary—has been a condition
for the welfare grant. The greatest fear has been that the poor will lose interest in menial jobs and
that without the “work test” there no longer will be a supply of desperate workers (Sparer 1971:
88-89).

Sparer didn’t just oppose welfare programs with punitive work tests, he also rejected
more popular “work incentives” such as a negative income tax plan which would allow welfare
recipients to keep a portion of their earnings. Sparer opposed these programs on pragmatic
grounds (they would be too expensive to implement) and more principled ones: because they
continued to “condition survival of the needy poor on their willingness to accept menial jobs, just
as effectively as the most harshly administered work test—or perhaps more effectively” (Sparer,
90). Rather than perpetuate a system intended to maintain a supply of “desperate workers,”
Sparer implored people to “analyze what we want by way of a welfare system, what other goals
are inconsistent with our own goals” (Sparer 1971:88). In other words, Sparer underscored how
an insistence on work as evidence of deservingness, stood in the way of policies that actually
met people’s needs. Instead of shying away from the fact that a guaranteed income might allow
many to leave the labor market, Sparer envisioned this as one of its benefits to society:
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Suppose a welfare system offered an adequate grant to all those in need (with income below it),
and a right to refuse work which paid less than the welfare grant. If as a result, private business
and government were forced to reorganize the economy to ensure that it provided purposeful and
well paying work, would not that be desirable? Are we not producing the opposite result when we
subsidize… the most pointless and exploitative jobs in the economy while denying decent welfare
grants to those who cannot work? (Sparer 1971: 84).

In this aspect of his argument, Sparer’s analysis resembles a number of far Leftist antiwork
theorists who criticize reforms that seek redistribution without also welcoming a transformation
to production. Gilles Dauvé, for example, points to a common critiques of antiwork politics
which oppose them by posing the question ‘but who will take out the trash if people refuse
work?’ Dauvé argues this analysis is overly narrow, and that antiwork politics should be
desirable precisely because they would compel a fundamental reorganization of “the process and
logic of garbage creation and disposal” (Dauvé 2015:54), among other facets of production.
Sparer, in rejecting work tests and work incentives, attempted to forge a constitutional
path towards guaranteeing a universal right to live, regardless of workforce participation, and
against other typical conditions for welfare, such as motherhood. Scholars have argued that at
times this univeralist strategy brought the legal faction of the movement into conflict with the
women recipients within NWRO who feared having their privileges eroded if this expansive
objective was not reached (Bussiere 2001).
Despite the highly visible and robust extent of Sparer’s analysis, Nadasen (2008), argues
that lawyers of the movement preferred work as the solution to recipients’ poverty, silencing the
profound (and certainly not hidden) insights offered by Sparer who emphasized the problematic
moral and pragmatic implications of making relief conditional on waged work. This is just one of
many examples of silencing that the NWRO’s critiques of waged work has sustained by existing
scholarship.

68

What is lost in this incorrect interpretation? Historical accuracy is a necessary component
of any scholarship, but especially in the development of social movement lineages as these
legacies help inform later political projects. Many of the same questions that were raised during
the era of the NWRO continue to be asked today, these conversations would benefit greatly from
the robust analysis and critical insights of provocative, critical thinkers like Sparer, who already
grappled with these questions.

Oppositional Consciousness
Above I have challenged existing scholarship on the welfare rights movement’s stance
towards waged work, especially by focusing on archival material that has been ignored by
existing scholarship and is at variance with most common analyses of the causes and solutions to
poverty. I argue that participants in NWRO articulated trenchant critiques of waged work and
employment programs, not in order to reform or improve work but, to describe how poverty was
constitutive of the employment relationship, and to decouple income from work. Nevertheless, in
focusing on material that helps elucidate their criticisms of waged work, I have de-centered other
beliefs and desires articulated by movement participants. At times NWRO undeniably resorted to
arguments that held up the work ethic as an arbiter of decent and deserving citizens. For
example, in a factsheet that attempted to address frequently asked questions about NWRO’s
counterproposal to FAP, NWRO wondered: “Wouldn’t people stop working if they were
guaranteed an income?” the pamphlet asserts “no,” “poor people want to work and have to work
harder than others. Poor people respond to the same incentives as everyone else.”38
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How are we to understand an organization that devoted an enormous amount of time and
effort to challenging the idea of deservingness delineated by waged work but then nonetheless
attempts to reassure skeptics by resorting to the same logic? Is it possible for scholars to make
sense of contradictory views, and the way structures of power and privilege impact belief
systems without resorting to paternalistic notions like “false consciousness?” Indeed existing
scholarship on ideology and social movements can provide helpful hints for us as we unpack the
challenges NWRO faced in developing and articulating an antiwork political imaginary in a
society deeply invested in waged labor.
Writing a few decades after the decline of NWRO, Kathi Weeks expounded upon the
enormous role wage labor plays in mediating all aspects of life in contemporary society. She
argued,
Waged work remains today the centerpiece of late capitalist economic systems; it is, of course,
the way most people acquire access to the necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. It is not
only the primary mechanism by which income is distributed, it is also the basic means by
which status is allocated, and by which most people gain access to healthcare and retirement.
After the family, waged work is often the most important, if not sole, source of sociality for
millions. Raising children with attributes that will secure them forms of employment that can
match if not surpass the class standing of their parents is the gold standard of parenting.
(Weeks 2011:6-7)

Not only is work the means through which most people ensure their economic survival, but
Weeks argues it is also the primary means through which people are integrated “into social,
political, and familial modes of cooperation. That individuals should work is fundamental to the
basic social contract…and for that reason, is treated as a basic obligation of citizenship” (Weeks
2011:8).
Far from just a material concern, Weeks underscores that the morality and values
attributed to work are extremely pervasive and imposing. “The category of the work society
refers not just to the socially mediating and subjectively constitutive roles of work but to the
dominance of its values.” Therefore, Weeks argues, “Challenging the present organization of
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work requires not only that we confront its reification and depoliticization but also its
normativity and moralization. Work is not just defended on grounds of economic necessity and
social duty; it is widely understood as an individual moral practice and collective ethical
obligation” (Weeks 2011:10). If we can fairly easily identify the pervasive and hegemonic reach
of the work ethic, it is much more difficult to ascertain how challenges to it may and do come
about. How does an “insubordination to the work ethic” develop in light of work’s
pervasiveness? (Berardi 1980:169 quoted in Weeks). And how can we even identify this
“insubordination” when it arises, if, as we have seen with the NWRO’s critiques, these are
sometimes articulated in ambiguous, contradictory or polyphonic ways?
When Marx claimed, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e.
the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual
force” (Marx and Engels 1970:64), did he believe the working class was destined to blind
obedience to hegemonic values? Marx and Gramsci, among others, argued that although ruling
classes develop ideological structures to justify and legitimate structures of inequality, these
hegemonic values are not totalizing and remain subject to challenges to their legitimacy. How
then do these challenges come about? Marx implies that it is through praxis—actions rather than
abstract ideas— that the working class gains clarity and a class consciousness, but he does not
provide a fully fledged map of how this takes place. Gramsci similarly wondered how the
working class might shake off its ideological servitude, concluding that it is only by building a
counter ideology of their own as an antidote to that of the ruling class (Gramsci 1971: 376-7).
Contemporary scholars of social movements have identified this counter ideology as an
“oppositional consciousness” that occurs when an “oppositional culture” develops in contrast to
or challenging a “culture of subordination” (Morris and Braine 2001). I believe if we view
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resistance to work as an oppositional consciousness that emerges in contrast to the culture of
subordination to the work ethic we may better understand how it might be that, for example,
welfare activists could simultaneous articulate stark critiques of the work ethic, while at times
deploying it to seek legitimacy. Morris and Braine argue it is common for two conflicting
“cultures” or consciousness to coexist. They aver,
Opposition is often present in the same cultural materials that promote submission. Rather than
running along parallel tracks, cultures of subordination and cultures of opposition travel
crisscrossing routes with frequent collisions and cross fertilization. Thus, much of Black
religion speaks simultaneously of overthrowing oppression and rewarding meek souls in a
blissful afterlife. These cultures embody, therefore, an internal contest between opposition and
subordination…. Indeed, members of oppressed groups tend to vacillate between their
oppositional and subordinate cultures (Morris and Braine 2001:22-23).

Morris and Braine find that between dueling consciousnesses, the culture of subordination will
often win out because people lack the concrete means of overcoming repression and are well
versed in the potential risks of challenging hegemonic structures. They emphasize that,
Oppositional cultures often do not provide potential collective actors with the directions and
strategies required to overcome repression. As a result, when cultures of opposition and
subordination weave back and forth in their crossing, the culture of subordination often wins
out because it focuses on the abundant knowledge of the negative consequences associated
with rebellion. (Morris and Braine 2001:26)

Given the lack of knowledge of strategies necessary to overcoming repression, Morris and
Braine argue it is often the task of organizers to elevate and encourage previously latent
oppositional consciousness, emphasizing structural problems as sources of people’s
dissatisfactions rather than individual failings.
Oppositional consciousness directs individuals away from explanations of their fate based on
neutral impersonal forces or personal shortcomings and identifies dominant groups and their
structures of domination as the source of oppression. Oppositional consciousness thus critiques
and undermines the submissive messages that sprout from the cultures of subordination. In the
evolution to oppositional consciousness that we describe, mere sense of difference, selfpreservation, opposition, anger, and resentment develops into an understanding of unequal
power, injustice, and finally the systemic quality of the oppression (2001:27).

Rick Fantasia’s Cultures of Solidarity provides insightful analysis of the ideology and
resistance of working-class laborers, and identifies a similar tendency of multiple, sometimes
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contradictory ideas to exist within individuals or groups. Fantasia is particularly interested in
“‘explosions of consciousness’ that erupt periodically and sometimes contradict the result of
surveys” (Fantasia 1988) and also emphasizes the importance of praxis in bringing oppositional
consciousness to the fore. While critical of surveys of workers’ attitudes (I discuss these in the
methods chapter) Fantasia is particularly careful to not ascribe a “truth” to actions over survey
data, but argues that predicting class consciousness based on limited and fixed studies can
overlook a number of important components which lead to upheaval and a more potent class
consciousness. Fantasia and others claim this is one of the fruitful insights of Marx’s rejection of
both Hegel’s idealism and Feuerbach’s (vulgar) materialism: What determines ideology, or class
consciousness is not a direct reflection of material life (as Feuerbach might have posited), nor do
ideas alone create the material realities in which people live (as a simplistic reading of Hegel
might assume), rather it is through the practice of transforming and enacting class struggle that
ideas and material conditions change, bringing once latent beliefs to the fore.
This analysis can illuminate the development of NWRO’s dissident perspectives on work,
which gained increasing clarity and force as the movement asserted itself. Participants often
spoke of the impact NWRO involvement had on shifting their perspectives, encouraging them to
reject individualized shame and sharpen their political analyses.
Existing scholarship on the welfare rights movement has emphasized what Piven and
Cloward term welfare recipients’ “moral economy of domesticity” to explain the ideological
foundation for their rejection of waged work,
we can see the traditional caretaking values of the moral economy of the family that provoked
the political action of women and also guided its forms, much as “the moral economy of
subsistence” or the “moral economy of the English crowed” provoked and guided the political
actions of peasants. More than that, caretaking values sometimes armed women to challenge or
defy the dominant values of the public world, and particularly the values of the market, for
when women entered the public world, the moral economy of domesticity inevitably clashed
with the doctrines of laissez fare (1997:220)
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Although is true that values of caretaking sometimes animated welfare recipients’ justifications
for evading work, NWRO also relied on other ideological justifications and wellsprings to form
the base of recipients’ critiques of waged work. These included a structural critique whereby
NWRO activists asserted that the problems poor people experienced in the work force could not
be dealt with by isolated reforms, but rather these problems were constitutive of waged work; a
second major influence was the historic injustice of slavery and the exploitation of Black
workers throughout American history.
George Rudé argues that working-class consciousness develops from an amalgam of an
‘inherent element’ “a sort of “mother’s milk ideology based on direct experience” (1980:22) and
a stock of ideas that are “‘derived’ or “borrowed from others” (ibid) which he argues “could only
be effectively absorbed if the ground was already prepared” (29). We may think of the influences
on NWRO’s critiques of work springing from the “inherent element” of highly unpleasant, low
wage work experiences, coming into contact with arguments for guaranteed income (the
“derived” element) at a moment of world historical upswell and institutional transformation.
This last aspect Rudé identifies as the third element impacting the development of working-class
consciousness, what E.P Thompson called “the sharp jostle of experience” (quoted in Rudé
1908:29) or the historical circumstances in which these ideas mix. In the previous chapter I
examined the political economic context in which the NWRO’s critiques of work developed in
hopes of gaining greater insights into why in this particular moment it became possible and
desirable to offer a “redistribution of the sensible” (Rancière 2012), challenging the longstanding belief that work was the primary means through which poor people could improve their
lot.
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Conclusion: Retrenchment
In this chapter I have argued that the welfare rights movement developed a radical
critique of waged work that became especially prominent as the movement gained members and
political power. Very early statements from the membership expressed sentiments like Johnnie
Tillmon’s 1966 insistence that mothers on welfare wanted to work. “Everybody is dying for a
job, she said. ‘Everybody is saying, yes, we want to be trained for something that pays decently”
(Orleck 2005:109, Original quote appears in West 1981:92). But by the late 1960s and early
1970s this had palpably shifted towards a dramatic reconfiguration, demanding guaranteed
income for all poor people, regardless of gender or workforce participation, and criticizing the
notion that waged labor could resolve poverty. But by 1973 shifts in the movement’s finances,
membership base and political influence contributed once again to a reconfiguration of its
analysis.
In 1973 George Wiley departed from the organization he founded due to a number of
internal conflicts and, to a large degree, disagreement over the strategic potential of the NWRO’s
analysis of waged work (West 1981:124-125; Nadasen 2005:223). The organization he founded
following his departure, Movement for Economic Justice (MEJ), emphasized broader goals of
economic justice and deemphasized welfare and guaranteed incomes. West summarized this
transition writing, that Wiley “believed that another group of low-income people in the $5,000k
to $15,000 income range (approximately 70 million), who were generally ‘very hostile to welfare
recipients and adamantly opposed to NWRO’s plan’ for a guaranteed income, might be
mobilized around other economic issues. Instead of welfare, the issues would be ‘tax reform,
national health insurance and housing.’” West emphasized Wiley’s hope that the new movement
should be “‘an organization of taxpayers’ with the emphasis on the needs of working people and
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other poor people, rather than on welfare benefits for poor women and their dependent children”
(West 1981:124).
Importantly, West emphasized how different this new organization was from the
antiwork analysis and goals of the NWRO:
As a new movement organization of poor people, the MEJ appears to have had more political
appeal within the liberal sector than had NWRO. Its emphasis on values, goals, and strategies
that were consonant with the basic U.S. principle of income through work and achievement
decreased the cost of participation for potential members and supporters at a time of increasing
hostility toward the dependent poor (West 1981, 125).

Wiley’s departure coincided with a massive decline in broader working class militancy, and a
simultaneous sustained assault on welfare recipients, both ideologically and materially. In the
preceding chapter we examined the extent to which these two phenomena were intertwined,
underscoring among other things, the extent to which business interests believed generous
welfare benefits to be promoting a culture of entitlement and rebelliousness amongst the broader
working class.
A number of ideological shifts took place in this era, especially an increasing vilification
of the Black poor, which many have argued made organizing support around welfare and poverty
particularly difficult (West 1981:125; Nadasen 2005; Reese 2005). As a result, the NWRO
found itself on the defensive. Transformations to welfare programs, especially the abolition of
special grants, greatly hindered the ability of the organization to acquire and retain membership
while, Wiley’s departure dramatically impacted the organization’s ability to fundraise. Many of
the NWRO’s former benefactors, including churches and foundations, moved to supporting MEJ
and Wiley instead of the faltering NWRO. Despite their best efforts, significant debts forcing
the closing of the NWRO’s headquarters in the Spring of 1975 (West 1981; Nadasen 2005).
In the final months of the organization’s life, its rigorous critiques of waged work appeared
to falter as NWRO attempted to foster support and allies where ever it could. This defensive, and
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somewhat panicked retreat from the organization’s earlier vehement analysis helps to underscore
how unique, vibrant and militant their critiques of waged work were for a number of powerful
years.
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Chapter 4: The Radical Feminist Legacy of the National Welfare Rights Organization

For the propertied bourgeois woman her house is the world. For the proletarian woman the
whole world is her house, the world with its sorrows and its joy, with its cold cruelty and its
brutal size. —Rosa Luxemburg, The Proletarian Woman

Introduction
Inspired by the larger Black freedom movement and propelled by their own experience of
exploitative jobs, poverty wages, and paternalistic, intrusive, and stingy public programs, welfare
activists took to the streets, welfare centers, and courts alike with the aspiration that women’s
lives would no longer be dictated by husbands, employers, government bureaucrats, and clerks.
In so doing they forged a subversive feminist politics which remains underappreciated and yet is
deeply relevant to today’s political landscape. In this chapter I revisit some of the more avantgarde feminist features of the movement: its critique of waged work, prosex attitudes, and an
encompassing understanding of social reproduction.

Black Maternalists or towards something new altogether?
The mainstream women’s movement was hopeful that the Equal Rights Amendment
would finally guarantee women equality in the workplace. By contrast, the NWRO demanded
the freedom to not work. In 1972, gesturing to their substantive differences with the women’s
movement, welfare rights activist Johnnie Tillmon proclaimed that the welfare rights movement
was the vanguard of women’s freedom “because we have so few illusions and because our issues
are so important to all women” (1972). One of the primary illusions the NWRO militated against
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was the popular insistence that waged work could offer the solution to the problems of women or
people of color (Le Blanc and Yates 2013; Kornbluh 1998; Nadasen 2002; Stein 2016).
Participants in the movement developed vigorous critiques of job-training programs, low-wage
jobs, and even the broader capitalist institution of waged labor. These criticisms emerged
partially in response to new policies at the local, state and federal levels which sought to curtail
rising welfare rolls by imposing work requirements on welfare recipients, as well as from their
own extensive experience of often back-breaking and low-wage work. In widely distributed
pamphlets, activists rejected the popular argument that waged work would “give them a sense of
dignity, self -worth, and confidence,” arguing instead that it “institutionalized poverty” (Wiley
Papers, box 1952).
In speeches, interviews, newsletters and more, participants demonstrated a critical stance
toward waged work with particularly sophisticated analyses of the intersectional ways their
positions as, in Tilmon’s (1972) words, fat, Black, middle-aged mothers rendered them
particularly vulnerable to exploitation. The culmination of NWRO’s theorization of waged work
is most clearly and vociferously articulated in their 1970 proposed alternative to Nixon’s welfare
reform plan. In Bill HR 7257, also known as “The Adequate Income Plan” NWRO declared:
The real employment problem is not that people need jobs and jobs need people. It is that
employment does not distribute wealth the way its advocates claim it does. As a wealth
distribution system employment has never worked well for the poor, especially the black poor.
Even if all eligible Americans were employed today, the poverty rate would not be seriously
affected.39

In the place of “slave jobs” and “forced work,” recipients sought a “guaranteed adequate
income” for all Americans, similar in many substantive ways to today’s calls for Universal Basic
Income (UBI).
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Many scholars have made sense of this fervent critique of waged work (and the
movement’s sharp divergence from both the civil rights and women’s movements positions on
work) by emphasizing that welfare activists eschewed waged work out of a prioritization of
motherhood and care labor. Guida West argues, “Welfare rights women identified themselves
primarily as mothers, fought for ‘mother power’ in the political arena, and argued that mothering
was an important job that should be adequately subsidized by the state” (1998, 100). Ellen Reese
understands the strategy of demanding income rather than work as “a product of its time. In
1970, only about 30 percent of married women were in the labor force. Like others, the NWRO
embraced the family wage system, demanding poor mothers’ right to stay at home with their
children” (2005, 114). Denton echoes this sentiment insisting that “welfare recipients focused on
mothers’ roles as nurturers and providers. . . Even though many of these women also worked
outside the home in low-income jobs, their lives tended to center on home and children” (2012,
217). Premilla Nadasen interprets this aversion to waged work as an expression of Black
women’s desire to receive benefits, social and material, that maternalists had long granted white,
middle-class women. Additionally, Nadasen argues, “Wage work for poor women and most
Black women often meant long hours, drudgery, and meager rewards, not a fulfilling career. . . .
Given the opportunity, many poor African American women preferred to stay home” (2002,
280). For Nadasen “this, in itself, was a radical challenge to the socially defined gender roles of
poor Black women, who had never been seen primarily as homemakers or mothers” (286).
Marisa Chappell interprets much of the fight over welfare reform in the late 1960s to
have been centered around reasserting the hegemony of the male bread winner family model:
homogenizing the very large distinctions in logic and rationale held between different
constituents: “this commitment to enabling male breadwinning and female homemaking among
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poor African Americans led the anti-poverty coalition—from middle class liberals and radicals to
AFDC recipients— to demand a radical kind of welfare reform.” (ie the guaranteed income)”
(Chappell 2010:57-58). Chappell further argues,
Employing a model of motherhood-as-service that reached back to maternalist reformers of the
Progressive Era, the NWRO compared AFDC recipients—The “MOTHER CORPS”— to
members of the peace corps. Welfare Mothers had “been employed by your federal, state, and
local governments to see to it that 3 ½ million children are raised to be strong, healthy, active,
productive, responsible citizens of this society.” The problem these citizen-mothers faced was
simply “a very bad contract” (Chappell 2010:100).

Welfare recipients undeniably did, at times, rely on their subject position as mothers as a
foundation from which to argue for the importance of welfare, providing not only their own
livelihood but also their children’s. Their motto “Mother Power!” featured prominently at
protests on signs and buttons alike. The logic animated arguments for guaranteed income in
many publications produced by the NWRO, for example in 1969 the Ohio Steering Committee
For Adequate Welfare newsletter argued, “There is no reason why any mother with school age
children to care for should be forced to work. Raising children under conditions of poverty is in
itself one of the most difficult jobs imaginable.”40
The NWRO’s rejection of waged work was sometimes framed on the basis of insisting
they were needed in the home with their children. From the flier “Facts About the Anti Welfare
Law” the first “most important” provision they critiqued was that it “Forces mothers to work,”
“This law takes away the right of welfare mothers to decide when it is in the best interests of
their children to remain at home as a full-time mother. It authorizes welfare bureaucrats to force
mothers to leave their children and go to work outside their homes. If a mother refuses, she is to
be cut off welfare and may have her children taken away from her and put in foster homes.” 41
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Although it is clear that the poor Black women who made up the grassroots of the welfare
rights movement were long denied the racialized benefits of maternalism, and that insisting on
those rights challenged some long-standing, discriminatory norms, I believe scholars’
interpretation of the movement’s objectives, emphasizing as they do “staying home” and lives
centered around children, flattens out much of the more vibrant and radical analyses welfare
activists offered.42 I propose instead that much of the archival record suggests NWRO
participants did not uniformly share the presumption that a woman’s place should either be at
home with their children or at work, but that many fervently challenged these narrow options for
women, insisting on a different priority.
These clashing perspectives came to a head when the U.S. Congress Joint Economic
Committee held a hearing on Income Maintenance Programs in 1968, where Beulah Sanders, a
recipient activist in the NWRO, and Representative Martha Griffiths, the self-anointed “most
dedicated feminist we have in Congress,” disagreed over the impact work requirements would
have on welfare recipients, as well as their understanding of what constituted the life of a welfare
recipient. Griffiths argued in favor of attaching work requirements to welfare benefits, claiming
that without them, women would be relegated to their homes. By forcing women into the waged
workforce Griffiths believed the government would be ensuring “those people [welfare
recipients] have a right to participate in the economy of this country” (Hearings on Income
Maintenance 1968:76). Sanders responded to this argument by asking if she could comment on
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transformation, and that much existing scholarship misses what is in fact radical about the NWRO.
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this claim “woman to woman,” therefore challenging Griffith’s assertion that she represented the
sole voice of feminism:
One of the things we are concerned about is being forced into these nonexisting positions which
might be going out and cleaning Mrs. A’s kitchen. I am not going to do that because I feel I am
more valuable and I can do something else. This is one of those things these people are worrying
about, that they are going to be pushed into doing housework when they can be much more
valuable doing something else. . . . What they have that is going for them is the nitty-gritty stuff
and that is out into the community, mixing with the people, finding out what their problems are,
and trying to help solve those problems (ibid 77–78).

Sanders’s statement encapsulates a unique position NWRO developed regarding waged labor,
care work, and civic engagement. She challenged the prevalent views that waged work held
intrinsic value for women, or that by rebuffing waged work, women would be cloistered in their
homes. Instead Sanders asserts that they had more “valuable”—primarily political—tasks to
attend to. Contra many scholarly narratives of the NWRO, Sanders and others often did not
appeal to a Black maternalist logic arguing for the importance of care labor provided by mothers,
but rather the necessity and relevance of community engagement. This passage is also quoted, in
part, by Felicia Kornbluh in her book The Battle for Welfare Rights, although she leaves out the
especially relevant insight: “They can be much more valuable doing something else . . . what
they have that is going for them is the nitty-gritty stuff and that is out into the community,
mixing with the people, finding out what their problems are, and trying to help solve those
problems” (ibid). By ignoring the end of Sanders’s sentence, Kornbluh concludes that Sanders is
articulating a fear that “welfare mothers who wanted to spend most of their time raising their
children would be forced to do something else for a living” (2007, 99). This example is
emblematic of the erasure that welfare recipients’ distinctive interventions have faced.
Rather than simply allowing them access to the vaunted but often inaccessible role of
housewife and mother, welfare and the welfare rights movement provided recipients with an
education in political mobilization, and the means to act on it. This analysis was far from unique
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to Sanders. In numerous accounts, welfare activists underscored the sense of fulfillment they
achieved through their political activism. Jacqueline Pope joined the Brooklyn Welfare
Organization (B-WAC) as a recipient and eventually became a national organizer and later,
scholar. Her accounts of the movement further affirm that the maternalist discourse deployed at
times by recipients and emphasized by scholars was not the entire story. Pope recalled,
The organizers helped clients face reality about the unlikelihood of obtaining employment that
would offer a salary adequate enough to make them self-sufficient and free of the welfare system.
Accordingly, B-WAC promoted discussions concerning social or political unsalaried community
participation that was as important as salaried work. In essence, people could make contributions
to improving the quality of community life regardless of their employment status. Former
members agreed that organizers were relatively successful in this effort and that most members
were pledged to a continuing civic involvement. (1989: 103)

B-WAC developed an extensive curriculum of leadership classes, which it offered at its
Bushwick location to standing-room-only crowds. These offerings included five distinct classes
on welfare case law; how to organize welfare rights groups; how to plan and implement actions,
particularly direct action related to welfare rights; causes and explanations of the welfare crisis;
and understanding the local political landscape. B-WAC was by far the largest welfare rights
organization within the NWRO, comprising a third of the national organization’s membership
and it’s clear their model of education and mutual aid was deeply empowering to participants.
More than ten years after the decline of the Brooklyn organization, Ms. Wise, a former
participant, reflected on her experience in the movement and the reverberations it had through
other civic organizations, saying,
I learned I am somebody. Welfare Rights meant a right to life—it freed me from emotional
slavery. I am a person you can’t push aside, I have the right to be. Welfare Rights showed me that
my counterparts are all around; knowing this, I no longer felt alone. Welfare Rights lives, I and
other people are still active, struggling for a better life. PTAs, school boards, even political clubs
have former welfare rights members and we continue pushing the welfare rights agenda (quoted in
Pope 1990: 73).

The empowerment, joy and satisfaction that recipient activists felt due to their activism
resonates in in many accounts of the movement. Orleck’s interviews with Nevada welfare rights
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organizers express this in both light-hearted and profound ways. One activist recounted being
arrested:
They took us downtown, fingerprinted us and put us in a cell. The women were singing civil
rights songs in their cells in the Clark County jail when the bailiff came to tell them they were
free to go. ‘I was peeved to be bailed out so soon,’ Duncan laughs. She was looking forward
to a night’s sleep and having someone else do the cooking.. ‘yeah,’ says Mary Wesley. ‘They
didn’t let us get our rest.’ In January 1970, Duncan, Beals, Wesley, Stampley, and several
other CCWRO women were convicted of disorderly conduct and sentenced to perform
community service at local Boys’ Clubs. ‘That just meant...that we had to go on doing what
we were doing anyway’ (Orleck 2006:126).

Their disappointment at not being kept in jail overnight and instead having to return home to
cook and clean could have been tongue in cheek, but the genuine pride in their political
successes is unquestionable. Activist Ruby Duncan recounted to Orleck, “it was so much fun to
demand… to know that we were demanding from this big entity, this institution, the state.
Knowing how ruthless they were to poor people. And especially a group of us so-called
uneducated. I think they were caught by surprise as much as we were” (Orleck 2006:125-126).
Duncan also recounted the thrill of shutting down the Vegas strip saying “They closed their
doors. No hotel had ever closed its doors on the Strip. But they were worried about us. That day
was the greatest satisfaction of my life” (Orleck 2006:158). Hyperbole is a well-documented
feature of activism that is often deployed strategically to emphasize hardship or inflate the size of
attendance at a crowd, signifying robust support. It is possible activists were being hyperbolic in
asserting the joy they acquired from their activism, but by insisting they primarily wanted to
“stay home” scholars undermine the resounding emphasis welfare activists place on the
importance of their political efforts. Activism was not simply pursued by welfare recipients as a
means to be able to stay home, but as a genuine source of strength, pride and accomplishment in
its own right.
The now-adult children of welfare activists recount childhoods not of cookie-cutter
mothers whose ultimate priority and joy was homemaking, but rather of activists pursuing
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something akin to a calling, which often relegated mothering to a secondary priority.43 This is
not to suggest that welfare recipients were bad mothers by any means, but the repeated insistence
by scholars that their lives center around children and the desire to “stay home” is not visible in
the archival record to the extent that these other overlooked values and objectives are evident.
NWRO members not only sought support and recognition for their community activism,
but some recipients expressed irritation with the emphasis on motherhood as patronizing or
condescending. Indeed, recipients sometimes became indignant at the emphasis on children as
the justification for their benefits. For example, a number of recipients interviewed in George T.
Martin’s 1972 study of the movement critiqued the insistence on the motherhood framing
although their discomfort was often expressed indirectly. “The basic problem with welfare rights
in Detroit,” one interviewee stated, “is the overbearing influence of X and Y. . . . They have a
condescending attitude towards the mothers. They act and talk as if the mothers are incapable of
making their own decisions. They refer to recipients as ‘the mothers’ or ‘our mothers’ in talking
to non recipients” (Martin 1972:143. And another informant: “I don’t get along with Y at all. She
infantilizes the recipients” (1972: 145). It would be impossible to overlook the fact that
motherhood was the condition for all but a very few recipients’ benefits, but the fact that the state
recognized motherhood as a role which merited some form of recompense—and that it therefore
made strategic sense to deploy it at times publicly—does not necessarily mean it was the main
way participants ultimately defined themselves or their efforts as worthwhile.
Recipients identified civic engagement as a productive effort, deserving of both respect
and remuneration, and movement participants repeatedly challenged the familiar dichotomy
between “home or work,” and in the process delineated a more innovative form of feminism than
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is often ascribed to them. Think, for example, of the way they couched their demand for
childcare, which they thought should be provided regardless of whether they were working or
not. To be sure, lack of childcare was often identified by NWRO as a reason why it was unjust to
expect mothers of young children to work. However, members of NWRO did not desire
childcare solely to facilitate labor market participation, as many contemporary liberals do:44 they
laid claim to it more generally for the autonomy it would provide. Numerous NWRO
publications argued for opposing Nixon’s proposed welfare reforms partially on the basis that
childcare provisions were inadequate and overly geared toward enforcing wage labor. They
asserted that childcare was “not really designed to help mothers and children; they are designed
to rationalize the Family Assistance Plan’s onerous forced work requirement—to ‘free’ mothers
so they may labor for slave wages.”45 Other publications highlighting NWRO’s demands
emphasized the importance of accessible, high-quality childcare regardless of whether a woman
was working or not. “Mothers,” they noted, “especially need childcare that will free them for
community involvement.”46
The exigence, and efficacy of community involvement was noted by many participants
and observers of the movement. Margaret Prescod, a co-founder of Black Women for Wages for
Housework, collaborated with numerous welfare rights activists in NWRO including partnering
with Beulah Sanders during the UN Women’s Decade Conference in Houston in 1977. Prescod
recalled community mobilization in Brownsville led by welfare recipient activists who were “at
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the forefront leading this really important struggle” as a major source of her political training and
awakening (Author’s Interview March 25, 2019).
For Prescod, and others, recognizing the significance of the political work undertaken by
welfare recipients is crucial to making sense of the intense backlash welfare recipients faced in
the following years. Prescod stated,
Whoever crafted these workfare [requirements] knew what they were doing: Having to go
work one of these low wage jobs meant that that took time away from the kind of community
work that welfare mothers were doing – this was a big kept secret— Leading the fight for
housing, open admissions, community control, whatever. (Ibid)

Authors affiliated with Zerowork, examined working class mobilizations of the 1960s and ‘70s
and came to a similar conclusion as to why welfare programs were attacked with such vitriol:
First of all the legacy of Johnson’s Great Society had to be wiped out. Those measures and
those agencies were already obsolete, not so much because they did not accomplish the goals
for which they were created, but because... they became a means for financing and organizing
social struggles (Carpiagnano 1975 23).

By ignoring both its political motivation and implications, emphasis on motherhood as
the justification for and objective of welfare support in existing scholarships on NWRO has
obscured some of the more nuanced and radical ways recipient activists made sense of their
situations and justified their role not only as productive members of society, but as empowered
participants in a democracy. For the NWRO, a woman’s place was not exclusively in the office
nor the home: it was also, importantly, in the community. This remains a particularly relevant
insight today as interest in UBI gains traction. Some feminists have opposed UBI with the belief
that it would only further entrench gendered divisions of labor and ensure women would be stuck
at home (Bergmann 2004; Robeyns 2008). The history of the NWRO offers an example of the
existing legacy of feminists who favor a guaranteed income for the increased political
engagement it could make possible, not simply so they could “stay home.” Additionally,
scholarship that insists welfare was primarily obtained in order to facilitate domestic, private
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lives, obscures what was indeed so potent and threatening about the “welfare explosion”: it
financed wide spread social struggle, not simply domestic retreat.

Wages for Housework
The welfare rights movement’s influence on contemporaneous social struggles was
almost immediately noted by many engaged in and studying them. One notable and influence of
the NWRO was on the Wages for Housework (WFH) movement, which Silvia Federici, one of
WFH’s founding members, has acknowledged was deeply inspired by the welfare rights
movement.
Existing scholarship on the welfare rights movement has noted this influence; however,
by mischaracterizing WFH’s aspirations and demands, it often fails to acknowledge the decisive
parallels between these two movements. Part of the short-sighted analysis current scholarship has
offered on the welfare rights movement is visible in the analogies drawn with the Wages for
Housework movement. Nadasen (2002) for example writes, “the wages for housework
campaign, which involved both working class and middle class white women, more closely
parallel welfare recipients’ demands for economic support for motherhood... Much like the
welfare rights movement, wages for housework advocates wanted the work that women did in
the home to be recognized and rewarded” (2002: 280). But in summarizing wages for
housework’s goals thus, Nadasen eclipses what was in fact the most radical and unique aspect of
the movement’s strategy and analysis. WFH was not a movement that simply sought to gain
recompense for gendered household labor, rather it aspired, quite explicitly, to cause a crisis in
the existing arrangement, in order to transform rather than enshrine care labor. By demanding
that women be paid for the often-unrecognized labor they were performing in the home WFH
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hoped to render the existing arrangement too expensive to maintain, compelling a massive
transformation in how responsibilities were apportioned, not just within individual families but
across society.
In a recent anthology of Wages for Housework literature, Federici addressed this
question, distinguishing WFH from other “mother’s pensions” and remuneration for housework
plans which had gained intermittent visibility throughout the late 19th and mid 20th century.
These first endorsements marked a political turn in the popular and institutional conception of
housework. They paved the way to the recognition that the housewife is a worker…There
was, however, a profound difference between the perspective of the 19th century supporters of
wages for housework and that of our campaign. For most of them wages for housework was
the just remuneration of a work with which they identified but wished to see upgraded…
Demanding WFH was for them an affirmation of housework, while for us it expressed the
refusal of a work by which we felt imprisoned and whose ends (the provision of cheap, docile,
disciplined workers) we rejected as social and feminist ideals (Federici, 2017: 15).

Federici continues her critique of this subtle, yet extremely crucial distinction, arguing
that earlier demands for wages for housework more closely resembled a “union demand, a
recognition of the ‘social usefullness’ of domestic work, but understood as an occupation only of
concern for mothers and wives. It was not (as it was for us) an anti-capitalist strategy intended
not only to end women’s dependence on men but also to subvert the hierarchies constructed on
our unpaid domestic labor and the use of the wage as a means of exploitation and social control”
(ibid p 16). Federici thus clarifies that the project of Wages for Housework was not simply for
recognition nor even remuneration, as scholars like Nadasen have wrongly insisted. Instead,
drawing directly from the inspiration of NWRO, Wages for Housework demanded a wage in
order to bring about different social arrangements, not simply to extend existing privileges to
different classes of people.
Additionally, established scholarship fails to acknowledge the contribution NWRO’s
tactical approach made to collectives like WFH, not only in seeking to establish the right to
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income for groups who had been too often denied it, but also importantly their strategic analysis.
Wages for Housework derived their crisis strategy— make a demand that is too expensive for the
system to tolerate, in order to bring about a new system— directly from Piven and Cloward’s
strategy of crisis which forged NWRO’s approach to resolving the problem of poverty.

Sexual Liberation, Reproductive Justice
It was not just on the question of waged work or motherhood that NWRO pushed the
boundaries of convention. Their trenchant critiques also suggested aspects of a unique, avantgarde feminism that has been either mischaracterized or completely ignored by scholars.47 One
of NWRO’s major critiques of the welfare system concerned the myriad ways it forced women
to “give up control of your own body” (Tillmon 1972: 178), On A.F.D.C., you’re not supposed
to have any sex at all. You give up control of your own body. It’s a condition of aid. You may
even have to agree to get your tubes tied so you can never have more children just to avoid being
cut off welfare (1972:178). Constant assaults on recipients’ autonomy as women and sexual
subjects offered ample ground for criticism and transformation of the existing welfare system,
and became the site of some of the movement’s most concrete victories (Davis 1995; Bussiere
1997).
Establishing bodily autonomy had long been a feminist objective, but the NWRO fought
for it in ways that were particularly attentive to the concerns of Black and poor women, offering
insights that the mainstream feminist movement did not integrate for generations (Nadasen
2002). Two major legal advancements the movement made in asserting this autonomy included
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the 1968 Supreme Court case King v. Smith, which did away with “man-in-the-house” rules that
had permitted midnight raids of women’s homes, removing benefits if investigators found any
evidence of male presence, romantic or otherwise; and Relf v. Weinberger in 1974, which
challenged involuntary sterilization as a requirement for welfare (Davis 1995).
These legal gains were important in and of themselves, but the process of achieving them
also yielded generative ideological interventions that challenged the moral basis of patriarchal
insistence on women’s respectability. Intrusions by caseworkers provided an impetus to publicly
assert their unabashed right to romantic and sexual lives free from the prying eyes of the state,
despite the fact that they were, for the most part, as a virtual condition of welfare eligibility,
unwed single mothers. In other words, their heartfelt opposition to man-in-the-house rules
entailed defiance of sexual mores.
This insistent and unapologetic validation of women’s sexuality is a part of the
movement’s political analysis, and would in later iterations of feminism come to be known as
“prosex.” Still, numerous scholars have avoided this aspect of the welfare rights movement.
Perhaps this is understandable in a society where Black women have often been oversexualized
and objectified. To point to their exuberant sexuality might seem to detract from their
seriousness as political actors. But in the larger context of the welfare rights movement, it does
no such thing; rather, it contributes to an understanding of the profundity of the movement’s
political vision, a vision predicated on (and uncompromising about) the centrality that pleasure,
well-being, and autonomy should hold in a person’s life. This conviction animated welfare rights
actions around establishing the right to credit (Kornbluh 1997), as well as their right to intrusionfree and shame-free sexuality.
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The effort to eliminate man-in-the-house rules was carried out by lawyers allied with the
movement, but the undertaking was enthusiastically supported by the movement. In the course of
the campaign NWRO challenged entrenched and lingering aspects of the respectability politics
that cast women’s sexuality as an unpolitical and private matter, largely relegated to marriage.
Seeking the end of these man-in-the-house incursions, which denied them privacy in their most
intimate lives, recipients took vocal positions on women’s rights to their sexuality. This is
particularly notable in transcripts of meetings and offhand comments made by participants, as
well as in plans for community-controlled reproductive health centers that NWRO hoped to
develop.
For example, at the organization’s 1972 national convention in Miami, Jesse Gray, a
leader of the National Tenants Organization, gave one of the conference’s plenary speeches.
Audio recordings of the speech reveal an extremely engaged crowd, roaring in approval at
Gray’s characterization of the exploitative nature of rent and the need for tenant control of
housing. Simply putting tenants on the board was insufficient, Gray argued; it had to be tenants,
who were clearly on the side of residents, and who refused to police recipients’ respectability.
“You got some people, if you play the numbers, they don’t talk to you. . . . If they saw a man
slipping through your back door, they won’t talk to you. ‘You’re too old for him!’”48 The
auditorium thundered in approving laughter and applause at this assertion, which clearly
resonated with participants’ rejection of the surveillance of their sexuality that they had endured,
not only by caseworkers but from neighbors who likewise sought to penalize female residents for
their sexual or romantic relationships. Gray’s added emphasis that nosy neighbors would judge
women for having younger lovers played particularly well to a crowd of confident women.
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Gray’s radical, if not downright revolutionary, message that housing is a human right and should
be free (“Kill off the private landlord! Kill him off!”; “Lock up a landlord!”; “Free rent is not out
of the question!”49 was paired with a message about the importance of ensuring women’s sexual
freedom, to which the audience was extremely receptive.
Frances Fox Piven recalled, in an interview, the excitement at the 1971 annual conference
when participants discovered the happy coincidence that the conference was taking place next to
a U.S. Navy base, in close proximity to numerous sailors. Participants began planning social
events to which they could invite the Navy men. All this was done with a sense of frivolity, she
notes. They did not seem concerned with finding husbands; rather, “they treated men just a little
like prey, as men had long treated women” (Piven, pers. comm., May 18, 2018).
Recipient activists in the NWRO forged a unique style of feminism that departed from
that of middle-class white feminists, but also attempted to challenge the explicit misogyny of
Black nationalism, while not isolating themselves from Black men altogether. Piven recalls,
“They liked men, but they didn’t want them at their meetings, and they didn’t like the men who
tried to offer them physical protection, a posture that the rise of the Panthers made fashionable at
the time” (pers. comm., May 18, 2018). In this sense the feminism of the NWRO shares
commonalities with the Combahee River Collective who, years later, similarly expressed “we
struggle together with Black men against racism, while we also struggle with Black men about
sexism” (quoted in Taylor 2017, 19). This is a notable distinction between the NWRO and other
feminist organizations of the time whose seriousness as political actors was predicated on either
distancing themselves from men, as some white feminists advocated, or maintaining an
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intentional nonsexual outward appearance as many female civil rights activists had (Nadasen
2002).
Importantly, however, the movement was not composed exclusively of bon vivant “maneaters.” A large number of religious recipients were active in the movement, meetings sometimes
began with prayers, and churches were some of the largest, most enduring supporters of the
organization (West 1981). For them, this “prosex” ethos may not have been ideal. However, in
stark contrast to many other movements, feminist and otherwise, who developed contentious
fractions over issues such as this, the NWRO maintained a united front and allowed for a true
diversity of experiences and values. Although major conflicts certainly arose throughout the
organization’s life (Martin 1972; West 1981; Nadasen 2005), there does not appear to have been
any contention over the struggle for reproductive and sexual autonomy.
Much of the existing scholarship has downplayed this aspect of the movement,
overwriting the significance of women’s sexual agency and autonomy, and insisting rather that
there was “a maternal rationale behind welfare recipients’ advocacy of birth control—they
believed it would enable them to be better mothers to the children they already had” (Denton
2012, 212). Kornbluh (1998) interprets recipients’ desire to end man-in-the-house rules as
motivated largely by the desire to be allowed to marry or develop the kinds of relationships with
men that would lead to marriage. Kornbluh writes, “Although it is tempting to see this case as an
affirmation of women’s individual rights to sexual freedom outside marriage, for many welfare
recipients it also represented an opportunity to marry” (1998, 73). Mobilization against this
invasive and humiliating practice may have been partially motivated by a desire to marry,
although the evidence Kornbluh presents for this is sparse.
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What I am particularly concerned with is pushing back against the silencing of alternative
and less “respectable” articulations. By ignoring instances when issues around sexuality emerged
within the movement, and by focusing solely on public-facing arguments that appealed to
mainstream values (such as the eugenicist argument that better birth control would mean fewer
and better-raised children), scholars like Denton and Kornbluh reinscribe onto the NWRO a
startlingly patriarchal logic whereby women’s sexuality must always be functional, i.e. desired as
a means of achieving marriage or better mothering. This is not to suggest that participants in the
welfare rights movement were not concerned with being good mothers, or interested in
potentially marrying, but to present these as the extent of their concerns for sexual autonomy is
to do a massive disservice to the intellectual and political legacy they leave.

Social Reproduction Feminism and Anti-war Politics
Not only was the feminism of the welfare rights movement “prosex,” but the movement
also developed a vision of reproductive politics far in advance of other feminists, one that
prefigured what later feminists termed “reproductive justice.” In contrast to the narrow focus of
“reproductive rights” which often prioritized access to birth control and abortion while ignoring
the complex ways different class and racial positions informed access and need for these
services, reproductive justice insists that de jure legal access to “choices” about one’s body are
not truly choices if they are financially untenable (Ross et al. 2017). NWRO participants sought
the right to have genuine autonomy over their bodies: to have children if they chose, and to
prevent pregnancies if that was their desire. They understood that true reproductive freedom
meant not just possessing the negative freedom to decide whether to keep a pregnancy or not, but
also the positive freedom to be financially capable of raising a child (Berlin 1969; Nadasen
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2002). In doing so, they extended the concept of “reproduction,” as many socialist feminists do,
to include “social reproduction,” which consists not just of the intergenerational reproduction of
life but also the daily reproduction of people by providing necessary food, housing, and care
(Bhattacharya 2017). The NWRO fought for access to and recognition of those features of
reproduction just as much as birth control, abortion and freedom from forced and coerced
sterilizations.
Part and parcel of the social reproduction feminism espoused by the NWRO was an
explicitly anti-war stance (West 1981; Kornbluh 2007). The NWRO not only disavowed the
Vietnam war, but articulated the inseparability between an unjust war abroad and the struggles
they faced at home: “STOP THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND ON THE POOR” was a common
refrain throughout campaign materials.50 Indeed, as if they could forget how profoundly
intertwined these two “wars” were, Moynihan’s notorious 1965 report explicitly justified sending
young Black men to fight in Vietnam as a primary solution to the “tangled web of pathology” he
ascribed to growing up in Black, female-headed households. Moynihan argued,
Given the strains of the disorganized and matrifocal family life in which so many Negro youth
come of age, the Armed Forces are a dramatic and desperately needed change: a world away from
women, a world run by strong men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is
nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if limited, are granted on the basis of
performance. The theme of a current Army recruiting message states it as clearly as can be: “In the
U.S. Army you get to know what it means to feel like a man” (1965, 18).

Welfare activists linked their struggles to the Vietnam War in two major ways, denouncing in the
first instance the fact that funds were being spent to kill children abroad that could have been
used to feed children domestically; and secondly, recognizing that it was their very own children
fighting, and often dying at higher rates.
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In a booklet intended for children, NWRO attempted to explain why “many of our
brothers and sisters do not have enough to eat or a decent place to live. Do not have nice clothes
to wear or enough money to have a pet.”51 Their answer situated war spending at the core of this
problem “because America spends too much money killing poor women and children in other
lands. And rich people want more than they really need.52 The NWRO devoted the May 1970
issue of its newspaper, the Welfare Fighter, to the theme “Welfare and the War,” underscoring
how disparate welfare rights groups were linking the two issues around the country:
There is a close relationship between the way human beings are being treated in Viet Nam and the
way human beings are being treated in the United States. WRO members in Ohio have first hand
experience in this relationship and therefore join the struggle to end the war. At the November
mobilization in Washington DC . . . Ohio’s WRO members voice opposition to a system which
forces their sons to fight for freedom in Viet Nam when there is a small chance for freedom in this
country. A young man is forced to struggle for food, shelter, and clothing for 17 or 18 years
because of oppressive social, economic, and political institutions that have oppressed him. Some
WRO mothers have suggested that all children of low-income families should be granted amnesty
from the draft. It is clear that WRO members represent a solid opposing force against the war,
against the national priorities which subvert rather than subsidize life.”53

The analysis linking domestic poverty and war emphasized the man-made nature of both crises.
In the NWRO’s view, poverty and the war were the result of unjust use of resources, which
could be corrected, rather than a natural course of events. The NWRO underscored this analysis
throughout much of their work, repeatedly demanding “welfare not warfare” (also the
organization’s 1971 national conference theme). For the NWRO, ending the war was the answer
to two major problems: the war itself, which they understood to be disproportionately harming
their sons; and the issue of how to fund the guaranteed annual income which NWRO sought.

Implications for Today
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Fifty years later, far from having been resolved and resigned to history, the interventions
made by NWRO activists remain dispiritingly relevant to the lives of women today. Their
perspectives on everything from poverty, reproductive justice, work, and war provide
illuminating alternatives for contemporary feminists.
Work has become more onerous and less rewarding for large swaths of the labor force,
with many of the worst characteristics of the contemporary labor market—irregular schedules,
low wages, and of course sexual harassment—disproportionately affecting women. Nevertheless,
too many feminists continue to insist on “leaning in” at work as the solution to many problems
women face (Sandburg 2013).
Although I have challenged the claim that motherhood was the defining identity for
welfare activists, the NWRO undoubtedly understood the problems associated with parenting to
be political. Since the 1970s, declining real wages for most working people has forced more and
more families to rely on all adults in a household working, sometimes more than full time. Even
with two earners, families are often unable to make ends meet, partially because the cost of
childcare has skyrocketed, overtaking even the astronomical increase of rents in many regions.54
Additionally, given the gendered division in childcare, the lack of paid maternity leave for most
mothers, and crisis rates of Black maternal mortality, the “penalties of motherhood” remain
steep. NWRO’s early and expansive analysis of reproductive justice provides a powerful
framework for thinking through and fighting for the well-being of women and mothers without
relegating them to traditional family roles, while emphasizing at every step that feminist
objectives must explicitly include economic security for all. It is unfortunately too rarely
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asserted, in the era of feminist hawks like Gina Haspel and Hillary Clinton, that a massive
reduction in defense spending and a reapportioning of those funds to improving lives, rather than
destroying them abroad, should be a foundational element of contemporary feminism.
While many of the NWRO’s interventions provide a robust framework for approaching
contemporary feminist issues they do not directly engage with all of today’s political questions.
How, for example, might they respond to current movements who exclude trans* people from
feminism? Or what might they proffer as the solution to the crisis of climate change? I haven’t
encountered direct statements on these matters, but it is possible to extrapolate some relevant
insights. For example, their deep suspicion of the intrinsic value of waged work, and their
concomitant insistence on community-based involvement might lend support for contemporary
arguments that less work for all—antiproductivist policies favoring degrowth, shortened work
weeks, and more community-based involvement—could be an important component of
addressing impending environmental crises caused by greenhouse gas emissions (Spicer 2019).
Welfare rights activists’ insistence on bodily autonomy, freedom from intrusion and coercion,
and their mobilization for economic freedom might also provide a historical precedent that
contributes to current struggles for trans* self determination and radical transfeminist critiques of
economic injustice. When in doubt we might turn to the powerful words of Beulah Sanders:
“Give poor people enough money to live decently, and let us decide how to live our lives”
(1969).
Former participants in the NWRO drew on their experience in the welfare rights
movement and many remained committed activists throughout their lives. But for many others,
the NWRO would be the last time they situated their political engagement in an explicitly
feminist organization. Perhaps this can be explained by a sense of alienation from feminist
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organizations and projects where NWRO-style feminism—prosex, critical of waged work,
devoted to working class women’s needs, critical of respectability politics with an insistence on a
broad vision of reproductive politics and the centrality of economic well-being to achieving any
of these other goals—was all too often silenced.
Even scholars who admire and respect the work of NWRO activists have contributed to
this silencing by highlighting aspects of the movement which are congruent with mainstream
values and glossing over those focused on here. This impulse may be a well-intended one: the
intense vilification of welfare mothers in decades following the NWRO’s decline has placed
those concerned with the rights of welfare recipients in a defensive position. But by insisting on
recipients’ worthiness in ways that are legible to racist, capitalist, patriarchal society, we lose
sight of the militant ways they challenged these social relations and some of the most rousing
lessons they leave to guide us forward.
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Chapter 5 Bread and Rose Perfume
“As we come marching,
marching, we bring you hope
at last
The rising of the women
means the rising of the class
No more the drudge and idler
– ten that toil where one
reposes
But a sharing of life’s glories:
Bread and roses, Bread and
roses”
“Bread and Roses” James Oppenheim

Let’s categorically refuse the ideology of PROFIT and PROGRESS or other pseudo-forces of the same type.
Progress will be what we want it to be. Let’s refuse the trap of luxury and necessity – the stereotyped needs imposed
separately upon all. . . (‘We are on the way’, L’Amnistie des yeaux creves, Paris, May 1968)

“When the rich get together to concern themselves with the poor that’s charity, and when the poor get together to
concern themselves with the rich, that’s revolution.”
(Welfare Fighter Special Edition 1970)

NWRO: Echoes of Marxism?
Participants, and later, scholars of the movement often asserted that there were no
revolutionaries in the NWRO. Writing about the Brooklyn WRO, B-WAC, Jackie Pope argued
in 1989 that any assertion the organization had “revolutionary overtones” was absolutely
incorrect. Its members she clarified “were patriotic, loyal to capitalism, and scornful of anyone
discussing a different system of government. B-WAC participants knew this country’s
weaknesses—to be sure—but they were confident that it provided enough range for them to
promote economic and social changes. Perhaps…they were too confidant” (Pope 1989: 99).
Long time organizer Hulbert James offered a more subtle, and strategic explanation of the
NWRO’s ideological underpinnings and objectives at a VISTA training in 1969:
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Two persons asked me about ideology and whether what we are doing is relevant in terms of the
whole revolutionary crowd…One of the things we are sharp about is in not advertising what we
are doing. I think that one of the problems that the Panthers are in trouble today is not so much
that they are a vanguard force, but that they have come out with a clear call to the people for
power and revolution. We are doing the same thing but we are not coming out with a manifesto
saying where we are going. We know where we are going and the ladies know where they are
going. To advertise that is only to bring an onslaught we are not ready to deal with (Quoted in
Whitaker 1970 190).

James’ statement underscores what I have argued throughout this text, that the appearance of
compliance with norms of work was largely strategic and did not encapsulate the genuine,
expansive analyses and demands of the movement as a whole. Asserting that the NWRO was
“doing the same thing” as the Panthers is only one of many indications that the NWRO was
substantively more radical than existing scholarship has acknowledged.
In this chapter I argue the NWRO’s staunch rejection of the compulsion to “work or
starve” and their insistence that poverty was constitutive of waged work for the working class,
rather than an anomaly that could be remedied by reforms, significantly overlap with
revolutionary analyses of capitalism, and challenges Pope’s assertion. I claim that the analyses
proffered by the NWRO are particularly commensurate with a Marxian analysis of waged labor.
In particular, these two different analyses share an emphasis on 1) the coercive nature of waged
labor, 2) the institutionalization of poverty for waged workers 3) alienation inherent in waged
labor and 4) the central role of a surplus population or a “reserve army of labor” to the
functioning of a capitalist system. I am not suggesting that members of the NWRO were secretly
Marxist, or even that many of them were necessarily familiar with Marx, rather that their
analysis of waged labor echoes key elements of Marxian analysis. This may suggest that Marx’s
analysis so aptly encapsulates the working class’ experience of work that across different
continents and centuries, people of different races and genders come to similar observations
about the nature of work under capitalism. In any case, the fundamental radicalism of the
NWRO has been vastly undermined and overlooked by scholars in the intervening years. For
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example, Kornbluh’s claim that welfare recipients were opposed to “compulsion” rather than
“work as such” (2007: 89) ignores how intertwined these two concepts are for most radicals
examining waged labor under capitalism.55
For Marx, the proletarian condition of “the working class” is defined precisely by the
“work or starve” ultimatum which welfare recipients critiqued so vehemently (see Chapter
Three). Marx understood the emergence of the working class under capitalism to be the result of
its “double freedom.” Firstly, the working class was, in the initial development of capitalism,
freed from the legal fetters that defined feudalism, restricting movement of individuals and
restraining them in place and bound to one lord. But they were also, necessarily, “freed” from
access to the means of production, in other words, freed from the ability to sustain themselves in
any way other than through waged labor. Marx notes that this second “freedom” comes about not
voluntarily or naturally but through violent dispossession. After all,
nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or commodities, and on the other hand
men possessing nothing but their own labor power. This relation has no basis in natural history,
nor does it have a social basis common to all periods of human history. It is clearly the result of a
past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a
whole series of older forms of social production. (Marx 1992: 273)

Marx’s assertion is echoed in similarities to the analysis NWRO members offered of their
dispossession through generations of enslavement. For them there did not just randomly or
naturally appear people with “nothing to sell but their own hides” (as Marx would have said)
rather this was the explicit result of historical dispossession. Recall Kirkpatrick’s song,
“Everybody’s Got a Right to Live”, a staple of the NWRO’s song book: Black man dug the
ditches/ Both night and day/Black man did the work/ While the white man got the pay./I want
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And indeed not just radicals. “In two early decisions, the Supreme Court shed light on what counts as work,
explaining that work means “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business” (Tennessee Coal,
Iron and Railroad CO v. Muscoda Local no. 123 [1944]:598), while one who labors “solely for his personal purpose
or pleasure” does not work (Walling v Portland Terminal Co)” (Crain et al 2016: 260).
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my share of silver/I want my share of gold/I want my share of justice/ To save my dying soul”
(Collier and Kirkpatrick 1968).
In Marx’s analysis, it is this dispossession that makes wage laborers structurally
compelled to sell their labor power in order to survive, not because they prefer working for
someone else, or enjoy cash over subsistence farming but because they must sell their labor
power (work) or starve. Much of the intellectual and political project Marx undertook throughout
his lifetime was to reveal the illusion of working class freedom and equality under capitalism as
fraudulent, due in large part to this compulsion. As Marx wrote in Volume One of Capital, “The
Roman slave was held in chains; the wage laborer is bound to his owner by invisible threads.
The appearance of independence is maintained by a constant change in the person of the
individual employer, and by the legal fiction of the contract” (1992:719). For Marx, the premise
of freedom under capitalism, that the laborer and capitalist meet and enter into a contract as
formal equals was “fictional” because although the laborer maintained the appearance of
freedom by being able to change employers, he could not remove himself from the employment
relationship writ large. “Economic bondage” (1992:723), or what the NWRO activists called, the
compulsion to “work or starve” forces a person to work in the way physical fetters do. Without
other means of survival, the worker possesses no choice but to work in order to survive. “The
culmination of this slavery is that it is only as a worker that he can maintain himself as a physical
subject and only as a physical subject that he is a worker” (Marx and Colletti 1992:325).
This argument appears particularly succinctly in the Communist Manifesto where Marx
defines “the proletariat, the modern day working class” as “a class of labourers, who live only so
long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital” (Marx
and Engels 2012:42). For Marxists, it is, in part due to this understanding of the working classes’
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condition under capitalism as inherently coercive and unjust that they oppose capitalism. Further,
Marx believed work was evidently compulsory because workers performed it, despite how
miserable it made them. Marx argued,
he does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does
not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence the
worker feels himself only when he is not working when he is working he does not feel himself.
He is at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is working. His labour is
therefore not voluntary but forced, it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need
but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself (Marx and Colletti 1992:326).

Welfare rights participants did not necessarily understand themselves as Marxist or anticapitalist, however, in their adamant opposition to the compulsion to work, and their insistence
on the right to choose whether they worked or not, they nevertheless enter into a centuries long
tradition criticizing waged labor for its reliance on the unfreedom of workers. As Piven and
Cloward noted in Poor People’s Movements, it is uncommon for people to launch massive
systemic critiques, rather typically the form their mobilizations take is typically directed towards
a more concrete and immediate opponent. They argue,
people experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of
large and abstract processes, and it is the concrete experience that molds their discontent into
specific grievances against specific targets. Workers experience the factory, the speeding rhythm
of the assembly line, the foremen, the spies, the guards, the owner, and the pay check. They do not
experience monopoly capitalism (Piven and Cloward 1977: 20).

For activists in the NWRO, their direct target was often work requirements for welfare
recipients, but the content of their arguments frequently revealed a broader criticism of the
employment relation. Indeed, Moynihan boasted that “A Yugoslav Marxist, for one, was
reported as commenting within his circles that were [FAP] to pass it might well be the most
important social legislation in history in that it would finally free the individual and his family
from the myriad and inescapable forms of coercion which society exerts through the employment
nexus” (1973: 4). Welfare recipients were undoubtedly more familiar with the particular
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intricacies of FAP’s proposed guaranteed income than this unnamed Marxist and therefore less
optimistic that it would achieve this objective, which they too sought.
In addition to their disdain for compulsory participation in the labor market, another
major critique welfare recipients mounted against waged labor was that it did not address their
primary concern: poverty. Likewise, Marx understood poverty as a constitutive feature of
working class existence because capitalists retained the bulk of the wealth created by the laborer,
leaving the laborer in the same, or worse state in which they began. He argued:
It is true that labour produces marvels for the rich, but it produces privation for the worker. It
produces palaces, but hovels for the worker. It produces beauty, but deformity for the worker. It
replaces labour by machines, but it casts some of the workers back into barbarous forms of labour
and turns others into machines. It produces intelligence, but it produces idiocy and cretinism for
the worker (Marx and Colletti 1992:325-326).

For Marx, capitalism is particularly unjust because unlike previous economic systems, it
has unparalleled capacity to produce extraordinary abundance and plenitude, which is withheld
from, and often harms the laborers who generate this bounty. Marx identifies this as “the
antagonistic character of capitalist accumulation” (1992: 799). Despite all the value produced by
laborers, the result of capitalist accumulation for the working class is “pauperism.” For Marx,
“pauperism forms a condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of
wealth. It forms part of the faux frais of capitalist production: but capital usually knows how to
transfer these from its own shoulders to those of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie”
(1992:797). By asserting that waged work would never resolve their poverty, the NWRO
entered, albeit discreetly, into a lineage of radical thought which posits waged work not as the
solution to poor people’s problems but rather their cause. Marx further described this inherent
feature of capitalism,
the characteristic result of capitalist production, a result which is constantly renewed and
perpetuated. On the one hand, the production process incessantly converts material wealth into
capital, into the capitalist’s means of enjoyment and his means of valorization. On the other hand,
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the worker always leaves the process in the same state as he entered it—a personal source of
wealth, but deprived of any means of making that wealth a reality for himself (1992:716).

Despite being the producer of wealth, the laborer is constantly separated from that which he
produces, resulting in material and psychological alienation rather than the accumulation of
wealth. Rather than producing his own well-being, Marx argues the laborer produces wealth for
the capitalist and reproduces his own alienation and physical impoverishment.
Marx’s repudiation of capitalism centered on the fact that the worker produces value but
retains only a tiny portion of it. Varying scholars have interpreted Marx’s analysis of the misery
produced for the worker by waged labor as being relative privation in contrast to capitalist
wealth; absolute privation; or a more spiritual impoverishment. There exists convincing
evidence for and debate over all three interpretations.
Fundamental to Marx’s aspiration to socialism was the hope and belief that this situation
could be righted, no longer would man be the slave to objects of his own creation, but rather, in
Eric Fromm’s words, socialism would be “emancipation from alienation, the return of man to
himself, his self- realization.”
One of NWRO’s major critiques of workfare programs and waged labor generally, was
that once forced into the paid labor market they would be required to perform many of the same
tasks for which they were responsible at home: primarily domestic labors-- mopping floors,
tending to children, washing laundry, cooking meals etc. There was however a major
difference56: in performing many of the same tasks they were already performing at home, on the
labor market, the women would no longer control the product or the process of their efforts. In
this case, by performing the same activities for wages rather than in their own home, the laborers
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There were in fact two major differences, the second of which Marx does not address. This is the lack of adequate
childcare which made entering the paid labor force either prohibitively expensive for parents or unsafe for their
children who would be left alone or in substandard care.

108

(the welfare recipients in this case) would cease to have control over the end product of the
efforts (i.e. the shirts they ironed would no longer be theirs or their families but someone else’s,
the children they helped raise they might never see again) as well as the process through which
they performed these activities—they ceased to have control over the speed at which they
performed tasks, and deeply personal, individual decisions about styles of care giving for
example were set for them. They could not multitask as they saw fit.57 These features—a loss of
relationship to the product and process of activity are two of the principle defining features of
Marx’s notion of “estranged” or alienated labor. In other words, that which distinguished
fulfilling, creative human activity from the impoverishing, alienation of wage labor.
A final major analytic commonality shared by NWRO and Marx is the argument that the
unemployed, and other categories of people like housewives, who appear putatively “outside”
the process of production, are in fact central to its machinations.58 For Marx, one of the general
“laws” of capitalism was the creation of a “surplus population,” He wrote, “The labouring
population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means
by which it itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population; and
it does this to an always increasing extent” (1992: 591). For Marx, this wasn’t an accident, or an
occasional friction to be overcome, nor was it the result of purely demographic shifts as Malthus
might have argued, rather it was essential to the profitability of capitalism: “The whole form of
the movement of modern industry depends, therefore, upon the constant transformation of a part
of the labouring population into unemployed or half-employed hands” (1992: 647).
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Tera Hunter (1998) argues the desire to multitask wage earning and care giving responsibilities shaped low wage
African American women’s preference for jobs, like washing clothing which allowed them to bring work home and
have autonomy from their employers.
58
Although I do not engage with it directly here, Jeanne Boydston’s (1990) Home and Work has been an important
reference.
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Recall that NWRO’s answer to the question “Why are there so many poor?” centered on
the function of the poor and unemployed to the generation of profits (to the economic system):
Our economic system is structured so there is always a large number of poor people. The poor are
needed to fill millions of low paying jobs that sustain many industries in our country. When
industry needs them, the poor are called to work. When industry doesn’t need them, many people
must go on welfare or survive as best they can. By always having more people than available
jobs, industry is guaranteed all the cheap labor it needs. The “job market” is like a giant game of
musical chairs. Everyone wants a chair but there are not enough chairs to go around and someone
always ends up the loser…59

In her famous 1972 Ms. Magazine article, Tillmon theorized the role of the welfare recipient in
much the same way Marx framed his notion of surplus population as a force that trammels not
only the wages, but also the aspirations of the working class. “Why would a 45-year old woman
work all day in a laundry ironing shirts at 90-some cents an hour?” Tillmon asked?
Because she knows there’s some place lower she could be. She could be on welfare. Society
needs women on welfare as “examples” to let every woman, factory workers and housewife
workers alike, know what will happen if she lets up, if she’s laid off, if she tries to go it alone
without a man. So these ladies stay on their feet or on their knees all of their lives instead of
asking why they’re only getting 90-some cents an hour, instead of daring to fight and complain
(Tillmon 1972 Quoted in Sreenivasan 2009:617).

The language differs, but the similarity to Marx’s analysis is striking:
The industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down
the active labour-army; during the periods of over-production and paroxysm, it holds its
pretensions in check. Relative surplus population is therefore the pivot upon which the law of
demand and supply of labour works. It confines the field of action of this law within the limits
absolutely convenient to the activity of exploitation and to the domination of capital. 1992:701

Both Tillmon and Marx underscore the effect the reserve army of labor has on the
broader working class, undermining its power to refuse bad jobs and conditions, and the
extent to which this is an ongoing feature of capitalism.
NWRO’s era was a particularly fecund one for discussions about the importance of the
reserve army of labor to capitalism. In particular a heated debate among Marxist feminists
questioned how to understand housewives within this heuristic (Dalla Costa 1972 [2019];
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Seccombe 1974; Molyneux 1979 and many others). Additionally, many developed insightful
analyses of the importance of the much maligned Black unemployed as emblematic of this
surplus population. Stuart Hall et al argued that both housewives and the urban unemployed had
similar uses for capitalism. They averred, ‘the key to unravelling the relation of both is not the
question of whether each directly receives a wage or not, since a proportion of each is, at any
time, in employment – i.e. ‘waged’ – while the rest are ‘wageless’; […] the key lies in the
reference to capital’s control over the movement into and out of the reserve army of labour’
(1978: 369).
Perhaps most importantly, despite these extensive criticisms of waged work, Marx, like
the NWRO did not aspire to reform wage labor. Marx and Engels’ objective was not the
improvement of working conditions, increased salaries, nor jobs for all, rather their hope for a
new society was defined by the abolition of wage labor. Perhaps Engels put it most succinctly
when he wrote in The Origin of the Family, “For with the transformation of the means of
production into social property there will disappear also wage labor” (Engels 2010). In addition
to the similarities of both Marx’s and NWRO’s analytic approach which situated poverty,
alienation and expropriation as core, constitutive elements of wage labor, the two projects shared
not only a common critique but, I argue, also an aspirational ethos.
Terry Eagleton once described “the project of Marxism is restoring to the body its
plundered sensuality” (Ross 2008:xi). There are few Marxists, and even fewer social movements
who took this restorative challenge more seriously than the welfare rights movement. In the
following section I propose situating the welfare rights movement within a broader legacy of
militant, pleasure seeking activism rather than welding it to the more banal post war
consumerism with which it is often associated.

111

The leftist legacy of luxury
In multiple campaigns over the course of nearly a decade the NWRO argued for the right
to sustenance and to evade the compulsions of the labor market, but they didn’t stop there.
Welfare activists asserted their right to have control over their time, autonomy over the decisions
comprising the fundamental aspects of their lives—where they lived, with whom they were
intimate, etc. Additionally, they staked claims over the right to consumption and not just of the
austere variety (Pope 1990; Bussiere 1997; Kornbluh 1997). In this section I examine NWRO’s
multi-year effort to establish the right to credit at a number of department stores and attempt to
situate it within a broader leftist tradition of demanding not only bread, but also roses.
The Sears Campaign, a demand that Sears, and other major department stores extend
consumer credit to welfare recipients, began as a controversial, rank and file-led initiative which
NWRO leaders tried to discourage (Kornbluh 2007: 115; Piven, pers. comm., May 18, 2018). In
62 cities welfare recipients occupied stores, engaged in disruptive actions such as jamming
registers and shopping lines, and demanded the provision of credit from these corporations
(Whitaker 1970; Pope 1990). Some stores eventually acquiesced, and scholars have classified
this mobilization a success, but what precisely was achieved and the character of were
participants’ objectives and analyses remains open to debate and deserves a more thorough
examination.
Juliet Greenlaw, the NWRO Indiana State Representative explained the campaign in
1968, stating, “Welfare gives us enough for food and rent and second-hand clothes for us and our
children, and in some states, not even enough for food. But food and rent is not all of life. Why
shouldn't we be able to buy perfume once in a while— or a ring—or even a watch? Every
woman wants and needs some of these things” (Kornbluh 1997: 77). By arguing not just for
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their right to survive, but for their right to luxuries decoupled from traditional markers of
deservingness: waged labor or motherhood, this campaign was particularly notable as recipients
explicitly situated their demands for perfume, jewelry, new stylish clothing in a common, human
interest in nice things, in the fundamental importance of pleasure. In doing so, welfare recipients
challenged many long-standing social norms.
Previous interpretations have not only occluded important aspects of the movement but
have served to (perhaps inadvertently) reinscribe it within a logic of respectability, which I argue
the movement fought against. As with other aspects of the movement (the fight against waged
labor, for example) this argument is somewhat nuanced, because although scholars have
described these articulations of welfare activists as “radical” they simultaneously underscore
recipients’ adherence to fundamentally liberal logic and values. In other words, scholars,
especially Kornbluh who authored the most in-depth examination of the campaign for credit,
argue the movement was radical while simultaneously soldering it to the conscribed logic of post
war consumerism. It is more fruitful and perhaps more accurate to the movement’s aspirations to
examine its commonalities with a broader lineage of leftist thought.
Scholars have previously interpreted this aspect of the welfare rights movement in very
different ways. Nadasen for example, understands the demand for credit and consumer goods as
evidence of welfare recipients’ ultimate espousal of middle class values (Nadasen 2008).
Kornbluh’s many illuminative studies of the subject argue it was the product of a particular
postwar, American, ethos, a means of seeking full citizenship in a consumer-based society,
unique to the mid 20th century (Kornbluh 1997 and 2007). Kornbluh argued “it fit, in part as a
point of consistency and in part as a point of contest, with the important historical scholarship
then being done by scholars such as Lizabeth Cohen and Alan Brinkley, which defined consumer
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citizenship as at the heart of post-New Deal political economy” (Kornbluh, pers. comm., March
28, 2019). Kornbluh (1998) identifies similarities between T.H. Marshall and the NWRO’s
position on consumer citizenship, although providing no evidence that participants in NWRO
had read Marshall. There is however copious evidence of overlap and exchange between
members of the NWRO and the Black Panthers. Why not, for example, frame their demand for
consumption decoupled from income as congruous with the provocative assertion made by
Eldredge Cleaver in his incendiary text “On Lumpen Ideology” that “The basic demand of the
Lumpen, to be cut in on Consumption in spite of being blocked out of Production is the ultimate
revolutionary demand”?
Here I counter the notion that the demand for luxuries for poor women was the product
of an exceptional postwar, military Keynesian compromise and rather situate these demands
within a more expansive and militant tradition.
The Left has long had a fraught reputation regarding pleasure in general and material
desires in particular. Perhaps the stereotype of the Left as hyper masculine, productivist
abdication of all things joyful, is best represented by Stakhanovism—the punishing standard of
self denial and highly productive output promoted by the Soviet Union.
Recall the famous phrase, often attributed to Emma Goldman, “if I can’t dance, it’s not
my revolution,” which is partially notable, and popular, for its utter dissimilarity to most militant
utterances. But Goldman’s critical insights against an austere political imaginary are more
profound than this oft quoted adage suggests. In her memoir Living My Life Goldman recounts
an encounter with a comrade at a dance who scolded her for dancing with “reckless abandon” in
a manner that he deemed “undignified” of a serious militant whose “frivolity would hurt the
cause” Goldman replied,
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I insisted that our Cause could not expect me to become a nun and that the movement would not
be turned into a cloister. If it meant that, I did not want it. "I want freedom, the right to selfexpression, everybody's right to beautiful, radiant things." Anarchism meant that to me, and I
would live it in spite of the whole world — prisons, persecution, everything. Yes, even in spite of
the condemnation of my own closest comrades I would live my beautiful ideal (Goldman 2006,
56).

In this passage, Goldman articulates revolutionary goals as inextricably interwoven with the right
to frivolity, self expression, and “everybody’s right to beautiful, radiant things.” Importantly,
Goldman writes “things”, not “immaterial activities freed from any connection to capitalism.”
Leftists have often been critical of “beautiful, radiant things” as distractions inherently situated in
and reifying of capitalism or bourgeois individualism, rather than a position from which to
imagine any legitimate, critical political project (see below), but here Goldman explains them as
part and parcel.
Socialists have at times tried to infuse their political imaginary with an emphasis on
pleasure to odd results. Fourier famously believed the problems of dull and dissatisfying, or
even denigrating work, could be cured by imbuing it with playfulness. In his socialist utopia,
unpleasant tasks could be ameliorated and made enjoyable by the presence of eroticized nymphlike women that would compel men to work: “haying” for example in Fourier’s utopia, would be
“followed by a meal attended by the loveliest women” (O.C.I, 177).60 Misogyny may account for
some of the clumsy relationship to pleasure and sensuality in these two examples, though not all
of it.
In contrast to Fourier’s imaginary, in Goldman’s understanding, pleasure was not the way
to endure unpleasant work but rather an important wellspring one draws upon for transforming
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“Les harmoniens ne sauront pas ce que c’est que récréation; et pourtant ils travailleront beaucoup plus que nous,
mais par attraction. Les séances de travail seront pour eux ce qu’est l’affluence de fêtes pour les sybarites parisiens,
qui ne sont en peine que du choix des spectacles, des festins, des bals, des maîtresses, etc” (Fourier 1973 Ch 8).
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society. In this sense we may come to regard the desire for material pleasure and luxuries as an
impetus mobilizing people to demand better lives, which the Left dismisses at its peril.
Much of the past approach to consumption is couched in highly negative terms that
frames consumerism or materialistic desires as deeply problematic expressions of “false needs”
and an inculcation into capitalist ideology, rather than a source for mobilization against the
inequalities and austerity of life under capitalism for the working class. This perspective has
been strongly informed by the popularity of the Frankfurt School’s/ Critical Theory’s
interpretation of Marx that “views the commodity affluence of western modernity in
overwhelmingly negative terms.” As such, scholars who are sympathetic to consumerism have
framed Marx as “an obstacle to be surmounted” rather than a resource (Landa 2017, 3-4).
The rebellious welfare activists demanding their rightful perfume had not imbibed
Herbert Marcuse’s ground-breaking One Dimensional Man, released to critical acclaim a few
years before Greenlaw’s statement. In it Marcuse argued that consumerism was central to
understanding why the specter of communism that Marx and others predicted, had failed to
sufficiently haunt the western world. For Marcuse, wide-spread consumerism undermined class
consciousness by providing a false sense of similarity between opposing classes, causing
working class people to identify closely with hegemonic society and the class responsible for
their oppression. According to Marcuse, this identification kept the working class mired in work
and competition in order to attain their “false” consumeristic desires. Marcuse argued,
If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same resort places, if
the typist is as attractively made up as the daughter of her employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac,
if they all read the same newspaper, then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of
classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the
Establishment are shared by the underlying population (Marcuse 1991, 8).

Marcuse’s popular text helped to cement the Left’s understanding of consumption and
luxury as primarily “false needs” that functioned to imprison the desirer within the logic of a
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deeply oppressive system. Increasing dread over ecological crisis gave further support to
concerns that desires for consumer goods could only bring harm, but agreement with Marcusian
analysis was far from complete. Ellen Willis for example, argued that Marcuse’s dismissal of
consumption writ large was a disavowal situated in sexist logic (Power 2013).
Expanding our vision beyond the postwar era it becomes easier to understand the desire
for pleasurable things, not just basic subsistence, as a human urge. Monica Miller, for example,
argues in Slaves to Fashion (2009) that ornamentation is a fundamental feature of expressing
one’s humanity and individuality, and as such was one of the first things enslaved people would
do with a surplus of time, money or goods.
Importantly however, challenging the dismissal of pleasure and consumption as politics is
not to position (as some enthusiastic scholars have) all pleasure-seeking as “resistance.” This
pendulum swing from all to nothing, has resulted in particularly uncritical scholarship from
Queer Studies, for example which imbues sexual pleasure and preference with an almost
supernatural power capable of destroying all systems of power and oppression. Kim and Rhee, to
pick one example of this tendency, argue that queerness is inherently, “a critical and creative disorder of things: a befuddlement, a bewilderment, if not an outright disruption of the traditional
structures of nation, self, and kinship that are necessarily governed and policed by heterosexism, patriarchy, ableism, capitalism, imperialism, and white supremacy” (Kim and Rhee in
Joo et al eds 2018:543). Enthusiastic participation of queers in the U.S. military might seem
sufficient to debunk these ahistorical and anti-materialist claims of queerness’s “outright
disruption”, although leftists sound equally wrongheaded when they dismiss the politics of
pleasure as selfish, individualistic and unsophisticated. In other words, no foundation for
political mobilization. David Harvey wrote disparagingly in A Brief History of Neoliberalism
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that “the narcissistic exploration of the self, sexuality and identity become the leitmotif of
bourgeois urban culture” (Harvey 2005: 46-47).
Challenging these reductive and essentializing tendencies, I argue that consumption, and
pleasure more broadly, are neither purely disruptive, nor fundamentally selfish and
individualistic, but rather, they have a certain indeterminacy about them. Just as Goldman argued
that politics without “beautiful radiant things” would be insufficient, the rise of consumption or
sexuality as politics also provides a deeply unsound foundation for a radical project.61
Harvey may have dismissed “the narcissistic exploration of the self”, but the pursuit of
self was not always a negative, counter-political notion for leftists. Ernest Mandel reminds us
that Marx himself “appreciated and stressed the civilizing function of capital, which he saw as
the necessary preparation of the material basis for a ‘rich individuality’” writing in The
Grundrisse: “Capital’s ceaseless striving towards the general form of wealth drives labour
beyond the limits of its natural paltriness, and thus creates the material elements for the
development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its
consumption” (Mandel 1999:394). For Marx, via Mandel, one of the benefits of capitalism, in
addition to expanding productive capacities, is that it functions to expand peoples’ needs and
creates the technological means to fulfill them. While capitalism creates the possibility for this
however, it is the working classes’ task to fulfil this potential by challenging the political and
economic dominance of capital.
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Perhaps most emblematic of this “politics as consumption” was the Whole Earth Catalog which lead at least a
generation of dissatisfied baby boomers to believe it was possible to change the world by buying the right kind of
stuff. This belief was solidified for a new generation via Steve Jobs’ hagiography, who, perhaps better than anyone
else, represents how comfortable politics of consumption (a reverence for the Whole Earth Catalog) could be with
deeply oppressive systems of production and distribution (see: Foxconn).
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These snippets of nearly three centuries of leftists grappling with the proper place of joy,
consumption and luxury in a militant framework. Is the pursuit of pleasure selfish and
individualistic or potentially emancipatory? How might we reasonably adjudicate between such
competing claims? Marcuse believed it possible to distinguish between “true” and “false” needs,
however, the intrinsically social nature of needs makes drawing that distinction in any
satisfactory manner, improbable. A rubric of sorts would be helpful to determine if there might
be some sort of corollary to Andre Gorz’s notion of “non-reformist- reforms,” but of needs and
desire (Gorz 1967). In the meantime, I suggest that the NWRO’s campaign for credit, and the
ensuing analyses they developed, it was not about the end object of desire in and of itself. Of
course, the object/ive of our desire and pleasure should ideally not be produced under miserable
conditions for the producers, but that was never Marcuse’s issue with “Cadillac owning Negros.”
It might be most generative to turn our attention to the activity, or praxis, of articulating and
struggling for the fulfilment of these desires. Is the demand for the occasional perfume, for
example, rooted in a militancy that fuels and develops a broader sense of class consciousness and
collective power? Does it confirm, as Rosa Luxemburg hoped, “that class feeling, the class
instinct, is alive and very active”?62
Reexamining the archival records of the NWRO’s Sears campaign suggests the demand
for credit, rather than simply seeking perfume, was highly potent in fueling a broader sense of
class consciousness and class power.
“Since We Organized”, a song printed in NWRO’s songbook, underscores how
movement activists understood the campaign as central to developing collective identity and
class based power:
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General Strike chapter VI.
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We’re on welfare but we ain’t like we used to be
ain’t like we used to be
ain’t like we used to be
We’re on welfare but we ain’t like we used to be
Since we organized
Verses
We’ll get our rights
We’ll march and sing
We’ll go to jail
We’ll tear up Sears 63

The song highlights the transformations participants underwent in the process of organizing,
importantly not expressed in an individual but collective voice. “We’re on welfare but we ain’t
like we used to be” The activist/ recipients continue to depend on welfare but they have changed.
Since they organized they have a sense of their collective power, allowing them to “get our
rights” even if it means having to go to jail or “tear up Sears.” Importantly it is their organizing
(“since we organized”) that provides the central catalyst to the change participants undergo.
Other archival material related to the Sears campaign highlights the broader class-based
analysis in which this campaign was situated. An image appearing on the back cover of the
July/August 1969 edition of the NWRO’s newspaper encouraged readers to “BOYCOTT
SEARS.” The wood block print depicted a stylish, slender Black woman outfitted with an afro,
large hoops and a mod dress swinging a weapon, perhaps her purse, labeled “BOYCOTT” at a
large feudal lord figure looming above her carrying a “SEARS” banner, a large shield and an
elaborate helmet. (See Appendix Image 3)
Despite the Sears lord being nearly twice her size, the woman, still in swinging motion,
stands confidently and firmly, appears to be making a significant impact as he is depicted with
one foot in the air, as though he has lost his balance and is retreating backward. The image of
the young, powerful woman attacking a feudal lord implies that activists envisioned Sears as
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connected to outdated and unjust systems of production and distribution, that were notably
gendered and racialized. The chic activist pictured had figured out how to fight back, and was
confidently winning.
This particular image is not depicted in existing scholarship on the movement. Of course
there are numerous reasons why certain images are chosen over others (some having more to do
with editors than scholars themselves) but these types of images carry weight and transmit
powerful notions of who the movement imagined themselves and their adversaries to be, and
how we remember them. In contrast, the image featured in Kornbluh’s writing on the Sears
campaign presents a vastly different sense of the movement in general and what they understood
this particular campaign to represent. In the alternative image, which has been more frequently
reproduced in scholarship, a middle aged, heavy set woman in a matronly dress and flat, clunky
shoes (labeled NWRO) raises her fist at a squawking chicken who has been startled off its nest.
The nest is labeled “SEARS EGG NEST” and the egg it uncovers represents “credit for
recipients” (Kornbluh 1997:76) (See Appendix Image 4).
Consider the vastly different meaning contained in this image in contrast to the previous:
Here, an angry, harsh, outdated woman disrupts a natural process (a chicken sitting on its egg) to
take something that belongs to someone else (the bird). It seems justifiable that the chicken
would be perturbed and resistant! In the other image, a young, contemporary woman, whose
appearance corresponds with a visual vernacular of Black power, topples an ancient, unjust,
outmoded, violent, white male representative. These images both originated from the movement,
reflecting the existing conflicts over the validity and legitimacy of this campaign, but these
representations of it were created with very different notions of the project in mind. A movement
as complex and diverse as the NWRO undoubtedly possessed multiple different currents: it was
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comprised of young chic radicals and matronly mothers; activists who envisioned this as a
broader social transformation and recipients who simply wanted a larger check, as well as many
other types of individuals who are not represented in these two exaggerated cartoon characters.
But examining the scholarly record alongside the archives of the movement, it appears
time and time again that the more radical, the more systemic critiques, are excised from the
record in favor of respectable, rights-based analyses.
I have already noted, NWRO participants were responding to life as impoverished
welfare recipients at a particular historic conjuncture, in which the contradiction of being poor in
an exceptionally wealthy and abundant society was on the minds of many. But the scholarly
record is misleading in insisting that the movement is only the result or a response to a particular
facet of that historic conjuncture, as if the demands for nice things could only have justifiably
come about during the “thirty glorious years” of dramatic GDP growth—and in a way tied to
middle class values. In contrast, and without resorting to an ahistorical notion of human
“nature,” I argue that the desire for nice things, for ornamentation, for more than just bare
subsistence is part of a broader human project than a constrained post-war, consumer society,
and that too often this has been an overlooked part of a Leftist landscape. If anything, historic
context provides language, reference and framing from which the NWRO draws, but it is
essential that scholars reject interpretations that limit this to post-war American exceptionalism.
Given the importance of the Sears campaign as an organizing tool that successfully
politicized a number of recipients, it is no surprise that the Sears campaign was the brain child of
the Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization, one of the most radical collectives in the
organization, notorious in some of the movement literature for adamantly opposing the NWRO’s
acceptance of a federal work training grant in 1968 (West 1981:305).
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Scholars have asserted that ultimately the Sears campaign was “a great success, garnering
credit agreements with the Wanamaker, Lerner, Lit Brothers, and Lane Bryant stores by August
1968 (the Philadelphia WRO later gained limited credit access from other stores, including
Sears).” At some shops “applicants for credit showing evidence of WRO membership would not
even undergo credit checks, but would receive credit automatically… The credit benefit was a
major draw to new members, and the Philadelphia WRO saw its membership double after it
publicized its agreements with the stores” (Kornbluh 1997:84). But its success was also clearly
its impact as a mobilizing tactic rather than simply for the goods recipients were able to procure.
Organizer Tim Sampson called it “an ideal kind of connecting link campaign” (ibid).
In a final example of a broader, militant legacy of pleasure-seeking that attempts to build
“class feeling” and collective power, I suggest that this feature of the NWRO’s analysis more
closely parallels insights provided by Alexandria Kollontai than the politics of middle class
consumption.
In Winged Eros, Kollontai explores the place of romantic love in a revolutionary society.
She asks: Is romantic love, exclusively the purview of bourgeois society since it encourages us
towards a deeply private, individualized (or coupled) experience in which we retreat from the
world? Or additionally, as many militant feminists argued (Ferguson 1984), is romantic love too
tied up in the ideological weaponry of “family” and “love” to be of any generative use to
feminist aspirations? Kollontai asserts this need not be the case, and that romantic love can be an
important force mobilized in support of a broader revolutionary project, particularly as it
generates solidarity. “Solidarity is not only an awareness of common interests” Kollontai posits,
rather “it depends also on the intellectual and emotional ties linking the members of the
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collective. For a social system to be built on solidarity and co-operation it is essential that people
should be capable of love and warm emotions.”
Kollontai believed not only could romantic love be an important source of what
Luxemburg called “class feeling” but that only the revolutionary working class could give true
expression to romantic love once it abolishes the constraints capitalist life creates on love.
In a similar logic to Kollontai’s approach to romantic love, Ishay Landa argues that rather
than abandon consumption as hopelessly perverted by bourgeois society, it can be reclaimed
from the distortions and limitations it is subjected to under capitalism.
What capitalism is by definition refrained from doing is to endorse the point of view of the
consumer proper, of use-value understood as a goal rather than a means. It must always –
considered morally, culturally, philosophically, psychologically and aesthetically – take its stand
against, as Smith put it, ‘the passion for present enjoyment’, even as it exerts itself to capitalise on
it (Landa 2018:23).

In contrast to the Frankfurt school’s vilification of consumption as that which stands in
the way of revolutionary transformation, Landa suggests Marx believed a better, postcapitalist social arrangement might actually be compelled in pursuit of consumption.
Landa argues Marx “sets forth a radically different challenge, namely to defend the point
of view of the consumers, justify their ‘depravity’, rescue it not so much from capitalist
temptations but from capitalist defamation and instrumentality, and in doing so to point
beyond capitalism, exposed precisely as a system of (ethical) anti- consumption” (ibid
23).
For Landa, Marx’s vision of communism,
is therefore one in which so-called affluent society ceases to be a Fata Morgana and becomes for
the first time a reality. After ‘the abolition of the capitalist mode of production’, Marx maintains,
‘the part regularly consumed by the direct producers would not remain confined to its present
minimum level.’ Here we have a blueprint for a theory of consummunism, for a society in which
mass consumption is expanded, not cut down to size, as eagerly expected by both left-wing
pessimists and right-wing advocates of austerity (ibid 25-26).
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The fight over welfare, and more broadly the rights of the poor has always been as much
an ideological battle as a material one. In decades since the decline of the NWRO, one of the
primary struggles welfare activists and scholars have faced, is pushing back against pernicious
narratives of “Welfare Queens.” For these reasons it makes sense that scholars interested in the
Welfare Rights Movement would, recognizing the current political stakes of the debates,
emphasize the respectability of those engaged in welfare activism— their congruence with
middle class, post-war American values. But in doing so much of the richness of the movement
is occluded and trammeled, reduced to the version most palatable to the contemporary political
landscape. I argue that in effect, rather than seeking inclusion into repressive institutions, in fact,
much of NWRO’s activism centered around dismantling typical signifiers of respectability: They
fought unapologetically for unmarried women’s rights to have sexual lives free from the prying
eyes of the state, they fervently criticized waged labor as a solution to poverty, advocating
guaranteed income instead of unfulfilling low wage work. In addition, they demanded the right
to luxuries not based on their deservingness as mothers and workers but the fulfilment of a basic
human desires.
In reimagining the NWRO not as a product of an exceptional moment of postwar wealth
but as part of a longer legacy of radical aspirations for pleasure and luxury, we expand our
collective repertoires and radical imagination, recognizing that the demand for luxuries serves as
a particularly important manner of rejecting austerity and the continued impoverishment that is
too often constitutive of working class existence. Conceiving of it thus may provide a robust,
and indeed, rosier foundation as we attempt to restore our plundered sensuality.
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Chapter 6: Methodology
Throughout this dissertation I make the claim that participants in the NWRO articulated
critiques of work, not in order to improve it, but because they aspired to decenter waged work as
the primary means of survival and legitimacy for working class people. But claims making about
individual and collective beliefs and desires, especially regarding waged work is
methodologically and epistemically complex. In this section I combine insights by scholars
engaging with feminist methodology, critical approaches to archival research, and meta analyses
of data on workers’ attitudes in order to illuminate limitations of existing scholarship on the
welfare rights movement and to provide support for the alternate approaches I have taken. In
each subsection, I begin by tracing theoretical insights of a high level of abstraction and progress
towards more concrete examples pertaining to the NWRO. I conclude by arguing that the unique
perspectives academics hold towards their work may encumber our ability to take seriously
examples of antiwork politics when they do appear, but that current transformations to academia
– although troublesome in many ways— may result in generative advancements to scholarship
on work refusal.

Feminist Methods
Much of my methodological approach draws from insights from the broad category of
“Feminist Methodology” and attempts to expand those insights from women’s lives to a broader
range of subjected people and suppressed ideas. Marjorie DeVault argues there is no one
“Feminist Methodology” rather that term encompasses a wide range of research methods, with
the primary unifying feature identified by Devault, that “Feminists seek a methodology that will
do the work of "excavation,"... that is, to find what has been ignored, censored, and suppressed,

126

and to reveal both the diversity of actual women's lives and the ideological mechanisms that have
made so many of those lives invisible.” (Devault 1996:32) Devault continues, “What makes a
qualitative or a quantitative approach feminist is a commitment to finding women and their
concerns. The point is not only to know about women, but to provide a fuller and more accurate
account of society by including them (Nielsen 1990)” (ibid 33). The excavation I undertake in
this project aims not to reveal the presence of women in toto, rather, this project seeks to apply
the feminist methodological objective of “excavation” to find aspects of the welfare rights
movement that have been ignored and suppressed within existing scholarship, and the
“ideological mechanisms” that render these aspects of the historical record mostly invisible.
Feminist methodology is particularly appropriate for this project because it emphasizes
research into ideas or groups whose existence is “at a variance” with mainstream society and as a
result has been “muted.”64 Anderson et al (1987) state,
the expression of women’s unique experience as women is often muted, particularly in any
situation where women’s interests and experiences are at variance with those of men. A women’s
discussion of her life may combine separate, often conflicting perspectives: one framed in
concepts and values that reflect men’s dominant position in the culture, and one informed by the
immediate realities of a woman’s experience. Where experience does not “fit” dominant meaning,
alternative concepts may not readily be available (Anderson et al 1987:11).

Beliefs held by NWRO participants, particularly regarding wage work, certainly did not always
“’fit’ dominant meaning” and often came into sharp contrast with them. Indeed, as Andersen
and Jack predict, I believe that as result of a dearth of existing conceptual frameworks to guide

64

Other, not explicitly feminist, scholars like James Scott and Irving Goffman also underscore the sociological
importance of acknowledging that people’s beliefs and utterances are not always exactly straightforward and
transparent, rather there is often a performative and strategic element at play by which people present certain aspects
of themselves and not others. Goffman for example, contributes the notions of “front stage” behavior whereby
people are aware that others are watching them. This behavior is consciously or unconsciously constrained and
informed by societal norms and ideals. Many critics of Goffman have pointed out his inattention to the question of
power in his dramaturgical conception of society. Are all actors equally empowered? Do they all face the same
conditions “backstage”? James Scott (1985) applies many of Goffman’s insights, repositioning a dramaturgical
conception of society within the context of highly unequal distributions of power and finds that actors particularly as
they are engaged in resistance, are deeply attuned to their vulnerabilities and often conceal what they really think or
feel about things until they are “backstage.”
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and shape their analyses, participants in NWRO sometimes articulated their vision for “a world
without workers” in contradictory or evasive ways. A large task of this project has been
attempting to reveal beliefs held by welfare activists which were at times strategically muted, or
inadvertently ignored by the historical record without over-amplifying or projecting certain ideas
on to participants.
Numerous scholars studying oppressed or marginalized groups in different disciplines
have echoed the importance of reading between the lines to reveal ideas or lived realities that are
contrary to mainstream values that have been strategically concealed or obfuscated (Scott 1987;
Kelley 1994; Munoz 2009; Ranciere 2012). José Esteban Munoz’s notion of “queer
hermeneutics” offers a type of “utopian hermeneutic” that encourages scholars to read closely in
order “to see an already operative principle of hope that hums.” Munoz’s work focuses on
unveiling latent queer imagery in cultural articulations like poetry, but his insistence in looking
for “The not-quite-conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon, insisted upon,
if we are ever to look beyond the pragmatic sphere of the here and now, the hollow nature of the
present” (Munoz 2008:454) is helpful for thinking about how we can uncover other nonhegemonic realities.
To be sure, both expressions of queerness and work refusal challenge some of the most
hegemonic social ideals and therefore may at times require subterfuge, or as Anderson and Jack
argue, articulations “may combine separate, often conflicting perspectives” and therefore
additional effort on the part of the scholar to bring them to the surface. Feminist scholars of
various disciplines have offered us a number of key verbs with which to think through this
process: “unearthing” “intervening”, “mending.” For example, as Hemmings argues, "the radical
scholar’s task is at once archeological (unearthing the hidden to change our view of the earth)
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and interventionist— retelling stories to allow for present living, in a process feminist literary
historian Jane Marcus (1984) evocatively refers to as "invisible mending." It seeks truth but
revels in inevitable creative openness as both means and end of politicized historical endeavour"
(Hemmings 2018:22).
Anderson and Jack aver that in order “to hear women’s perspectives accurately, we have
to learn to listen in stereo, receiving both dominant and muted channels clearly and tuning into
them carefully to understand the relationship between them.” A compelling statement, but
Anderson and Jack provide little practical guidance for the researcher as to how exactly to tune
into these dominant and muted channels. In the following section I will examine the concrete
ways I have developed to apply feminist methodological insights for tuning into the muted,
overlooked, or non hegemonic beliefs of the NWRO.

Applying Feminist Methodological Insights to NWRO’s AntiWork Politics: tuning in to the
muted channel
I began my aspiration to “unearth” “intervene” and “mend” NWRO’s scholarly record by
acquiring65 a trove of materials on the movement’s analysis of waged work. Once I had enough
to begin noticing themes I separated many of these into categories (these included: work’s failure
to resolve poverty; critiques of work ethic/ ideology; critiques of workfare programs; racial
framing; and more, with the recognition that often many of these categories were not mutually
exclusive.)
As the project expanded and I realized that the lacuna within existing scholarship on the
movement’s critique of waged work reverberated into analysis of other aspects of the movement,
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I will discuss the archival aspect of this “acquisition” later in this chapter
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I also began paying particular attention to and developing a similar collection of materials related
to motherhood, childcare, sexuality, the Vietnam war, the campaign for Sears credit, and
metalevel analysis and commentary by NWRO participants on their perceptions of the
movement’s impact and its tactics and strategies. I purposely highlighted what appeared to me to
be distinctly radical currents or articulations within the movement, and examined how these had
been interpreted by scholars, in hopes of discovering a pattern to those interpretations. Although
I examined and engage with much secondary scholarship on the movement I especially focused
on the work of Felicia Kornbluh and Premilla Nadasen whose books are the most cited
references on the movement and play an enormous role in shaping its legacy (Nadasen’s Welfare
Warriors has 248 citations while Kornbluh’s has 202, many multiples that of other scholars
writing on NWRO aside from Piven and Cloward’s Poor People’s Movements).
In this process I uncovered two main patterns in existing scholarship: one of silencing or
ignoring certain radical elements of the movement (for example, a number of the key documents
I encountered in the archives that contained the most explicit and radical analyses of waged
work, have to date receive absolutely no mention in existing scholarship). Secondly, I also
unveiled a pattern in existing scholarship of acknowledging a radical aspect of the movement
while reinscribing it within a hegemonic logic. For example, much of Chapter Four on the
NWRO’s feminism emphasizes the way scholars have made sense of the NWRO’s analysis of
waged work by insisting on motherhood as recipient’s ultimate goal and objective. In some
instances, scholars engaged in both patterns—ignoring and reinscribing within hegemonic
logic— at a time. One particularly resonant example of this pattern is Felicia Kornbluh’s
analysis of why welfare recipients did not want to be forced to enter the labor market, Kornbluh
argues it was because recipients wanted to be able to “spend most of their time raising their
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children.” As support, Kornbluh relies on a much-cited interaction between recipient activist
Sanders and Congresswoman Griffiths at a Hearing on Income Maintenance, in which Sanders
asserts:
One of the things we are concerned about is being forced into these nonexisting positions
which might be going out and cleaning Mrs. A’s kitchen. I am not going to do that because I
feel I am more valuable and I can do something else. This is one of those things these people
are worrying about, that they are going to be pushed into doing housework when they can be
much more valuable doing something else… what they have that is going for them is the nittygritty stuff and that is out into the community, mixing with the people, finding out what their
problems are, and trying to help solve those problems. (Hearings on Income Maintenance
1968:78–79)

However, Kornbluh modifies this quote to remove what I believe to be the particularly relevant
and insightful final sentence: “they can be much more valuable doing something else… what
they have that is going for them is the nitty-gritty stuff and that is out into the community,
mixing with the people, finding out what their problems are, and trying to help solve those
problems.” By ignoring the end of Sanders sentence, Kornbluh concludes that Sanders is
articulating a fear “that welfare mothers who wanted to spend most of their time raising their
children would be forced to do something else for a living” (Kornbluh 2007:99). Kornbluh thus
imbues the earlier portion of Sanders’ comment with a meaning that more closely accords with
hegemonic notions of what the main options for women’s lives and priorities should be—work
or motherhood. This example is emblematic of the erasure that welfare recipients’ distinctive
interventions have faced, which I have highlighted throughout the chapters Three, Four and Five.
An additional way I attempt to tune into muted currents of NWRO analysis is by
juxtaposing the articulations of movement participants with those of established radicals to
attempt to demonstrate the congruity between the two seemingly different analyses. I hope that
by placing these two articulations side by side we are able to more clearly see aspects of their
radical imaginary that are perhaps strategically understated. This method forms the bulk of my
approach in the Bread and Rose Perfume chapter in which I hope that by examining, for
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example, the critiques of work forged by NWRO participants alongside Marxian perspectives on
alienation, surplus population and the working class’s inherent unfreedom, we can begin to see
the fundamentally radical insights of the movement that have been eclipsed in much
contemporary scholarship.

The Importance of Time & Place
In addition to their tendency to either ignore or reframe particularly radical aspects of the
NWRO’s analysis, one of the major patterns I noticed in existing scholarship, is the failure to
take into consideration that statements have different relevance depending on the time and place
in which they occur. The notion of “code switching” gained popularity in the social sciences in
the late 20th century as a way of recognizing that people both shape and respond to
conversational contexts by altering their choice of words and tone. People perform speech acts
differently depending on the context because it is strategic to do so, and they face penalties when
they fail to conform to expectations and social norms. Consider for example this description of
code switching as a form of conflict management: “the discourse effects depend on the
interlocutors’ inference of anger or seriousness, humour, deference, distance, solidarity and so
on. These inferences can be made solely on the basis of participants’ knowledge of the social
context: they need to know how they stand with respect to one another in the activity in progress,
and where that set of relations fits within the wider community” (Heller 78). Likewise, I argue,
social movements must collectively “code switch,” presenting different aspects of themselves—
at times angry and threatening, at other times conciliatory and compromising— depending on
whether they are preforming direct actions, discussing strategy in internal documents, producing
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grant applications, or speeches for government hearings. These are just a few examples of
different situations in which different strategic approaches and framings are required.
In addition to shifting due to the immediate context, as I argued in Chapter Three, the
sentiments and statements of movement participants shift and develop over time, particularly as
the movement acquires more power, and then again later when facing massive retrenchment and
backlash.66
Most existing scholarship of the movement overlooks this. As a result, scholars accept
and take for granted statements intended for formal or propagandistic use without any metalevel
awareness of the performativity involved in social movements, or the strategy that may be
behind a certain framing and articulation for a certain audience.67 Without this
acknowledgement, existing scholarship draws broad conclusions from limited evidence. For
example, scholarly literature on the NWRO insists that an explicitly gendered set of values
shaped the analyses and demands of the NWRO, preferring waged work for men and
homemaking for women (Chappell 2010:58; Nadasen 2005:143; and perhaps most
confoundingly Cooper, 2017 who argues that “despite their methodological radicalism, what
Cloward and Piven meant by a basic guaranteed income was in fact a male breadwinner’s wage.”
(41) Cooper extends this claim to the entirety of NWRO, arguing there was “considerable
political affinity between Moynihan and the founding members of the [NWRO]. However loudly
these leftists disavowed the details of the Moynihan report, there was very little of substance to

66

I examine the relevance of this temporal development to the interpretation of evidence later in the chapter.
Whitaker 1970 is an important and lone exception to this. Whitaker provides thoughtful analysis of seemingly
contradictory statements from various participants, especially staff, on the goals of the movement offering “while
the public goals of the organization have been made intentionally ambiguous, its promoters might possess a set of
clearly defined but secret objectives. The degree of openness with which “real” goals are discussed would be
determined by the audience to the discussion” (191). However, Whitaker ultimately rejects this explanation arguing
that NWRO’s goals may seem contradictory because they are, as most nascent social movements are (his study
concludes during the movement’s infancy in 1969).
67
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distinguish their positions” (42). It’s a claim that is difficult to comprehend given the wealth of
contradicting evidence I examine in Chapter Four. In the culmination of NWRO’s analysis it is
clear the organization takes a stance that’s far from revering the male breadwinner model wage,
and points out the shortcomings of work in resolving the problems of poverty, regardless of
gender. Felicia Kornbluh is one exception to this trend, she argues accurately I believe, that
“NWRO members argued that the way to deal with women’s poverty was to let them decide
whether they preferred to receive their income directly from the government, from a private
employer, or from a combination of the two. The way to address men’s poverty was to let them,
too, make choices between government grants and wages” (Kornbluh 2007:152).
Nadasen’s Welfare Warriors argues that there was significant divergence between staff
and recipients on a number of crucial questions throughout the movement, and identifies the
issue of waged work as a major and early fissure between staff and recipients with staff
preferring women to work, while women prioritized staying home. According to Nadasen, by
accepting WIN funding, the organization “implicitly assum[ed] that women on welfare should
work” (2005:138). As evidence Nadasen offers the fact that in 1967 the NWRO accepted a grant
from the WIN program,
The staff signed the Department of Labor contract because they differed with the women in the
organization about work… NWRO’s DOL grant proposal stated that WIN ‘can provide new
opportunities for training of welfare recipients for meaningful jobs which could lift them out of
poverty.’ Most of the NWRO staff concurred with the popular belief that employment was the
best solution for poverty (2005: 138).68

Considering the extensive literature and commentary produced by the organization on the
question of employment for welfare recipients (and even employment more generally) it seems
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The passage I have omitted with ellipses states “Staff members opposed WIN and other work-related programs,
arguing that recipients wanted to work but that jobs and training were in short supply.… Staff members did not
oppose the 1967 law because it required mothers to work, but opposed its punitive nature.” this seems to contradict
her claim a sentence later.
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insufficient to rely on one sentence from a grant written at the beginning of the organization’s
tenure to serve as conclusive evidence of the staff’s position regarding waged labor. Rather than
assume that staffers wholeheartedly believed in “training of welfare recipients for meaningful
jobs which could lift them out of poverty,” Guida West argued the use of WIN grants was
strategic and did not imply an approval of work programs, rather,
the NWRO needed the monies to build its national organization. NWRO envisioned opening more
field offices, subsidizing staff and salaries, and paying for telephone communications across the
nation. Relatively speaking, the contract would bring in a substantial amount of money with very
few strings attached. The only requirement was that they mention WIN (West 1981:305).

West’s analysis is more consistent with the extensive literature examined in Chapter Three, much
of which was undoubtedly produced by the staff, arguing vociferously that the myth of waged
work as the means to a decent life was empirically false.
When faced with competing statements advocating “new opportunities for training of
welfare recipients for meaningful jobs which could lift them out of poverty” from a
governmental grant, or the NWRO song to which I return frequently, that encourages the listener
to journey to a land with “no workers”, “only joy”, it is essential for scholars to ask ourselves
before drawing broad conclusions: what might people be able to express differently about their
desires in (for example) a song, that they can’t express in a grant application to a governmental
program?
I draw here on another example from Kornbluh in which she argues that ending ‘man in
the house rules’ were motivated largely by a desire to be allowed to marry (and develop the
kinds of relationships with men that would lead to marriage). Kornbluh advises against the
temptation of seeing, “this case as an affirmation of women’s individual rights to sexual freedom
outside marriage” insisting that, “for many welfare recipients it also represented an opportunity
to marry” (1998:73). Of course, mobilization against this invasive and humiliating practice was
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informed by a number of motivations, including partially, no doubt, the desire for some to marry.
What remains suspicious however is the maintenance by scholars of a fidelity to hegemonic
norms and a silencing or undermining of evidence of alternative, oppositional desires and
demands within the movement. As I examined in Chapter Four, there is certainly copious
available evidence to confirm that mobilization against man in the house laws was indeed “an
affirmation of women’s individual rights to sexual freedom outside marriage.” Why then do
scholars so often urge that we distancing ourselves from that type of conclusion?
This specific claim, asserted by Kornbluh draws on remarkably little evidence: a sole
citation leads to an article in the Washington Post which states, “Several welfare recipients said
the end of the [man-in-the-house] rule would aid welfare mothers’ chances of getting married
and leaving the relief rolls” (Honsa 1968). An anonymous generalization may be sufficient
evidence for journalists, it seems a meager foundation for a scholarly claim of the sort Kornbluh
is making. In addition to the fact that Honsa relies on no actual voices from the movement
articulating this, Kornbluh’s repetition of it, and incorporation of this one brief journalistic
impression as the sort of standard word on what the movement’s objectives were vis a vis
women’s sexual autonomy, fails significantly to take into account the fact that political actors
deploy frameworks strategically, and that all statements are not a direct reflection of people’s
genuine hopes, desires and motives. In other words, while it is often strategic to resort to a logic
that resonates with respectability politics when describing the benefits of a major policy shift to
the journalist of a major newspaper, this does not mean it is the final way participants understood
or perceived it.
There is a fine line between acknowledging the different factors that mediate statements
and putting words in the mouths of people or ascribing a patronizing “false consciousness” to
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them. Numerous scholars, especially feminist scholars, have concerned themselves with the
question “How can we represent the views, lives, and agency of women without “colonizing”
them with our own agenda?” (Wolf 1993). One way that feminist (and other) scholars have
attempted to take into account the way power and authority shape research is by problematizing
the archive and interview as sites which perpetuate imbalances of power as they reveal them,
hoping perhaps that by remaining aware of power as it operates within these sites, they may
correct for it.
The Problem with Oral History
The temptation to undertake an oral history of the welfare rights movement is great, and
not just in order to justify the extensive time already spent securing IRB approval. Any scholar,
although perhaps particularly a white one, who studies a social movement comprised primarily
of poor Black women, without asking for their input directly faces the risk of being charged with
silencing, romanticizing, or putting words in the mouth of participants.
Oral histories have been valued by scholars as important complements to the
incompleteness of the archive. In particular, scholars have noted how oral histories can help not
only flesh out, but contradict and challenge official records presented in the archives. Relying on
oral histories, and personal accounts instead of just colonial archives, Burleigh Hendrickson for
example, argues it is possible to achieve a greater sense of the events of 1968. “By using oral
histories as interactive memoirs, we open new possibilities for creating and re-creating historical
memories of events like 1968 that are otherwise foreclosed and limited in national archives and
metanarratives” (Hendrickson 2017: 322).
To be sure, listening to welfare activists tell stories would have made for a more
enjoyable research process than digging through dusty papers in archives with temperatures so
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low my breath was nearly visible. But a number of realizations in my preliminary research led
me to believe it was fruitful to focus on analyzing existing material rather than generating and
recording new stories. One particularly notable distinction was a sense I had from reading
secondary material that narratives written about the movement in the 1970s and 80s painted a
fairly different portrait of the movement than the accounts that proliferated in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. Additionally, preliminary conversations with Piven, an active participant in the
movement herself, revealed that she had a significantly different analysis of aspects of the
movement than the perspective I was developing from the archives. One notable example is
Piven’s recollection that anti-Vietnam politics were not particularly relevant to activists within
the NWRO, while texts contained in the archives seem to indicate this was a central component
of how NWRO made sense of their demands vis a vis other government spending.
Scholars Joshua Bloom and Waldo E Martin Jr. had a similar experience while
undertaking their impressive study of the Black Panther’s politics. They initially planned on
focusing primarily on oral histories and interviews with participants in the movement, but after
preliminary interviews decided instead to center archival records in their analysis. They recall,
When we began the project in the late 1990s, we conducted formal interviews with Bobby
Seale and a range of others, expecting that these conversations would be the main source of
data for the project. But the more interviews we conducted, the clearer the limits of that
medium became. Retrospective accounts decades after the fact—with memories shaped by
intervening events, interests, and hearsay—are highly contradictory… we avoided using
retrospective interviews as a principal source of evidence, preferring to consult documentary or
recorded evidence that was temporarily proximate to the events. In the end, what made it
possible to uncover this history was a vast wealth of primary sources (2013:10).

Contrary to Hendrickson ‘s argument that oral histories augment archival records, numerous
scholars, particularly experts on the 1960s have noticed a trend to a kind of domestication,
“social amnesia”, “defanging” or liberal whitewashing that movements of the 1960s have
undergone in recent decades, even (or perhaps especially) when recounted by those present. The
Welfare Rights Movement is far from the only movement, especially from the 1960s, to have
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“intervening events and interests” impact its account in later years. Kristin Ross has written
extensively about the sanitization of the legacy of France’s tumultuous 1968 in which its antiimperialist, and indeed antiwork tradition has been occluded in favor of interpretations
emphasizing cultural transformations. Ross argues that this type of tautological scholarship
overly informed by the present that demonstrates “a set of determinations that confirm in the
final accounting that things could not have happened any other way, that things could not have
been any different” (Ross 2002:23).
This phenomena is by no means novel or unique to oral histories or scholarship on the
long 1960s, EP Thompson for example, expressed frustration at scholars from different
generations who read history “in the light of subsequent preoccupations, and not in fact as it
occurred” (Thompson 2001:6). The tendency for this to occur in the narrative accounts of
subversive political projects of the 1960s as described by Ross and Bloom and Martin Jr.,
dissuaded me from prioritizing oral histories. Instead I centered on the archives for my data
collection.

The Archives
One benefit of undertaking a dissertation on the welfare rights movement is that there is,
unlike many other movements, a finite amount of secondary literature. After familiarizing myself
with that literature, I began visiting archives where the documents related to the movement are
housed. I began with the Guida West papers at Sofia Smith Collection at Smith College. Guida
West was a participant/ scholar in the movement who wrote one of the first manuscript length
analyses of the movement. Her 1981 book The National Welfare Rights Movement: the social
protest of poor women, and her collection of movement ephemera—newspapers, pamphlets,
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training documents, as well as audio recordings of conferences and interviews with
participants— have been invaluable to this project.
Somewhat unsure of what exactly I was looking for, this was an exploratory trip. It
became a particularly fortuitous exploration. On my very first morning in the archive, I selected
folders to view somewhat at random, hoping to find something that might speak to the
movement’s position on waged work more fully than the sentence fragments with which scholars
explained (or it seemed to me, dismissed) the profundity of this unique perspective. The first
folder I opened contained a number of beautifully printed materials on thick card stock. One was
a booklet of songs, the other was a pamphlet of myths about welfare which participants sought to
challenge, emphasizing heavily their perspective on work and the work ethic, neither of which I
had ever seen mentioned in existing scholarship.
Howard University Archives
The papers of the national office of the NWRO are housed at the Moorland-Spingarn
Research Center at Howard University. This collection is comprised of a daunting nearly 1000
boxes of materials which, unlike the other two archives I visited, have been subjected to much
less organization and sorting (in fact, I’m not sure it has been subjected to any organizing). The
inventory of the collection alone is a cool 67 single spaced pages. Boxes are separated into little
recognizable order, there are no folder numbers or titles, the scholar is left to guess what material
they may contain based on extremely vague genre subheadings like “Women”, “Churches”,
“FAP”, “Reports” with little to no distinction of whether these are internal documents,
newspaper clippings on the subject, external organizations material’s or with any chronological
order. Most of the collection is housed offsite and scholars must pay ($64 for the first box and $7
for each additional box) to access the materials. Unlike the other archives where one could be
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fairly certain of what would be contained in a requested box, working in the Howard archives
often felt like a frustrating, expensive, gamble in which you never knew what awaited you in the
next box.
Compounding difficulties on to difficulties, unlike the other archives I visited, at
Moorland Spingarn, once you successfully manage to find a record you are interested in
analyzing (the thrill! The joy!), photographing is not permitted in the archives and photocopying
is expensive, time consuming and disorganized. I learned the extremely hard way that although
you are required to note the box, folder number and the title of the document on requests for
photocopies (visitors are not permitted to make their own copies or scans), the archive mails your
requested photocopies to you, weeks later, with no documentation of what file or box they were
located in. Many hundreds of dollars later I had some potentially useful materials and I feared,
no way to properly cite them.
I point this out not to deride this important archive, but as Fonow and Cook argue,
“Rather than ignoring the complexities of negotiating unpleasant interactions in the field,
feminist epistemology involves explicit attention to these experiences, analysis of their meaning,
and the incorporation of conclusions into further inquiry.” (Fonow and Cook 1991: 11). In this
instance the disparity between the resources and organizational capacity at two archives: Smith
College and Howard University, could not have been more stark, revealing just one more aspect
of the challenges scholars face in pursuing research on Black and working class subjects. There
is certainly an abundance of rich material awaiting analysis in the NWRO papers at Howard
University, but doing it justice would require the output of time and financial resources on a
significantly different scale than I possessed.
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I also visited George Wiley’s papers in Madison Wisconsin which were extremely well
organized, easy to access and the staff helpful when I realized later that I needed a scan of a
document. By the third archive, much of the material which interested me was beginning to be
repetitive, although most days I managed to discover something small and noteworthy. On my
final day in Madison I was particularly thrilled to finally encounter a copy of a study of
recipients’ attitudes towards work which I had been reading about throughout the secondary
literature for some time. It clarifies (and raises) a significant number of methodological questions
and is worth examining in depth here.
Problems with Studies on Worker’s Attitudes
The NWRO’s influence peaked in the early 1970s, coinciding with a period of extensive
concern over working class alienation or “blues”, and prompting a number of inquiries into
working class perspectives on work. But many scholars bemoaned the difficulty of assessing
these beliefs accurately. Researchers writing in Work in America, a Special Task Force to the
secretary of Health Education and Welfare, noted in 1973 that it was “almost as difficult to
measure these feelings of discontent about work as it is to measure such other basic feelings as
pride, love or hate. Most of the leading experts on work in America have expressed
disappointment over the unsophisticated techniques commonly used to measure work
dissatisfaction” (Zimpel 1974:52). A particularly glaring example of this difficulty was noted in
an interview conducted by the sociologist George Strauss in which the interviewee asserted “I
got a pretty good job.” “What makes it such a good job?” Strauss asked, to which the worker
responded, “Don’t get me wrong. I didn’t say it is a good job. It’s an O.K. job—about as good a
job as a guy like me might expect. The foreman leaves me alone and it pays well. But I would
never call it a good job. It doesn’t amount to much but it’s not bad” (Zimpel 1974:53). In this
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brief response the interviewee reveals a number of contradictory perspectives on work, as well as
a clear sense of the way expectations inform and constrain what workers conceive of as possible.
Scholars from later generations noted similar difficulties with data on workers’ beliefs
and attitudes. Rick Fantasia’s Cultures of Solidarity presents a particularly helpful intervention
into studies of workers’ ideologies in recent decades. In particular Fantasia argues for the
insufficiency of surveys of workers’ attitudes in capturing their true beliefs. He argues,
Survey research methodology entails some highly questionable assumptions when used in
analyses of class consciousness. The measuring of attitudes demands that an individual
response be recorded as his or her fixed views about an issue. Although peoples’ responses and
expressions must indeed be taken seriously by social science, part of doing so means
recognizing that the world may be a paradoxical and contradictory place to those negotiating
it… The sociological survey, in contrast, largely precludes one from discovering contradictory
lines of thought, as well as from exploring the methods by which individuals synthesize
contradictions (Fantasia 1988:5).

Despite the numerous established problems with drawing conclusions from survey data
on workers’ attitudes towards work, one survey has played an outsized role in representing
welfare recipients’ opinions on work throughout much scholarship on the movement. In 1966
The Center for Social Research at City College of New York conducted a survey of 2179
families receiving AFDC in New York City. The study asked a number of questions related to
families, housing, material possessions and more, but the report is most frequently cited as
conclusive evidence of welfare recipients’ preferences for waged work. A concluding report
summarized that “Seven out of 10 mothers said they would prefer to work rather than stay at
home” (Cox 1968) and has frequently been cited in both literature produced by the movement
while it was active, and in secondary scholarship (See for example Merrillee A. Dolan’s
statement in Nadasen et al 2009, original text 1972). In addition to the high percentage of
respondents who voiced a preference for waged work over welfare, the report highlighted a
strong sense of shame and negativity towards themselves and others who received benefits. Irene
Cox, author of the report summary concluded,
143

More than half of the mothers said they “felt bothered” about being on welfare and agreed with
the statements on the questionnaire that “getting money from welfare makes a person feel
ashamed” and “people should be grateful for the money they get from welfare.” The majority
of respondents believe that many undeserving people were assisted by welfare and that the
Department has the right to question the spending of money received (Cox 1968).

However, rather than simply accept these conclusions as reliable reflections of welfare
recipient’s “fixed” beliefs, as Fantasia would have pointed out, I argue that examining
scholarship on social science methods, particularly survey design, encourages us to question and
problematize these conclusions.
In the Practice of Social Research Earl Babbie argues one of the most important aspects
of survey design is to avoid the use of “biased items and terms” because “the meaning of
someone’s response to a question depends in large part on the wording of the question that was
asked. That is true of every question and answer. Some questions seem to encourage particular
responses more than other questions” (145). Babbie emphasizes the particularly high variation in
answers received to survey questions based on phrasing, by providing examples related to social
programs. Babbie avers that describing “assistance to the poor” garners more support in
questionnaires than “welfare” likewise “improving the conditions of blacks” received more
favorable answers than “assistance to blacks” (146).
Babbie attributes some of the wide discrepancy in survey answers based on “biased
terms” to what researchers identify as “the social desirability of questions and answers.” He
argues, “Whenever you ask people for information, they answer through a filter of what will
make them look good.” Babbie cautions researchers to “imagine how you would feel giving each
of the answers you offered to respondents. If you’d feel embarrassed, perverted, inhumane,
stupid, irresponsible, or anything like that, you should give some serious thought to whether
others will be willing to give those answers” (146). It seems reasonable to conclude that the
deeply entrenched, socialized notions of deservingness and legitimacy tied to work and welfare,
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renders surveys on these topics especially susceptible to answer variation. Babbie convincingly
argues that this is generally true about survey data related to social programs, but especially in
the case of the 1966 CCNY survey when questions are phrased with especially loaded terms such
as “shame,” “undeserving,” “grateful” with little room for respondents to articulate nuanced
perspectives.
In addition to the general difficulty in ascertaining answers to questions which are deeply
loaded with social desirability, scholars have concluded that the ordering of questions is likely to
impact the answers later questions produce. Babbie asserts, "The appearance of one question can
affect the answers given to later ones" (151). Although I was unable to procure the original
survey and don’t know in which order questions appeared, the questions that appear in the
published report are deeply leading about shame, gratitude and deservingness of welfare
recipients. For example, table 3 provides responses to questions of “preference for working or
homemaking” after Table 2 noted answers to the leading question of how many “agreed that
people on welfare feel ashamed.” In other words, extrapolating from Babbie’s insights, it comes
as little surprise that respondents would respond favorably to work given its social desirability in
the survey’s sequence of extremely biased and leading questions.
Additionally, as emphasized in Chapter 3, welfare recipients’ feelings changed
precipitously throughout the course of the movement. One of the most potent impacts the
movement had, which recipients voiced time and time again (and which numerous scholars
including Nadasen 2008, and Orleck 2006 also noted) was the sense of pride and defiance they
developed through their involvement and activism. The diminution of shame, and its
replacement with courage and a sense of deservingness was articulated individually as well as
collectively, as the movement developed. Jackie Pope, in just one of many examples of this
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phenomena, argued that recipient’s “self confidence increased as they became astute political
activists” (1990:66). One recipient noted “we were used to begging; we never demanded
anything—welfare rights enabled us to walk into a welfare center unafraid, dignified and secure
in the knowledge that our needs would be met” (1990:66). If there is one resounding uniformity
in accounts of the NWRO, it is the assertion that the movement itself shifted the way participants
perceived their situations, encouraging them to be “unafraid, dignified” and confident in their
right to welfare benefits. In addition to the other methodological problems raised by relying on
this survey for any conclusive evidence, is the fact that it was conducted during the first year of
the NWRO’s existence—before this emboldening effect could fully take place. Participants in
the movement have clearly articulated the effect their participation had on changing their
perceptions, especially regarding notions of shame and deservingness of welfare recipients. It is
likely that even if the same, equally biased, survey been conducted in 1969 or 1971 very
different responses would have been recorded.
Despite the myriad reasons we may question this survey’s accuracy in representing
recipients’ beliefs and desires, it is also important to not completely reject the insights it may
indeed provide. While remaining skeptical, rather than simply dismissing the data, we might shift
our attention to understanding what curtails working-class people’s sense of possibility, and
similarly, ask what expands it? Robert Kahn, a psychologist whose work focused on survey
methods, has noted workers’ attitudes are often constrained by the range of (undesirable) options
they perceive to be available to them:
For most workers it is a choice between no work connection (usually with severe attendant
economic penalties and a conspicuous lack of meaningful alternative activities) and a work
connection which is burdened with negative qualities (routine, compulsory scheduling,
dependency, etc.) In these circumstances, the individual has no difficulty with the choice; he
chooses work, pronounces himself modestly satisfied, and tells us more only if the questions
become more searching (Quoted in Zimpel 1974:53).
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Kahn’s insight is particularly helpful for thinking through why and how the NWRO’s critiques of
work arise in the ways they do. As Kahn notes, most working-class people usually have little
choice between the severe economic (and social) penalties of work refusal and the
unpleasantness of waged work. Thanks to a relatively generous moment of benefit expansion,
and the strength of a massive social movement, welfare recipients and participants in the NWRO,
were uniquely situated to actually possess a choice, and often made their choice to eschew waged
work to the extent possible. Additionally, as I argued in Chapter Four, recipients also possessed
an abundance of meaningful alternative activities to wage work. Members of the NWRO were
(at least temporarily) unconstrained by the two most severe structural limitations that curtail the
articulation of resentments around work: the possibility of an exit from the labor market, and an
alternative activity in which to find meaning and legitimacy. Welfare recipients in the late 1960s
and early 1970s possessed both in abundance. Additionally, they drew from the energy of a
militant upsurge at their back, helping to foster and encourage their increasingly radical beliefs.

What Scholars Think About Work and Resistance Impacts Their Ability to Study It
In this chapter I have examined some of the methodological or epistemic problems of
existing scholarship on the welfare rights movement, and traced the ways I have attempted to
account and correct for some of these shortcomings. I’d like to offer one final point on this topic
which synthesizes insights from feminist methodology’s emphasis on “excavation”, social
movement scholarship and additional relevant perspectives on surveys. In Poor People’s
Movements, Piven and Cloward argue that the discrepancy between what scholars believe
articulations of discontent should look like and the form they actually take, results in the
dismissal or overlooking of many important aspects of working class resistance. James Scott
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draws explicitly upon Piven and Cloward’s analysis and insists that “these practices, which
rarely if ever called into question the system… as such, nevertheless achieved far more in their
unannounced, limited and truculent way than a few heroic and brief armed uprisings about which
so much has been written” (1984: 34). Like Piven and Cloward, and Scott, Rick Fantasia (1988)
argues that scholars’ a priori beliefs about what worker consciousness or resistance should look
like may often hinder their ability to perceive and analyze the forms it actually takes. These
expectations may be one of the reasons scholars have failed to take seriously resistance to work,
and as a result, this important perspective has been too often neglected in the “repertoires of
contention” examined by social movements scholars (Tilly 1993). If scholars only consider
antiwork politics as occurring in moments when the Situationists slogan “ne travaillez jamais” is
scrawled across all surfaces (and even then, it’s often ignored), our understanding of people’s
perspectives on work, and the transformations to which they aspire, will remain deeply curtailed.
In addition to the general scholarly tendency to ignore working class politics that may not
match with scholar’s expectations, I argue this blindness is particularly exacerbated in the case of
antiwork politics because of academics’ unique relationship to work.
Frustrated with the reliability of studies on worker’s attitudes, the authors of the Work in
America report proposed that one of the more accurate ways of measuring job satisfaction (a
fraught and loaded notion examined above) was to ask workers the question, “what would you
do if you had a 26-hour day?” The results of one survey using this question found a massive gulf
between academics’ responses and those of other workers: two out of three college professors
and one out of four lawyers said they would “use the extra time in a work-related activity.” In
stark contrast, “only one out of twenty non-professional workers would make use of the extra
time in work activity” (Zimpel 1974:54). Scholars have often acknowledged the relative
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privilege of academic labor, Stanley Aronowitz not so long ago referred to his as “what may be
the last good job in America” (Aronowitz 2001:32) and the Work in America study underscores
that the exceptionality of academic’s relationship to work. Sociologists drawing from the work of
Patricia Hill Collins and Sandra Harding have long concurred that one’s positionality or
“standpoint” effects one’s understanding of the world (Harding 2004, Hill Collins 2008, Takacs
2002). The academic’s unique relationship to labor provides a standpoint that may impact the
academic’s ability to accurately perceive discordant feelings and articulations about waged work.
Psychologists have called this the “false consensus effect” and found “strong egocentric bias that
occurs when people estimate consensus for their own behaviors” (Mullen et al 1985).
Recognition of a “false consensus effect” may help explain why there is so little academic
interest in the subject of work refusal, especially its praxis. Indeed, many of the non academic
people with whom I have discussed this project light up in recognition at the description of a
social movement that sought a world without workers, while most professors with whom I have
broached the study have often responded curtly with a variation of, “antiwork politics don’t exist.
People love their jobs and find meaning in them.” One possible bright side of the rapid
adjunctification of academia, and the concomitant reduction in remuneration, autonomy and
respect many academics now receive for their work, might be an eroding fidelity to the academic
work ethic, prompting more recognition for resistance to work as a legitimate political objective
and site of study.
These insights combine to underscore why it is understandable that participants in the
welfare rights movement often understated and were even contradictory in their challenges to
waged work. Yes, it is challenging and extremely noteworthy for a mobilization to occur that
takes on the massive institution of waged labor that is so thoroughly embedded in almost all
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facets of our social, economic and political lives. Perhaps if scholars of social movements had
more expectation that even such hegemonic institutions like waged work are at times challenged,
and that doing so may entail contradictory or ambivalent articulations, the field would have
established better methods of recognizing and making sense of them. In their absence I have
forged a mixed methods approach.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Studying social movements is an academic endeavor that, at its best, seeks to contribute
to understandings of the world that may transform it for the better. EP Thompson insisted that
scholars needed to take seriously even (or perhaps especially) the “lost causes” of history
because they might contain clues that can aid problems of the present. Thompson derided
scholarship in which “only the successful (in the sense of those whose aspirations anticipated
subsequent evolutions) are remembered.” Thompson argued instead for the importance of
rescuing the often forgotten “blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers” of history…from the
enormous condescension of posterity” because after all, aspirations which have been dismissed
in the past, may become central to resolving contemporary issues. Thompson admonished, “we
are not at the end of social evolution ourselves. In some of the lost causes of the… Industrial
Revolution we may discover insights into social evils which we have yet to cure” (Thompson
2001:6).
Many of our most pressing current crises have at their center an ambivalence originating
in an unrelenting concern with job creation and employment. Addressing issues as varied as
environmental degradation, immigration, and corporate subsidies has proven particularly
difficult because of the way these issues are intertwined with job creation and job protection.
Deeply dubious and potentially environmentally catastrophic projects like the Keystone Pipeline
receive widespread support from labor unions who argue that for unemployed construction
workers “this project is not just a pipeline; it is in fact a life-line.”69 Fear that increased
immigration will cause job scarcity and drive down wages has prompted even nominal leftists to
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argue for closed borders and tightened immigration restrictions in the midst of massive
humanitarian migrant crises. While cities struggle to provide basic infrastructure to their
residents, local governments hand out billions of dollars in tax abatements and other incentives
to wealthy corporations in the name of “job creation.” The scale of the environmental crisis
alone, demands the temerity to seek answers that challenge existing notions of possible solutions,
particularly our fidelity to waged work.
The extraordinarily rich history of the welfare rights movement – and particularly its bold
courage in seeking to decouple income from waged labor – is a potent example of a “lost cause”
that is relevant to addressing the myriad issues facing society today. One of the NWRO’s major
demands – for guaranteed income—is experiencing renewed popularity unparalleled since the
NWRO’s era. Praised by Hilary Clinton, Mark Zuckerberg, Andy Stern and presidential
candidate Andrew Yang, seemingly every month a new book emerges touting UBI as the
putative solution to many social and economic problems of our day, and with good reason: fears
of automation and persistent poverty despite low unemployment have encouraged a new
generation of politicians, scholars, business and labor leaders to wonder if the aspiration to
decouple income from waged work bears revisiting.
With the resurgence of interest in guaranteed income, many of the same debates and
questions that NRWO faced, are reappearing. Is UBI a policy the radical left should pursue?
Does liberal and conservative interest in the policy obviate its radical potential? Would not a full
employment program more accurately address the needs and interests of the working class?
Would UBI simply result in massive numbers of people dropping out of the labor force to sit on
their couches watching TV all day, or would it facilitate much needed activities like care work
and political organizing? Would UBI reify existing and undesirable gendered divisions of labor?
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Does UBI hold any appeal to the working class, who are assumed to derive their sense of selfworth and meaning primarily through their relationship to employment, or is UBI just a thought
experiment favored by elites? Does fighting for UBI mean abdicating from improving waged
work?
Despite the striking parallels between the debates regarding guaranteed income in the
1960s and today, all too many contemporary scholars and others examining the subject behave as
though these questions have never been raised. In a particularly egregious obfuscation, voices of
the people who raised these same questions, who provided trenchant and insightful answers
regarding their preference for income decoupled from work and what they imagined that income
to be in service of, have been almost completely silenced in today’s debates, whether popular or
scholarly.
In addition to the insights it offers into questions surrounding guaranteed income,
reexamining the legacy of the welfare rights movement provides lessons from which today’s
movements can benefit. One of the major practical lessons from the welfare rights movement,
that I hoped I have illuminated, is that what is often dismissed as frivolous or contrary to serious
politics may very well inspire militant class consciousness. In particular, the NWRO offers an
example of the generative nature of much-derided “identity politics” and the pursuit of
consumption. The history of the NWRO underscores that “identity politics,” alliances built
around social categories such as race and gender, need not be apart from or in conflict with class
politics – they are class politics. The sophisticated analyses forged by welfare recipients were
deeply rooted in their positions as (in their words), “fat” “black, poor, women and mothers
(Tillmon 1972). These aspects of their identities and experiences as such provided the foundation
for their rigorous critiques of how capitalism exploited their position in and outside of the labor
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market. In stark contrast to today’s corporate feminism, participants in the movement did not
simply seek recognition, acceptance or inclusion into positions of power; they relied upon their
situated knowledge to theorize and put into action challenges to society’s most hegemonic and
oppressive institutions. Participants in the welfare rights movement provide evidence of and a
model for the essential place of identity politics in liberatory projects.
Moreover, participants in the welfare rights movement provide a model for reexamining
the politics of consumption, pleasure, and even luxury, as potentially fruitful avenues for
building class consciousness, challenging austerity and the continued impoverishment of the
working class. More research is sorely needed into this long-overlooked aspect of political
movements. To be sure, as the recent emergence of the Yellow Vest Movement in France
confirms, policies that attempt to address environmental concerns (i.e., tax on petrol) that
disproportionately burden the already struggling working class, are not solutions capable of
building a broad base of support for major social and ecological transformations. The NWRO’s
insistence that food is not all of life, and that even poor people deserve little luxuries at times
may be a more fruitful foundation for change. Rather than simply a race to the bottom, the
environmental crisis precipitates the opportunity to truly reapportion access to resources.
Additionally, while factionalism has long haunted political projects, contributing to
splintering and infighting, the NWRO presents an example of a large and powerful mobilization
that managed to unite a racially, geographically, and religiously diverse population in a common
project. As Jackie Pope stated, “regardless of the intensity of their internal conflicts, the
Brooklyn women remained publicly united, acting as one on nearly every issue” (Pope 1990:
69). We must learn from their discipline and the clarity of their transformative vision.
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The welfare rights movement provides us with a powerful heuristic for thinking and
working beyond existing institutional frameworks, which is desperately needed today. In
addition to wage work, we may find there are other putatively indispensable institutions we
could do without. For example, recent developments have encouraged a proliferation in projects
questioning the necessity of borders and prisons. These issues are not only tangentially related,
but lie at the heart of enduring respectability politics that govern the barrier between the
“deserving” and “undeserving” poor. Fidelity to the work ethic and legality remain some of the
strictest lines upon which society delineates those who merit support or those who do not. In
challenging this problematic divide, political projects of prison abolition and work refusal
demand new forms of distribution, new ways of adjudicating problems, ensuring survival, and
configuring production. If these projects require the establishment of new societies to achieve
their goals, so be it.
Perhaps most importantly for inspiring contemporary efforts of major social change, the
history of the welfare rights movement reminds us that our beliefs about the world, although
shaped by our experiences and what we perceive the range of possible outcomes to be, are not
fixed. Rather, they are transmuted through the active process of struggle.
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Image Appendix
Image 1

“WIN: training for what?” Piven Papers, Box 53, Folder 11.
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Image 2

West Papers, Box 25, Folder 10
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Image 3

West Papers, Box 25, Folder 11.

158

Image 4

Kornbluh 1997:76.
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